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Abstract
This article explores the links between energy policy, tax policy and global warming. This article focuses on tax
policy, because the emerging consensus among legal scholars favors economic incentives rather than
command-and-control regulations for reaching environmental goals, and the Federal income tax has proved
an effective delivery system for economic incentives.
After briefly discussing of the science of global warming and the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, the article reviews the impact of both existing tax law and current proposals for energy legislation on
global warming, as well as potential international law consequences of failure to act to curtail global warming.
This analysis also includes a discussion of global warming as "tragedy of the commons" issue and reflects on
how psychological factors and economic beliefs may affect the public's level of concern about global warming.
Concluding that both present law and current proposals create incentives for continued and increasing use of
greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuels, the article outlines a three part strategy for curtailing global warming
through tax policy: (1) reducing or eliminating the present law subsidies for fossil fuel use while creating and
strengthening incentives for alternative energy generation; (2) imposing a carbon tax; and (3) creating
incentives for development of carbon sequestration projects in privately held forests in the United States. The
article studies the effectiveness of these proposals by comparing similar proposals in effect in other countries
and by considering the classic tax policy goals of equity and efficiency.
The tax system is an appropriate and effective way to encourage businesses to adopt an environmental ethic
and take action to reverse global warming. Strong economic, esthetic, and moral arguments support changing
our tax system to protect the environment from global warming.
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INTRODUCTION:  GLOBAL WARMING, ENERGY POLICY, TAX POLICY
Energy policy, tax policy, and the warming of the earth may seem
like unrelated topics, but they are inextricably linked.  In the wake of
the energy crisis of the summer of 2001,1 the United States took
another look at the tax treatment of energy providers.  Congress and
the Bush Administration rejected the widely accepted tenets of the
Kyoto Protocol, provoking worldwide criticism.2  Many scientists agree
on the solutions to global warming including conservation,
conversion to renewable energy sources, and preservation and
enhancement of carbon sinks.3  As the foremost emitter of
greenhouse gases (“GHG”) the United States cannot sit idly while the
world wrestles with this problem; however, taking action against

1. See John C. Hilke & Michael Wise, Who Turned Out the Lights? Competition and
California’s Power Crisis, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 76 (discussing the California
electricity crisis and its consequences); STEVEN L. PULLER, PRICING AND FIRM CONDUCT
IN CALIFORNIA’S DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET (Nov. 2001) (Program on
Workable Energy Regulation (POWER), Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Working Paper
PWP-080) (noting the rise in energy prices in California was driven by changes in
costs and demand), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/
PWP080.pdf.   Although there is dispute as to whether there was an energy crisis in
the summer of 2001, in a deregulated energy market like California, there is a
tremendous incentive for suppliers to reduce production, creating price increases in
the spot market.  Id.
2. See Dana Milbank, Criticism Greets Bush as Europe Trip Begins, WASH. POST, June
13, 2001, at A1 (describing European criticism of the Bush Administration’s
opposition to the Kyoto treaty); see also discussion infra Part II.B (summarizing the
Kyoto Protocol).
3. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  MITIGATION, A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP III
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5–6, 8 (2001) (discussing the
results of a wide range of environmental studies, both regional and global, where
common solutions to, and trends of, GHG emissions were identified and included
low-carbon energy use and carbon sequestration), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pub/wg3spm.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
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global warming will be difficult.4  Re-examining the tax treatment of
GHG emitters and carbon sinks may provide a politically palatable
solution to global warming, as well as benefits to citizens.
Any re-examination of the tax treatment of GHG emitters and
carbon sinks should, in part, depend upon the state of our forests;
one third of the land area of the United States is covered with
forests,5 thus, preserving and enhancing the carbon absorption of this
resource would provide a significant means of reducing the total
carbon output of the United States.6  This Article briefly examines the
scientific debate surrounding global warming and its potential
consequences.  In addition, this Article analyzes current energy tax
proposals that may affect U.S. GHG emissions.  At press time,
Congress was working to reconcile House and Senate versions of a
major energy tax bill, which, although providing certain additional
incentives for energy conservation, would enhance the massive
subsidies currently provided to the fossil fuel industries under the
Internal Revenue Code.7
This Article will address the value of U.S. forests as producers of
goods and services, tangible and intangible, including their value as
carbon sinks to counteract global warming, and conclude that carbon
sinks may also provide a politically feasible way of reducing U.S. GHG
emissions.  Forests produce lumber and paper, but they also improve
air and water quality, serve as wildlife habitats, and provide

4. See Alvin Powell, Babbitt Delivers Earth Day Address:  Takes Aim at President Bush’s
Environmental Backdealing, HARV. GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2001 (quoting Bruce Babbitt,
former Secretary of the Interior as stating: “[t]he difficulty of this task is matched
only by its importance”), available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2001/
04.26/09-babbitt.html.
5. See W. BRAD SMITH, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1997 RPA ASSESSMENT:
THE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE CURRENT SITUATION 2 (1999) (noting that the
extent of forests in the United States has changed little in the Twentieth Century
and, in fact, that the volume of American timberland having actually risen by thirty-
six percent), available at http://www.srsfia.usfs.msstate.edu/wo/review.htm (last
visited Aug. 9, 2002).
6. While carbon sinks provide a significant means of GHG abatement, I do not
mean to imply that other measures, such as conservation, should not be employed.
However, in today’s political climate, carbon storage by preserving U.S. forests
probably has a better chance of implementation than energy conservation.
7. See Securing America’s Future Energy Act of 2001, H.R. 4, 107th Cong.
(2002) (adopting tax incentives to provide substantial financial benefits for energy
conservation, but also establishing new I.R.C. provisions that allow oil and gas plants
to expense, or deduct from income, costly environmental regulation compliance
programs and also allowing natural gas plants to significantly accelerate the
depreciation of property, thus recovering expenses at a much quicker rate); see also
Energy Policy Act of 2002, H.R. 4, 107th Cong. (2002) (revising the House version
for Senate consideration).  Conferences were held on June 27, 2002 and July 25,
2002, with final resolution expected in September 2002.  See Press Release, Senator
Frank Murkowski,  Energy Conferences Making Progress Securing America’s Energy
Supply (June 25, 2001) (on file with author).
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recreational opportunities and spiritual respite from the urban
world.8  Carbon sequestration in forestland has been recognized by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) as the
exclusive means of offsetting carbon gas emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol.9  In concluding that the value of living forests exceeds their
value as timber, this Article considers whether the Federal income tax
system encourages the maximization of forest values, and what
changes in the tax system would better serve the goal of maximizing
forest values.10  This Article focuses on U.S. law and forests located
within the United States because, although global warming is an
international problem, the United States can best implement
conservation policies within its boundaries.11  As the producer of
more GHG’s than any other country in the world,12 the United States
should set the example for the rest of the world.13  In addition, the

8. See generally Robert L. Fischman, Stumbling to Johannesburg:  The United States’
Haphazard Progress Toward Sustainable Forestry Law, 32 ENV’T L. REP. 10291 (2002)
(describing the ecological, economic and spiritual benefits of forests).
9. See The Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Art. 3.3. (1997) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (requiring
industrialized nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases with the
ultimate goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere), available at
http://www.unfccc.int.  The Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries, including
the United States, to meet their emissions requirements in two ways:  (1) by reducing
emissions from GHG sources, and (2) by using carbon sinks to remove CO[2] from
the atmosphere.  Id. art. 3.  Under the Kyoto Protocol, only forests count as carbon
sinks, although grasses and soils also store CO[2].  Id.  Article 3.3 of the Kyoto
Protocol reads, in pertinent part:
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990,
measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period,
shall be used to meet the commitments under this article of each Party
included in Annex I.
Id.
10. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the implication of tax changes on forests and
timber production).
11. See John Dernbach, Moving the Climate Change Debate From Models to Proposed
Legislation:  Lessons From State Experience, 30 ENV’T L. REP. 10933, 10940 (2000) (“For
practical and legal reasons, instruments utilized by the United States to reduce net
GHG emissions should focus first and foremost on sources and sinks within the
United States.”).
12. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
National Communications From Parties Included In Annex I to the Convention:  Greenhouse
Gas Inventory Data from 1990 to 1998 8 fig.5 (Oct. 11, 2000) (describing the steps
taken by nations to implement the Convention and giving an inventory of their GHG
emissions), available at http://www.unfccc.int/resource/natcom/index.html.  In
1998, the United States emitted 6.7 million gigagrams (Gg) of GHG’s, whereas
Japan, the second highest emitter after the United States, emitted only 1.3 million
Gg.  Id.  The U.S. increase in GHG emissions from 1990 to 1998 approximates
Canada’s (the third highest emitter) emissions for 1998 (approximately 700,000 Gg).
Id.
13. See Dernbach, supra note 11, at 10940 (arguing that legal tools such as
demand-side management, system benefit charges, and tax credits that focus on
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other benefits of forest conservation at home, such as clean water and
recreational opportunities, will accrue to American residents,
citizens, and taxpayers.14
Finally, this Article focuses on tax policy, because the emerging
consensus among legal scholars favors economic incentives,15 rather
than command-and-control regulations,16 for reaching environmental
goals;17 the Federal income tax has proved an effective delivery system

CO[2] emissions have the potential to reduce GHG emissions).  Taking the lead in,
or at least not opting out of, GHG abatement will also give the United States
“credibility in international negotiations.”  Id.  This statement is supported by India
and China’s response to a potential U.S. pullout:  “At a preliminary negotiating
session in New York in February 1995, China and India, both of which have vast coal
resources, argued that unless the U.S. leads the way by significantly cutting its own
emissions, their obligation to develop their own economies outweighs their
obligation to preserve the global environment.”  ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON:
THE HIGH STAKES BATTLE OVER THE EARTH’S THREATENED CLIMATE 118 (1977).
14. See Chad Hanson, Big Timber’s Big Lies, SIERRA, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 62
(explaining that because the United States is setting trends in international policies
affecting forests, preserving forests at home could lead to worldwide forest
preservation).
15. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity:  Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 133 (1999)
(“Instead of mandating uniform pollution reductions on a national basis, market-
based approaches use economic incentives to encourage polluters to reduce their
pollution in the most cost-effective manner.”).  But see David M. Driesen, Is Emissions
Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:  Replacing the Command and Control/Economic
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 290 (1998) (endorsing a more subtle
approach to environmental regulation, and stating that “both traditional regulation
and emissions trading rely upon the threat of a monetary penalty to secure
compliance with government commands setting emission limitations”).  Professor
Driesen concludes that both traditional regulation and emissions trading can be
considered “economic incentive program[s].” Id. at 290.  He defines an “economic
incentive program” as “any program that provides an economic benefit for pollution
reduction[sic] or an economic penalty for pollution.”  Id. at 323.
16. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1343 (1985) (describing command-and-control regulation as a
system that “envisions inevitably ill-informed bureaucrats continually ‘fine-tuning’
technological and economic decisions . . . .”).  But see Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory
Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (1985) (arguing the advocates for market
incentives have “an excessive preoccupation with theoretical efficiency, while . . .
plac[ing] inadequate emphasis on actual decisionmaking costs and implementation
constraints,” and identifying some advantages of traditional command-and-control
regulation over market incentives).
17. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:  The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174 (1998) (arguing that
severe failures in the cigarette market warrant “some form of victim-initiated ex post
incentive-based regulation, such as enterprise liability or smokers’ compensation”).
See generally Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation:  A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (advocating the
use of economic-incentive approaches to influence future environmental policy);
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:  the Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (arguing that a reformed
regulatory system will likely promote democratic dialogue that could shape the
future of environmental law).
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for economic incentives.18  Lawrence H. Summers, former Treasury
Secretary under the Clinton Administration, noted that “the
administrative efficiencies associated with providing benefits through
the tax code is less than under direct expenditures.”19  Further,
providing targeted credits through the code means “less government
regulation relating to the subsidy.”20

18. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMM. ON THE BUDGET, TAX EXPENDITURES:
COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 2, 105th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1998) (describing the revenue costs, impact and underlying rationale of each
provision of the federal tax laws dealing with tax expenditures).  Federal tax
provisions designed to encourage certain kinds of behavior by granting special tax
relief are called “tax expenditures.” Id. at 5.  Tax expenditures are economically
equivalent to direct government payments, albeit channeled through the tax system.
Id. at 16.  Although tax expenditures have been criticized as “hidden subsidies” that
create undue complexity and unwarranted tax loopholes, tax expenditures provide
certain political and psychological advantages over direct spending programs.  See
generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE:  TAX EXPENDITURES
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (describing the widespread system of
tax subsidies for social benefits, which mostly target those of higher socioeconomic
status); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:  A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155
(proposing a category of alternative tax provisions that would replace certain tax
provisions with non-tax programs, thereby providing benefits such as tax code
simplification); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985)
[hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL] (describing how the enactment and incidence of
tax expenditures raise complex questions about the legislative process and tax
policy).  “Legislators or presidents who do not want to appear to be ‘big spenders’
can comfortably approve tax expenditures without damaging their image of fiscal
conservatism.”  Id. at 104.  “Business generally dislikes the idea of government
subsidies, with its implication that the private sector is incapable of performing on its
own.  Tax expenditures, which business does not view as subsidies, carry no such
negative psychological effect.”  Id. at 107.  It seems that businesses protest too
much—a subsidy by any other name would still fill the corporate coffers.  Professor
Zelinsky, in a seminal 1986 article, argued that “tax incentives may be more efficient
for the implementation of government policies than direct expenditure programs
because of lower transactions costs.”  Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes:
The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1986).
19. Press Release, United States Department of the Treasury Secretary Lawrence
H. Summers, Remarks to the 63rd Annual Conference of the Tax Foundation,
Washington D.C. (Nov. 16, 2000), available at  http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
Is1029.htm.
20. Id.
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I.  GLOBAL WARMING
A.  Evidence and Consequences
There are no alternatives to many of the climate services provided
by nature, and several of the changes prompted by increasing
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may prove to be irreversible.21
Yes, it is hot out here—it’s not just you.  In response to an inquiry
by the Bush Administration, scientists confirmed that global
temperatures are rising.22  The eleven warmest years of this century
have all occurred since 1980, with 1995 being the warmest year in
recorded history.23  Why is it so hot?  To the dismay of weather
reporters and picnic planners everywhere, weather is naturally
variable and hard to predict.  Scientific evidence of ice ages (and
their subsequent thawing) shows that wide variations in temperature
do occur.24  However, the largest temperature increase during any
century for the past thousand years occurred in the twentieth
century.25
Although global warming first entered the public consciousness in
the late 1980s, with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC),26 it has long been known that excess
carbon dioxide could lead to global warming.27  Recent concerns
about global warming focus on the substantial evidence suggesting
that the present warm period has been at least partially caused by
human activities, such as burning fossil fuels and tropical

21. Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development, Meeting of the OECD
Council, Ministerial Level 2001, at 9 (2001).
22. Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council,
Climate Change Science:  An Analysis of Some Key Questions 1 (2001), available at
http://www.nap.edu.
23. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 2 (2001) (“Globally, it is very likely (90-99%) that the
1990’s was the warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year in the instrumental
record, since 1861.”), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/spm22-01.pdf (last visited
Aug. 9, 2002).  “The increase in temperature in the 20th century is likely (66-90%) to
have been the largest of any century during the past 1,000 years.” Id.
24. William K. Stevens, In Ancient Ice Ages, Clues to Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1999, at F1.
25. Id. at F2.
26. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 3 (defining the IPCC as that
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United
Nations Environment Programme).
27. See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 176 (noting that Svante Arhenius, a Swedish
chemist, discovered over 100 years ago that a buildup of atmospheric carbon dioxide
could lead to planetary warming).
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deforestation.28  Although scientists concede that human activity
cannot unequivocally be shown to cause the observed climate change,
the magnitude of the warming in comparison with natural variations
in climate strongly suggest a connection.29  Carbon dioxide, the most
common GHG, is emitted when people and animals exhale, when
biological matter decays, and when fossil fuels are burned.30  Carbon

28. See Rainforest Action Network, Rainforests and Global Warming:  Rainforests Fact
Sheet (concluding that CO[2], the “main” GHG, is actively changing the Earth’s
atmosphere and seventy-seven percent of CO[2] emissions are produced by fossil
fuel combustion and deforestation), at http://www.ran.org/info_center/
factsheets/04a.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with the American University
Law Review).  Additionally, industrial processes and fertilizer use were listed as
contributing to GHG emissions.  Id.; see infra note 29 and accompanying text
(documenting human contributions to GHG emissions).  See generally WILLIAM
MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 91 (1989) (“The greenhouse effect is a more apt
name than those who coined it imagined.  The carbon dioxide and trace gases act
like panes of glass on a greenhouse-the analogy is accurate.  But it’s more than that.
We have built a greenhouse, a human creation, where once sweet flowers
bloomed.”).
29. GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 17.  “Emissions resulting from human activities
are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases
. . . .  These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an
additional warming of the Earth’s surface.”  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT:  OVERVIEW 31 AUGUST 1990, in INT’L L. &
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 280, 281 (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991).
“Most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the
increase in GHG concentrations.”  Richard A. Kerr, It’s Official:  Humans Are Behind
Most of Global Warming, 291 SCI. 566, 566 (2001) (quoting an IPCC panel).
There will always be some uncertainty surrounding the prediction of changes
in such a complex system as the world’s climate.  Nevertheless, we support
the IPCC’s conclusion that it is at least 90% certain that temperatures will
continue to rise, with average global surface temperature projected to
increase by between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees Celsius above 1990 levels by 2100.
This increase will be accompanied by rising sea levels; more intense
precipitation events in some countries and increased risk of drought in
others; and adverse effects on agriculture, health and water resources . . . .
The balance of the scientific evidence demands effective steps now to avert
damaging changes to the Earth’s climate.
Editorial, Joint Statement Issued by the Australian Academy of Sciences et al., The
Science of Climate Change, 292 SCI. 1261, 1261 (2001); see also Clare Breidenich et al.,
Current Development:  The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 316 (1998) (discussing the conclusions of the
IPCC’s Working Group I, which determined that although not all scientists agreed as
to the exact human cause of global warming, they did agree that the alarming levels
of GHG’s were a serious threat to the global environment); GELBSPAN, supra note 13,
at 69 (quoting Jerry Mahlman, Director of NOAA’s Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Laboratory as stating, “the IPCC assessments are the most widely accepted statements
ever on climate change”); Peter A. Stott et al., External Control of 20th Century
Temperature by Natural and Anthropogenic Forcings, 290 SCI. 2133, 2136 (2000) (“Natural
forcings were relatively more important in the early century warming and
anthropogenic warmings have played a dominant role in warming observed in recent
decades.”); Francis W. Zewiers & Andrew J. Weaver, The Causes of 20th Century
Warming, 290 SCI. 2081, 2083 (2000) (“Forcing from anthropogenic activities . . . has
been the main driver of climate change during the past century.”).
30. See Breidenich, supra note 29, at 317:
The primary source of GHG emissions is the burning of fossil fuels, mainly
coal, oil and gas, which releases CO[2] into the atmosphere.  Other sources
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dioxide is absorbed by growing forests and other plant material, and
is stored in living trees, undisturbed soils, polar ice, and the oceans.31
GHGs increase global temperatures by acting like an insulator,
preventing the sun’s warmth from dissipating into space.32  Global
warming, if left unchecked, could lead to the thawing of the
permafrost;33 rising sea levels, resulting in flooding of islands and
coastal regions;34 increased intensity and frequency of severe storms,
changes in the amount and frequency of precipitation, changes in
ocean currents; and increased tropical diseases such as malaria,
cholera, and dengue fever.35  One commentator has aptly called these
worst-case scenarios “biblical in proportion.”36  Others argue that

of GHGs include methane from agriculture and energy production and
distribution; nitrous oxide (N[2]O) from agriculture and industrial
processes; and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulfur hexafluoride (SF[6]) (the ‘synthetic’ or ‘exotic’ GHGs) from a variety
of industrial and consumer uses.
31. See JAY R. MALCOLM & LOUIS R. PITELKA, ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE:  A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON U.S. TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS AND
BIODIVERSITY 18 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2000) (arguing that the
adverse effects on ecosystems from climate change can be lessened by focusing on
maintaining habitats and by maintaining overall ecosystem structure).
32. Understanding Climate Change:  A Beginner’s Guide to the UN Framework
Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, at 5-6 (describing GHG as “a blanket around the
earth”).
33. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP II OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 3, 6 (2001)
[hereinafter IPCC II] (including a list that is the beginning of potential impacts,
which could include significant slowing of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (the
Gulf Stream) and accelerated global warming due to massive releases of methane
from melting permafrost), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/wg2SPMfinal.pdf
(last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
34. JAMES G. TITUS & VIJAY K. NARAYANAN, EPA, THE PROBABILITY OF SEA LEVEL
RISE iii, 230-R-95-008 (1995) (noting that the EPA estimates the potential rise in sea
level to be between 15 and 65 centimeters (roughly .05 to 2 feet) by the year 2100),
available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/impacts/sealevel/
probability.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
35. See Paul R. Epstein, Climate and Health, 285 SCI. 347, 347 (1999) (arguing that
extreme weather can be a threat to public health).  Dr. Epstein, the Associate
Director of the Center for Health and the Global Environment, Harvard Medical
School, explains the connection between climate change and disease as follows:
The atmosphere holds 6% more water vapor with each 1 [degrees] C rise in
temperature.  The resulting increase in evaporation and greater residence
time for water vapor in the atmosphere boosts humidity and heat indices,
fuels storms, and reinforces the greenhouse effect (the trapping of heat by
atmospheric gases such as carbon dioxide).  An increase in the cloud cover
blocks outgoing heat, contributing to disproportionate warming at night and
during the winter-conditions that are unhealthy for humans but
advantageous for insects that transmit infectious diseases.  A moisture-laden
atmosphere also generates more tropical-like downpours that create
breeding grounds for mosquitoes, propel rodents from burrows, and flush
nutrients, chemicals, and microorganisms into waterways.
Id.
36. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L.
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increased global warming may help some nations by increasing crop
yields.37
Global warming represents a classic “tragedy of the commons”
issue.38  In his 1968 seminal article, Garrett Hardin described the
tragic outcome of a resource commonly held by members of a tribe.39
Each user of the commons exploits the resource until the expected
benefits of his or her actions equal the expected costs, ignoring the
costs imposed on other potential users of the commons.40  The
individual decisions made without concern for the common good
culminate in tragic overuse and the potential destruction of the
commons.41  Hardin suggested two possible solutions to this problem:
socialism and privatization.42  The economic approach to property law
suggests that private property ownership is usually more efficient and
productive, but also suggests that government intervention may be
necessary when the market fails to account for total costs.43  The

REV. 299, 300 (2000).  And what about a plague of locusts?  See Grasshoppers Rescend on
West, WILM. NEWS J., July 18, 2002, at A3 (suggesting that a mild winter and hot, dry
spring precipitated a bumper crop of grasshoppers).
37. See, e.g., K.E. Idso & S.B. Idso, Plant Responses to Atmospheric CO[2] Enrichment
in the Face of Environmental Constraints:  A Review of the Past 10 Years’ Research, 69 AGRIC.
& FOREST METEOROLOGY 153 (1994) (noting how the United States might realize net
positive benefits from a warmer, CO[2]-rich environment); IPCC II, supra note 33, at
6.
38. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); see also
RICHARD L. OTTINGER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 127 (1990) (“The
earth’s atmosphere is a global commons into which the world’s population emits the
gaseous by-products of its activities . . . .”).  If fuel costs included the full cost of the
environmental consequences of the combustion of the fuel, there would be no
marginal benefit to increased use of currently low cost fuels such as coal that emit
large amounts of CO[2] into the global commons.  “Unfortunately, the tragedy the
world now faces is that the economic benefits that each electricity generator derives
from emitting more CO[2] are greater than the harm to it resulting from the
increased emissions.” Id. at 137; see Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments:
Compensation, Market Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REV. 365, 419-25
(1995) (arguing that restoration costs, rather than commodity value, should be the
measure of damage to the environment).
39. Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1245-47.
43. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720-21 (1986) (suggesting, as a third
alternative, ownership of the resource by an “unorganized public.”).
There lies outside purely private property and government-controlled
“public property” a distinct class of “inherently public property” which is
fully controlled by neither government nor private agents.  [This “inherently
public” property is] collectively “owned” and “managed” by society at large,
with claims independent of and indeed superior to the claims of any
purported governmental manager.  Despite the well-known problems of
unorganized collective access to a resource—the “tragedy of the
commons”—equally difficult problems are posed by governmental
management:  the cost of instituting that management and, perhaps, the
temptations of politically motivated redistribution.
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global commons of the earth’s atmosphere is not susceptible to either
socialism or privatization.44  Traditional notions of state sovereignty
hold that states have a right to act autonomously, regardless of
adverse external consequences.45  Thus, a state is free to opt-out of
collective efforts to preserve the global commons.46  Although the
United States, as a sovereign nation, engages in democratic decision
making through the political process, its dominant world role,
combined with the ability to opt-out of international action,
effectively disenfranchises world citizenry, especially citizens of
countries whose interests may not be consistent with global capital
policy.47  Specifically, the external costs of global warming are likely to
fall disproportionately on the poor.48  Climate sensitive industries like
agriculture, coastal fisheries, and forestry constitute large portions of
the economies of developing nations.49  Poor people also
disproportionately bear the risks of climate-related natural disasters;

Id.  While air indisputably falls into the category of “inherently public property,”
issues of sovereignty discussed below will make it difficult to assert this property
claim.
44. Although, as discussed infra, carbon trading systems can effectively privatize
or at least commercialize the global commons of the atmosphere.  See, e.g., Ricardo
Bayon, Fight Global Warming the Capitalist Way:  Trading Pollution Credits Works and
Should be Expanded, WASH. POST WKLY., Aug. 13-19, 2001, at 23 (analogizing the
potential market for CO[2] credits to the thriving market for SO[2] credits and
noting that “by the end of the decade . . . the CO[2] market could be worth tens of
billions of dollars.”) (citations omitted); see also Gilles Trequesser, Critics of Kyoto Talks
Say Air Now a Commodity, SCI., Nov. 5, 2001, at 1 (quoting Tom Goldtooth’s claim that
“there is now talk of privatizing the air that we breathe”), at http://www.web.net/
nben/envnews/media/01/nov/kyoto.html (last visited June 2, 2002).
45. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 191 (2000).  Falk and
Strauss also note that the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are examples of the success
of global civil society in addressing international issues.  Id. at 195-99.  If Falk and
Strauss’s proposal for a Global People’s Assembly was adopted, then all of the citizens
of the world would have a say in the utilization of global commons.
46. See Carol M. Rose, From Local to Global Commons:  Private Property, Common
Property, and Hybrid Property Regimes:  Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons:
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property
Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 45, 50 (1999) (noting that global commons
problems have many local components and although global warming from carbon
dioxide is a planet-wide environmental issue, forests that sequester carbon, for
example, can be highly localized).
47. See Falk & Strauss, supra note 45, at 212 (“[T]he lack of direct democratic
accountability to citizens has also significantly affected policy outcomes.  The
international regulatory framework has been driven almost exclusively by the neo-
liberal (free-market) economic precepts so in vogue with the forces of international
capital.”).  “Community interests, especially the interests of poor people, are largely
ignored.  The socially sensitive regulatory framework adopted by some of the more
progressive societies of the twentieth century has been cast aside in favor of
nineteenth century laissez-faire models.”  Id.
48. POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENT MATTERS ANNUAL REVIEW 23
(World Bank Group 2000).
49. Id. at 23.
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for example, between 1990 and 1998, ninety-four percent of the
world’s major natural disasters and ninety-seven percent of natural
disaster-related deaths occurred in developing countries.50  The costs
of future severe weather events influenced by global warming are
estimated at $300 billion, with the United States bearing
approximately ten percent of those costs.51
Given the severity of the potential consequences from global
warming, the United States must act to protect the global commons
of the atmosphere.52  Commons issues have been historically resolved
in a number of ways, such as restricting access to the commons,
creating incentives to preserve the commons, and imposing
externality costs on those who abuse the commons.53  Traditionally,
discussions of commons issues generally involved a discrete common
pool resource (“CPR”), such as a forest or grasslands, and a limited
number of participants who shared the resource.54  A global CPR,
such as climate, raises more complex issues:  beyond the obvious
physical problem of restricting access, a global CPR has six billion
participants.55  As some researchers note, “having larger numbers of
participants in a CPR increases the difficulty of organizing, agreeing
on rules, and enforcing rules.”56  Moreover, these participants are
culturally diverse, which increases the difficulty of reaching
agreement about governing the global CPR.57  Finally, although all
inhabitants of the earth will feel some consequences of global
warming, geographical distance dims our recognition of this
interrelationship.58

50. Id.
51. See Envtl. Media Servs., Environmental Concerns (noting that global warming
will result in rising sea levels, more frequent hurricanes and blizzards, and damage to
agriculture and fishing), at http://www.ems.org/climate/climate_concerns.html
(last updated Nov. 6, 2000) (on file with the American University Law Review).  The
United States loses about $30 billion per year, from health-related measures and
more intensive water management; and climate change could cost developing
nations up to $9.3 trillion over the next twenty years.  Andrew Simms, Global
Warming’s Victims Could Take U.S. to Court, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 7, 2001, available
at http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=28507&owner=(IHT)&date=2001080
7000000.
52. Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244.
53. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons:  Local Lessons, Global Challenges,
284 SCI. 278, 284 (1999).
54. See id. at 279 (noting that CPRs have involved depletable ecosystems such as
forests).
55. See id. at 281 (describing the problems resulting from the sheer number of
people in the global CPR).
56. Id.
57. See id. (observing that cultural diversity frequently is accompanied by
divergent economic interests).
58. See id. (asserting that the complexity of ecosystem interaction makes it
difficult to view CPRs as global).
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B.  International Response
1.  The Kyoto Protocol
The GHG emissions of the United States, the world’s largest
emitter, constitute about twenty percent of the total manmade GHGs
worldwide.59  In the year 2000, CO[2] emissions by the United States
increased by 3.1%, one of the biggest annual increases in a decade.60
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) does not regulate
GHG emissions because CO[2] has not been designated a “criteria
pollutant” under the Clean Air Act.61  Although the United States is a
party to the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”), which developed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997,
the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.62
In general, the Kyoto Protocol establishes individualized country
targets, or goals, for reductions in GHG emissions.63  For example,
the United States would be required to reduce GHG emissions to
seven percent below 1990 levels, whereas the European Union
countries would be required to accomplish an eight percent
reduction.64  Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol permits limited

59. See Bill Sammon, Bush Hits Others for Global Warming:  Urges Increased Study, Not
Treaty, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A1 (reporting that Bush, while recognizing the
need for the United States to reduce its emissions, insisted that the high rate of GHG
emissions are understandable considering that the United States is responsible for
twenty-five percent of the world’s economic output).
60. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN
THE UNITED STATES 2000 DOE/EIA-0573, at 19 (2001) [hereinafter EIA:  EMMISSIONS
OF GREENHOUSE GASES] (detailing statistics regarding greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States over the past decade), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/057300.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
61. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1994) (requiring the EPA to publish a
list of air pollutants that reasonably can be anticipated to endanger public health).
But see Is CO2 a Pollutant and Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?:  J. Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Nat’l Econ. Growth, Natural Res. and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm.
on Gov’t Reform & Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Gary Guzy, EPA General Counsel) (noting that CO[2] meets
the Clean Air Act’s definition of criteria pollutant, although the EPA had made no
determination to exercise its authority over CO[2]).
62. See Kevin Sullivan, Four U.S. Senators Lobbying in Kyoto; Viewpoints Vary on
Climate Treaty, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1997, at A35 (indicating that the U.S.
representatives to the Kyoto Protocol conference held divergent views on how to deal
with global warming); see also S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138-39 (daily
ed. July 25, 1997) (enacted) [hereinafter Byrd-Hagel Resolution] (resolving that any
climate control treaty that attempted to reduce emissions must be accompanied by
an analysis of the impact on the U.S. economy); Lakshman Guruswamy, Climate
Change:  The Next Dimension, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 341, 345 (2000) (contending
that it is unlikely the United States will ratify the Kyoto Protocol).
63. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3 (stating that, while their commitment
period is from 2008 until 2012, countries must be able to demonstrate progress by
2005).
64. See id. annex B (showing the emissions targets for all involved countries, some
of which will be allowed emissions growth under the treaty).
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emissions trading; for example, the “Clean Development Mechanism”
(“CDM”) allows developed countries to invest in emission reduction
projects in developing countries.65  The investing countries may then
apply a portion of the reductions generated by these projects toward
meeting their own emission targets.66
Even though the United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
some U.S. industries have already begun to invest in CDM programs.67
For example, General Motors (“GM”) and American Electric Power
(“AEP”) have invested $15.4 million to fund the purchase and
reforestation of land on the Atlantic Coast of Brazil.68  GM decided to
invest in Brazil because the property values are lower than in the
United States, and because the forests along Brazil’s Atlantic Coast
absorb more carbon than similar areas in the United States.69  GM
hopes to earn a return on its investment through the carbon
sequestration market.70
2.  Why the United States resists GHG regulation
The Kyoto Agreement and the UNFCCC face significant political
resistance in the United States.  Opponents invoke four different
categories of arguments to support remaining dormant in the wake
of global warming:  (1) insufficient evidence about the effects of
anthropogenic global warming;71 (2) carbon emissions in the United

65. See id. art. 12 (explaining that CDMs assist non-developed countries achieve
sustainable development and assist developed countries in complying with their
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments).
66. Id.
67. See Press Release, Pew Center on Global Climate Changes, Three More
Companies Join the Fight Against Climate Change (June 28, 2001) [hereinafter Pew
Press Release] (listing the membership of the Pew Center’s Business Environmental
Leadership Council (“BELC”), a group of thirty-three companies that are committed
to taking steps to reduce GHG emissions, to include Boeing, BP, DuPont, Sunoco,
and Toyota),  available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas_item.cfm?content_
item_id=635&content_type_id=7&page=7&issue=19&issue_name=Global%20warmin
g&name=Grantee%20Press%20Releases (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
68. See Andrew Downie, Brazil Sees a New Forest for the Trees:  Pairs with U.S. to Revive
Woods, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at A12 (reporting that the companies have given
money up front and that the companies have committed themselves to the
reforestation project for forty years).
69. See id. (noting that companies are looking for ways to mitigate the effects of
the GHG emissions from their core businesses).
70. See id. (stating that investments of this type are risky because the carbon
market is in its early stages of development).
71. See, e.g., Mark Z. Barabak, The Times Poll; Bush Criticized As Fear For Environment
Grows; Survey:  Majority Say Pollution Is Worsening, And Fighting It Is More Important Than
Creating Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at A1 (indicating that thirty-eight percent of
Americans felt that Bush opposed the Kyoto Protocol because of insufficient
evidence that carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming).  But see Kerr, supra
note 29, at 566 (stating that an international group of scientists accepts the
significance of anthropogenic global warming).
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States are not rising as fast as the GDP;72 (3) developing countries will
not reduce their emissions;73 and (4) reducing carbon emissions will
hurt the U.S. economy.74
The UNFCCC incorporates the concept of “common but
differentiated responsibility” (“CBDR”), which led to the
individualized GHG reduction targets for each country.75  The U.S.
Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in July 1997, disagreeing
with the premise that developed countries with the largest share of
GHG emissions should take the first steps to reduce GHG emissions.76
In March 2001, President Bush rejected any U.S. obligation to join in

72. See NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, RELIABLE AFFORDABLE, AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 3-11 (2001) (discussing how
U.S. GHG emissions have begun to decline, even as the U.S. economy has been
growing at an unprecedented rate), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy.
73. See David G. Victor, Weak on Warming, WASH. POST., Feb. 19, 2002, at A15
(pointing out that the Kyoto Protocol does not offer any counter-argument to the
Bush Administration’s argument that developing countries will not reduce their
emissions because the Protocol does not require participation by developing
countries).
74. But see infra notes 104-16 (outlining a study commissioned by the Department
of Energy in which scientists found some economic benefits to curbing GHG
emissions).  The fourth reason seems inconsistent with the second reason—if the
U.S. economy can grow successfully without a concomitant increase in GHG
emissions, then reducing GHG emissions should not hurt the economy.  However, if
the increase in GDP is due to an increase in service-related industries, further GHG
restrictions may disproportionately harm manufacturing industries.
75. See U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Framework Convention on Climate
Change, pmbl. & arts. 3-4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849, 851-56 (1992) (referring
explicitly to, and defining, the concept of common but differentiated responsibility);
Guruswamy, supra note 62, at 356.  Guruswamy states that CBDR,
recognizes that only international cooperation will help to resolve a problem
of the magnitude of global warming, but that in responding to the problem,
different states have different social and economic conditions that affect
their response capabilities.  CBDR also incorporates the equitable notion
that developed countries which have the largest share of historical and
current emissions of GHGs, should take the first painful actions to
ameliorate the problem.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, supra note 62 (resolving that the United States will
not sign a climate change treaty that does not contain quantified emissions
limitations for developing countries or that would cause serious harm to the U.S.
economy); see also Senator Frank H. Murkowski, The Kyoto Protocol is Not the Answer to
Climate Change, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 345, 345-46 (2000) (arguing that growing
emissions from developing nations, that are not bound by emissions limits under the
Kyoto Protocol, would quickly overshadow any achievements in emissions reduction
by the United States and other nations that are subject to Kyoto’s limits; and finally,
that implementing the Kyoto Protocol could cause significant increases in gasoline
and electricity prices).  But see Erik Eckholm, China Said to Sharply Reduce Emissions of
Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at A1 (stating that Chinese officials want a
developed country to show them that reduced carbon emissions do not prevent a
high standard of living for its citizens); James M. Lindsay, Global Warming Heats Up:
Uncertainties, Both Scientific and Political Lie Ahead, 19 BROOKINGS REV. 26, 28 (2001)
(suggesting that making developing countries curtail emissions would force them “to
clean up a mess they didn’t create and potentially keep them poor by denying them
the right to pollute their way to wealth”).
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GHG reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, stating that the Kyoto
Protocol is “fatally flawed” and would harm the U.S. economy.77  U.S.
Senator Frank Murkowski argued that “[t]he Kyoto Protocol climate
treaty, often offered as the ‘cure’ for climate change, is actually bitter
medicine that would weaken the American economy and discourage
the sustained long-term effort needed to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations and protect the global environment.”78  Professor
Michael J. Glennon agreed, stating that “nixing [the] Kyoto
[Protocol] probably enhanced relative American economic power.”79
In August 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
expressing a change of heart, unanimously approved a resolution
that called on the Bush Administration to provide specific proposals
to reduce GHG emissions.80  Although President Bush later promised
new technological initiatives to combat global warming,81 when
negotiators from 165 nations met in Marrakesh in November, 2001

77. See Cooler Heads on Kyoto, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A18 (commenting that
one study estimates that implementing the Kyoto Protocol would cost the United
States $400 billion in lost productivity over the next decade); see also Edmund L.
Andrews, Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at
A3 (saying that Bush’s decision not to support the global warming treaty has evoked
an unusual amount of anger from European leaders); Amy Goldstein & Eric Pianin,
Hill Pressure Fueled Bush’s Emissions Shift, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1 (stating
that Bush used the energy crisis to rationalize his change in position regarding the
Kyoto Protocol); Lindsay, supra note 76, at 28 (explaining that Bush’s change in
position was due to a downturn in the U.S. economy and the looming energy crisis in
the Western United States); Eric Pianin & William Drozdiak, Bush’s Reversal Could
Affect Global Warming Agreement, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at A3 (stating that Bush
refused to support the Kyoto Protocol because it would be burdensome for the U.S.
economy and would counter the administration’s goal of increasing domestic energy
production); Press Release, White House, President Bush Announces Clear Skies &
Global Climate Change Initiative (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Press Release]
(announcing a new plan for climate change mitigation, which would involve
transferable emission credits and emission reductions tied to GDP), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020214.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2002).
78. Murkowski, supra note 76, at 345 (footnote omitted); see also Warwick
McGibbon, Moving Beyond Kyoto, 66 BROOKINGS INST. POL’Y BRIEF 1 (2000) (“[T]he
Kyoto Protocol is never going to work because it is the wrong approach to tackling
the climate change issue . . . .  What is required is an insurance policy against the
possibility that climate change could be very costly to the planet.”), available at
http://brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pb066/pb66.htm.
79. Michael J. Glennon, There’s a Point to Going It Alone; Unilateralism Has Often
Served Us Well, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2001, at B2.  Professor Glennon cites Kyoto as
just one manifestation of the benefits of American unilateralism, noting that the
power to act alone is “an indispensable attribute of sovereignty.”  Id.
80. See Eric Pianin, Bush Urged to Negotiate Global Warming Treaty, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2, 2001, at A14 (reporting that the non-binding committee resolution illustrates
the growing congressional support for mandatory limits on carbon dioxide and other
GHGs).
81. See Sammon, supra note 59, at A1 (reporting that Bush’s proposal includes
the National Climate Change Technology Initiative (“NCCTI”), as well as more
research on climate change and increased interactions with the United Nations).
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for the purpose of agreeing on the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, the United States conspicuously remained silent.82  
Despite the Bush administration’s lackluster performance, some
American businesses have already started acting to curb global
warming.83  Power industry executives argue that the regulation of
carbon dioxide is inevitable and want to ensure that, in the coming
decades, their investments in plant expansions will not be wasted.84  A
growing number of companies have voluntarily adopted climate-
related measures that have already saved them millions of dollars.85
For example, in 2000, IBM saved $15.2 million and reduced CO[2]
emissions by more than five million tons.86  The Federal government
should not only encourage other businesses to follow suit, but should
follow these businesses’ lead itself.
Three months after Marrakesh, President Bush announced his
unilateral shift in global climate policy and proposed reductions in
GHG “intensity” and a separate pollution reduction plan involving a
“cap-and-trade” policy.87  Some argue that it will be harder for the
United States to take a unilateral approach to global warming while

82. See Eric Pianin, 160 Nations Agree to a New Warming Treaty, WASH. POST, Nov.
10, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Pianin, Nations Agree] (noting that last summer, White
House officials admitted that the Administration would present fresh proposals at
the meeting in Morocco, but the events of September 11th have pushed U.S. action
on global warming initiatives aside).  Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State, and
the head of the U.S. delegation, arrived at the conference with no new offers and
remained in the background.  Id.  Latin American officials have already predicted
that environmental initiatives could be “another casualty of the Sept. 11 attacks on
America.”  Shasta Darlington, Latam Says Green Issues Eclipsed by US Attacks, REUTERS
NEWS SERV., Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/
newsid/12968/newsDate/24-Oct-2001/story.htm.  Brazil’s environment minister,
Jose Sarney, said “[w]e have to fight terrorism, but we also have to do whatever
possible to come to sustainable development.”  Id.  Almost a year after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States continues to disregard the environmental
concerns of the rest of the world.  See, e.g., Joseph B. Verrengia, U.S. Opposes Summit
Effort on Clean Energy, WILMINGTON NEWS J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A2.
83. See Pew Press Release, supra note 67 (demonstrating that many U.S.
companies are acting to reduce GHG emissions).
84. See Pianin, Nations Agree, supra note 82, at A22 (stating that several of the
nation’s largest utilities are placing pressure on the Bush administration to shift its
opposition to regulating carbon dioxide emissions).
85. See Sarah Z. Sleeper, Corporate America’s Stars Come Out to Cut the Power,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, July 27, 2001, at A6 (discussing the U.S. corporations that
have made the most significant conservation contributions).
86. See id. (explaining the steps that IBM took to achieve its conservation goals).
87. See Bush Press Release, supra note 77 (proposing to reduce GHG emissions at
a rate corresponding to the GDP); cf. Paul Krugman, Ersatz Climate Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2002, at A21 (arguing that Bush’s proposal would ultimately lead to
increases in GHG emissions because Bush’s promise to reduce GHG “intensity”
translates into a promise to reduce the GHG to gross national product ratio; however
this ratio is expected to increase by thirty percent in the next ten years, thus
effectively increasing GHG emissions).
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expecting U.S. allies to support its war on terrorism.88
Environmentalists have already alleged that the President’s plan will
not curb warming.89  Contrary to the opinion of National Security
Advisor Condoleeza Rice, the Kyoto Protocol is not dead.90  Despite
the U.S. pullout of the treaty, it is almost certain that the Kyoto
Protocol will be ratified by a sufficient number of industrialized
countries to put it into effect.91  But without U.S. participation, the
Kyoto Protocol’s effect will be minimal.92
The United States bears some risk in opting out of the Kyoto
Protocol, as noted by Professor Andrew L. Strauss.  Professor Strauss
has found grounds for suing the United States in the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for failing to reduce GHG emissions.93  If the

88. See Eric Pianin, Warming Pact a Win for European Leaders, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
2001, at A2 (quoting Dutch Environment Minister, Jan Pronk, who served as chair of
the recent conference on global warming in Bonn and Marrakesh, as saying, “[a]fter
the events of September 11th, if there is any reason to call for international, global
approaches, [the U.S. should also] join a global approach to the existing global
problem of climate change”); see also Pianin, Nations Agree, supra note 82, at A22
(quoting Philip Clapp, President of the National Environmental Trust, as stating,
“[h]ow long can the administration turn its back on issues the rest of the world cares
about—from global warming to trade in small arms—and expect broad support on
issues like the war on terrorism?”).
89. See John Podesta, Do the Math:  Under the White House Global Warming Plan,
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Pollution Would Continue Increasing at Same Rate as Past Decade,
CLIMATE CHANGE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. COMM. NEWSLETTER (ABA Mar. 2002) (arguing
that even if voluntary GHG emission targets are achieved, U.S. emissions of carbon
dioxide would continue to increase at almost exactly the same rate that they have for
the past ten years), available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/
climatechange/podesta.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002); Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Plan
Expected To Slow, Not Halt, Gas Emission Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A1
(reporting that opponents of Bush’s plan fear that the plan lacks credible incentives
for corporations to invest in emissions reductions); see also S. 556, 107th Cong.
(2001) (proposing a plan, sponsored by Congressman Jim Jeffords (D-VT), that
would limit emissions of four major pollutants from power plants:  carbon dioxide,
mercury, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides); Podesta, supra (indicating that the
Jeffords plan enjoys bipartisan support).
90. See Lindsay, supra note 76, at 28 (reporting Ms. Rice as saying that new, post-
Kyoto, solutions to the global warming problem will need to be developed).
91. See Colum Lynch, EU Ratifies Global Warming Treaty; Kyoto Accord En Route to
Becoming Law Despite U.S. Rejection, WASH. POST, June 1, 2002, at A15 (reporting that
the recent ratification by the European Union (EU) almost guarantees the treaty will
become law); see also Pianin, Nations Agree, supra note 82, at A22 (noting that the new
agreement created in Marrakesh includes a market-based mechanism designed to
assist highly industrialized countries in meeting their targets by allowing them to
purchase carbon credits on an international financial market from countries with
relatively small GHG emissions).  The agreement would also allow participants to
reduce their quotas by expanding forests and farmlands that absorb carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere.  Id.
92. See William D. Nordhaus, Global Warming Economics, 294 SCI. 1283, 1283
(2001) (“[T]he accord will accomplish relatively little in emissions reductions
without U.S. participation—reducing global carbon-dioxide emissions by about 1%
relative to no policy in the first period, 2008 to 2012.”).
93. See generally Andrew L. Strauss, Suing the United States for Global Warming
Emissions:  Discussion Paper for In the Red Conference (July 10, 2001).
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United States has entered into treaties with the complainants that
specifically provide for dispute resolution before the ICJ, they could
assert jurisdiction over the United States pursuant to Article 36(1) of
the Statute of the ICJ.94  While the United States has not entered into
any treaties that specifically forbid GHG emissions, it has entered into
a number of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties
that provide that each party will treat the other fairly.95  Professor
Strauss argues that the harm caused by the GHG emissions to other
parties to these treaties may provide grounds for legal action.96
Alternatively, countries injured by the United States’ GHG emissions
might seek advisory opinions from the ICJ,97 or they might seek other
forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as international
arbitration under the Law of the Sea Convention.98  Another ground
for a cause of action might be the international legal principle that
states are liable for the international effects of actions within their
boundaries.99  Specifically, environmental groups have explored the
possibility of bringing a class action suit against the United States or
emitting corporations.100  Attorneys general from eleven states have
sent a letter to President Bush urging him to act now to curtail global
warming, stating that “continuing federal inaction will inevitably lead
to a wider range of state regulatory efforts, [and] states . . . are
beginning to review their litigation options.”101

94. See 36 I.C.J. § 1 (2002) (stating the jurisdiction of the ICJ includes all cases
referred to it by involved parties and any matters so provided by the Charter, treaties,
and conventions of the United Nations); Strauss, supra note 93, at 2.
95. See generally Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 807 (1958) (stating that FCN treaties include a
variety of agreements that establish ground rules for the daily intercourse between
countries).
96. See Strauss, supra note 93, at 4 (contemplating an application of the treaties to
prescribe against harm to foreign interests).  Professor Strauss is not optimistic about
the chances of success for such a suit, noting that the ICJ rejected Iran’s argument
that several treaty provisions were violated by the U.S. military during the Iran-Iraq
War.  Id.  The ICJ found that it had jurisdiction but generally rejected a broad
interpretation of FCN treaties that would be helpful in a global warming case.  Id.
97. Id. at 5-6.
98. Id. at 6-7; see also Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention, pt. XI, sec. 5, at art. 188 (1982) (outlining the
procedure for arbitration under the Convention).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (1987) (stating that each state is obligated to take measures to ensure
that activities within its boundaries are conducted to avoid significant injury to the
environment of another state).
100. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Global Warming May Bring New Variety of Class Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at A14 (describing how a group of environmental lawyers is
exploring new legal strategies to combat global warming).  Even industries might
bring an action for environmental harm caused by global warming; for example,
owners of forested property may be injured if climate change causes the death of
their heat-intolerant trees.  Id.
101.  Letter from Thomas F. Reilly, Massachusetts Attorney General et al., States
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Delaying any substantive action on global warming could have
other practical consequences for the United States, especially because
it seems likely that carbon reduction targets can be met in part by
carbon trading.102  As a late adopter, the United States could miss
lower cost carbon-trading opportunities, resulting in higher
compliance costs when the United States finally decides to act.103
Some researchers argue that stemming GHG emissions could be
good for the U.S. economy.104  In 2000, scientists from five of the
National Laboratories were commissioned by the Department of
Energy (“DOE”) to form the Interlaboratory Working Group
(“IWG”).105  The IWG developed and compared three scenarios for
GHG mitigation and energy efficiency in the Clean Energy Future
(“CEF”) study,106 thus exploring several possible futures in a
systematic way.107  First, the Business As Usual (“BAU”) Scenario was
developed from the Energy Information Administration’s (“EIA”)
Annual Energy Outlook 1999 and was considered the baseline
scenario, reflecting current law and policies.108  Next, the Moderate

Attorneys General Press Bush Administration on Climate Change (July 17, 2002),
available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/press_rel/0702.asp?head2=July%2C+2002&
parent=464&section=5.
102. See Ricardo Bayon, Trading Futures in Dirty Air:  Here’s a Market-Based Way to
Fight Global Warming, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at B2 (comparing the success of the
sulfur dioxide trading program of the 1990s to the possible success of a carbon
trading program).
103. See id. (stating that if carbon emissions caps are implemented, the price of
carbon will skyrocket).
104. See, e.g., J. ANDREW HOERNER & JAN MUTL, GOOD BUSINESS:  ANALYSIS OF
ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY 17 (asserting that a well-designed, American energy
efficiency policy could foster significant economic gains), available at
http://www.sustainableeconomy.org/goodbusiness.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2002); see
also The Role of Tax Incentives in Energy Policy:  Hearings before the S. Comm. on Finance,
107th Cong. 56-58 (2001) (statement of Prof. Daniel M. Kammen) (examining the
increasing number of renewable energy options equally or less expensive than the
prevailing fossil fuel technologies); Daniel M. Kammen, Kammen Remarks at Finance
Hearing on Energy Tax Incentive Proposals, TAX NEWS TODAY, JULY 12, 2001, at 134
(“There is finally a growing understanding that a responsible national energy policy
includes a global climate change mitigation strategy that can be environmentally
effective and economically advantageous.”).
105. Members of the Interlaboratory Working Group came from Argonne
National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, National Laboratory
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific North
West National Laboratory.
106. See INTERLABORATORY WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY-EFFICIENT AND CLEAN
ENERGY TECHS., SCENARIOS FOR A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE ch. 8 (2000) [hereinafter
CLEAN SCENARIOS] (identifying the potential for impressive advances in the
development and deployment of clean energy technologies through the adoption of
fiscal incentives, voluntary programs, regulations, research and development and
concluding that the overall benefits of such policy changes would be comparable to
their costs), available at http://www.ornl.gov/ORNL/Energy_Eff/CEF.htm (revised
Dec. 20, 2000).
107. Id. at 8.4.
108. See id. at 3.2.1 (describing the three main methodologies that were used in
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Scenario was defined by a set of policies reflecting a slight shift in
political influences and public opinion, and was characterized by
stricter codes and regulations, information outreach, and tax
credits.109  Finally, the Advanced Scenario embodied a set of policies
consistent with an impending national crisis concerning energy
productivity, oil supply vulnerability, air quality, and GHG
mitigation.110  In addition, the Advanced Scenario assumed the
existence of a nationwide carbon permit trading system.111  In both
the Moderate and Advanced scenarios examined by the National
Laboratories, the energy bill savings, in combination with recycled
revenues from the domestic carbon trading system, exceeded the
annualized direct costs of the technologies and policies.112  J. Andrew
Hoerner and Jan Mutl took the CEF study further and analyzed the
overall economic impact on the U.S. economy and on specific
industries.113  They found that “a properly designed energy-efficiency
policy, including a market incentive to reduce fossil fuel
consumption, together with cuts in other taxes, would be beneficial
to a substantial majority of U.S. businesses, whether measured by
value of shipments or by employment.”114  Taken together over a
twenty year forecast, the net benefits for most individual businesses
are very large in the aggregate.115  These results are based entirely on
domestic policies and produce net domestic benefits.116
Subsequently, the Economic Policy Institute of the Center for a
Sustainable Economy conducted a macroeconomic analysis of an
alternative approach to climate and energy policy, and concluded
that over two million jobs could be created over the next twenty years
together with a fifty percent reduction in the United States’ carbon

the study).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 3.5.2 (analyzing the incremental investment technology costs, policy
and administrative costs, and direct savings created by implementing each of the
three scenarios).  These analyses did not reflect the value of other important benefits
such as reduced vulnerability to oil supply disruptions, cleaner air, and improved
balance of payments.  Id.
113. See HOERNER & MUTL, supra note 104, at 11 (examining the potential effects
of environmentally friendly tax incentives, and other similar reforms, on 498
industries and concluding that within ten years, eighty-four percent of these
industries would save millions of dollars if these tax policies were adopted).
114. Id. at 17; see also REPETTO ET AL., GREEN FEES:  HOW A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 59 (World Resources Institute 1992) (endorsing
a reduction in “deadweight losses” from taxes on capital and labor as a means to
counterbalance potential economic losses from reduced fossil fuel use).
115. HOERNER & MUTL, supra note 104, at 17.
116. Id. at 18.
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emissions.117
Although there is ongoing debate as to whether economic theory
and traditional cost-benefit analysis are appropriate for assessing
responses to a major environmental threat like global warming,
Richard Posner noted that while economics can determine what is an
efficient distribution of resources, it cannot resolve the issue of
whether such distribution is socially or ethically desirable.118  Using
solely economic calculations based on market evaluations for cost-
benefit measurements might lead to inadequate protection of the
environment.119  Legislation to protect the environment need not rely
only on conventional economics, but can reflect public concerns for
the environment.120  In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,121
the Supreme Court found that the EPA could not interpret the Clean
Air Act122 as defined solely by the implementation costs of pollution
abatement measures.123  This precedent, although based on a specific

117. See JAMES P. BARRETT & J. ANDREW HOERNER, ECON. POLICY INST. & CTR. FOR A
SUSTAINABLE ECON., CLEAN ENERGY AND JOBS:  A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY POLICY 2  (2002) (concluding that a policy plan
combining a “polluter-pays” approach with reduced taxes on working people and the
promotion of new, clean technologies would advance both environmental protection
and economic prosperity, disproving the idea of a required choice), available at
http://www.sustainableeconomy.org/press/globalwarming8.pdf (last visited Aug. 18,
2002).  The proposed plan would have four elements:  (1) a carbon/energy tax on
major energy sources combined with cuts in wage taxes; (2) promotion of energy
efficient and renewable energy technologies; (3) a border adjustment of carbon tax
for fossil-fuel producing and energy intense industries, thus preserving the
competitiveness of these industries; and (4) transition assistance for workers
adversely impacted by the policy.  Id. at 9-14.  By combining an energy tax with
energy efficient technologies, the overall tax rate would remain relatively low.  Id. at
10.
118. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1992); see also
Johnson, supra note 15, at 120 (citing economists’ admission that economic theory
cannot pass social or moral judgments on the allocation of resources).
119. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation
Measurement on Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3-5
(Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993) (explaining that economic calculations, based on
people’s behavior and choices, cannot reflect the value of commodities not traded in
markets or directly affecting people’s actions; for example, the value of wilderness in
Maine visited by few, the value of a nearly extinct species, the value of the Grand
Canyon, even if left unseen); see also John R.E. Bliese, Conservative Principles and
Environmental Policies, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (spring 1998) (arguing that
market signals do not provide clear indications of long-term resources because they
are the products of speculation and manipulation).
120. Diamond & Hausman, supra note 119, at 22-23.
121. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
122. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
123. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465 (holding that under the non-delegation
doctrine, the EPA is not permitted to apply cost-benefit analysis to the
implementation of new standards unless explicitly instructed to do so by the enabling
statute).  Specifically, where the statute provides that national primary ambient air
quality standards are to be set at the level requisite to protect public health, § 109, 42
U.S.C.A. 7409(b), the cost of implementation could not be considered.  Whitman,
531 U.S. at 465.  The Court stated,
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statute, indicates the legislature’s willingness to forego a cost-benefit
analysis where the analysis would endanger public health.124  Thus,
despite conflicting evidence about the cost of GHG abatement and
the potential effect on the economy, its probable effect on the
environment justifies taking action.125
The businesses most likely to be hurt by restrictions on GHG
emissions have powerful friends in the Administration and
Congress.126  The coal industry gives significantly more funding to
Republicans than Democrats, and coal industry executives have been
rewarded with positions such as energy advisor to the Bush-Cheney
transition team127 and deputy secretary of the Department of the
Interior.128  The coal industry’s influence is reflected in the
Administration’s rejection of carbon dioxide emission regulation
because it would reduce coal-burning plants’ efficiency and further
exacerbate the energy crisis.129  President Bush’s rejection of the
Kyoto Protocol advanced the coal industry’s view that, “carbon

[t]he EPA . . . is to identify the maximum airborne concentration of a
pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to
provide an ‘adequate’ margin of safety, and set the standard at that level.
Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of the initial
calculation.
Id.
124. Id. at 458 (concluding that the cost factor is indirectly related to public
health and had Congress meant to consider costs, Congress would have expressly
mentioned it in §§ 108-109 of the Clean Air Act).
125. Id.
126. See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that over the last six years, the oil
and coal industries have spent millions of dollars to minimize the threat of climate
change, “[f]or [the fossil fuel industry] . . . .”).
127. See Dan Morgan, Betting on Bush Pays Off for Big Coal, WASH. POST WKLY., Apr.
2, 2001, at 12 (noting that the holding company of the Peabody Group contributed
$250,000 to the Republican National Committee in July 2001).  For example, Irl
Englehardt, Chairman of the Peabody Group, the nation’s largest coal enterprise was
placed on the EPA’s transition team.  John Mintz, Transition Advisers Have Much to
Gain:  Consumer Activists Concerned Big Business Will Use Team Members to Muscle the
Incoming Bush Administration, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2001, at A15.
128. See Morgan, supra note 127, at 12 (noting coal industry officials’ strong
political influence, not only the executive branch of the government, but also in
Congress).  In addition, J. Steven Giles, has lobbied for coal and gas companies and
was nominated by Bush to be the Deputy Secretary of the Interior.  Press Release,
The White House, President Bush to Nominate Four Individuals to Serve in His
Administration (Mar. 8, 2001), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/03/20010308-18.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
129. See Peter Behr, Crisis? What Crisis?:  Market Forces and Conservation Have Calmed
Fears Over Fuel and Electric Supplies, WASH. POST WKLY., June 18, 2001, at 18 (noting
California’s successful and surprising avoidance of an energy crisis by using less
energy to avoid paying the high energy prices and concluding that when energy is
more expensive, people use less of it); Peter Behr, On the Energy Roller Coaster, WASH.
POST WKLY., Sept. 10, 2001, at 18 (citing four key factors involved in the unexpected
drop in energy prices:  (1) conservation, (2) regulation, (3) increased production,
and (4) recession).  By June 2001, commentators were wondering what happened to
the energy crisis, as gasoline and natural gas prices plummeted.
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dioxide is not a pollutant, and it should not be defined as such.”130
As discussed later in this Article, oil, gas, and coal already receive
significant subsidies via preferential treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code.131  Professor Garrett notes that current beneficiaries
of federal programs are in a better position to gain even more
benefits, because they already have organized and developed
expertise in lobbying the relevant committees.132  The marginal costs
of seeking new programs for an organized, established group are
much less than those of a group that must bear the significant start-
up costs of organization.133  This difference raises significant hurdles
to the enactment of GHG abatement legislation.  
Human psychology can also explain resistance to GHG
regulation.134  Recently, Jeffrey Rachlinski explored the psychological
impact of climate change reforms.135  He theorized that “cognitive
processes associated with evaluating new scientific information and
with evaluating decisions involving losses suggest that people will not
support costly precautions against global warming.”136  While it may
seem rational to support social and legislative changes to reduce
global warming, the nature of the evidence about global warming
and the human response to such evidence bodes ill for such
reforms.137  People tend to embrace evidence that supports their
existing beliefs about the world and reject evidence that is
inconsistent with such beliefs.138  Therefore, mixed evidence on a

130. National Energy Policy—Coal:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Energy and Air
Quality of the House Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 16 (2001) (statement
of J. Brett Harvey, President & CEO, Consul Energy, Inc., the “nation’s largest
producer of underground coal,” id. at 15).
131. See infra Part III.A.2 (highlighting the current state of the tax code within the
oil and gas production context).
132. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics:  The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 522 (1998) (concluding that the
dynamic will further entrench status quo distributions of government resources).
133. Id.  See also Todd J. Zwyicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities:
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 863
(1999) (arguing that the significant barriers to environmental reform come from the
collision of industry and environmentalists’ interests, rather than the industry’s
opposition to environmentalism).  Professor Zywicki believes that industry and
environmental groups cooperate to allocate gains derived from regulation among
themselves and that only the public loses in having to pay higher prices.  Id. at 849.
134. Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 299.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 304.
137. See Dale Jamieson, Uncertainty and Risk Assessment:  Scientific Uncertainty and the
Political Process, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 35, 36 (1996) (explaining that
opposing partisans take advantage of the scientific uncertainty concerning climate
change to further divisiveness over the issue).
138. See id. at 39 (arguing that because “scientific” uncertainty is not strictly
scientific, but also deeply cultural, scientific advances alone will not eliminate
people’s perception of risk).
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subject about which people have strong opinions tends to make their
opinions stronger.139
The evidence for climate change comes from highly complex
climate models, rather than from everyday experience.  The real
dangers and evidence of global climate change cannot be understood
without using scientific theory.140  Because scientific theory entails
some uncertainty, some people will remain unconvinced.141
Diminished and inconsistent public support makes it hard to
promulgate any GHG regulations or implement new taxes on carbon
emissions.142
However, even if all of the scientific evidence supported a theory of
global warming, psychologists and behavioral economists believe that
people would be unwilling to make changes that might reduce their
perceived quality of life.143  This phenomenon is known as loss
aversion, which causes people to be less willing to sacrifice their
present benefits for future benefits, and thus creates significant
hurdles for global warming abatement.  Under a loss aversion theory,
people would not start using fossil fuels at the risk of global warming,
even if enhanced wealth was a substantial probability.144  However, as
society is already reaping the economic benefits of consuming fossil
fuels, it is unlikely to reduce its consumption, resulting in what would
be perceived as a sure loss in economic benefit.145  History shows the

139. See id. at 40 (“[U]ncertainty reduces science to just another playground for
competing ideologies.”).
140. Id. at 36.  Jamieson elaborates:
Knowledge claims presuppose categories, but categories are relative.  For
example, some people point to increases in global mean temperatures and
extreme climatic events as evidence of global warming.  But why is global
mean temperature a significant category?  Why not instead focus on, say,
average temperatures?  And why bring together in the single class of extreme
events such diverse phenomena as hailstorms, droughts, hurricanes, heat
waves, cold snaps, and so on?  What are the baselines from which the claims
of increasing frequency or increasing temperature are projected?  What may
appear to be an increase from a baseline of 50 years ago may appear to be a
decrease from a baseline of 500 or 5000 years ago.  Of course, stories can be
told about why one form of categorization is better than another; the point is
that empirical investigation presupposes categories, without being able to
justify them empirically in advance.
Id.
141. See id. (“[T]he very characteristics of science that enable it to have its unique
cultural authority as a knowledge producer disable it from bringing public decisions
to closure.”).
142. See id. at 40 (arguing that direct appeals to uncertainty rarely foster consensus
in policy-based debates).
143. Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 307.
144. Id.
145. See Murkowski, supra note 76, at 358:
It is difficult for politically attuned leaders to agree to risk America’s
economic growth in an effort to minimize the uncertain impacts of climate
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effect of this phenomenon in the long delays in implementing
safeguards for various hazardous substances such as asbestos and
hydrocarbons.146  In the case of asbestos, a researcher wrote in 1898
that exposure to asbestos dust would cause injury to the lungs.147  The
European Union acted one hundred years later, in 1998, to impose a
ban on asbestos, which is to be implemented by member states by
2005.148  The European Environment Agency noted that:  “[t]he costs
of preventative actions are usually tangible, clearly allocated and
often short-term, whereas the costs of failing to act are less tangible,
less clearly distributed and usually longer term, posing problems of
governance.  Weighing up the overall pros and cons of action, or
inaction, is therefore very difficult . . . .”149
The risk of harm from global warming in the future is also
discounted in an economic sense.  The long lag until many of the
harmful effects of GHG emissions are felt affects society’s willingness
to incur costs to prevent climate change.150  With such a long time
horizon, all benefits are discounted to zero using any positive
discount rate, so that a death prevented in the distant future is worth
nothing today.151
Of course, cost-benefit analysis for environmental issues has
practical and philosophical problems.152  Former Vice-President Al

change.  Even if it could be determined that action now yields benefits later,
the discounting of those benefits means that the current willingness-to-pay
for emissions reductions is quite low relative to current costs.
146. See EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, ENVTL. ISSUE REPORT NO. 22, LATE LESSONS
FROM EARLY WARNINGS:  THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1896-2000 59 (Paol Harremöes
ed., 2001) (noting politicians’ hesitance to promote long-term societal interests over
the short-term interests of powerful interest groups).
147. Id. at 53.
148. Id. at 57.
149. Id. at 3-4.
150. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943 (1999) (critiquing analysts’
practice of discounting losses to future generations when assessing environmental
policies).
151. See id. (opposing the use of a discount theory in cases of environmental harm
and advocating a policy of intergenerational obligations and sustainable
development); see also Bliese, supra note 119, at 20 (asserting that it almost always
makes more financial sense to destroy a sustainable natural resource by overuse, or
overharvesting, and to put the money in the bank because harvesting yields higher
annual returns when selling all the trees or fish and banking the money, as
compared to harvesting sustainably; thus, any positive discount rate causes
catastrophes in the distant future to be reduced to insignificant factors in the present
decision making process).
152. See Wallace E. Oates, Symposium, Innovations in Environmental Policy:  From
Research to Policy:  The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 135, 149
(2000) (noting the difficulty of placing monetary values on benefits, such as
improved health and extended longevity, that result from reduced air pollution); see
also John P. Weyant, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, An Introduction to the
Economics of Climate Change Policy 44 (2000) (noting that with respect to climate
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Gore suggested that one of the most effective ways to reduce
pollution is “to put a price on the environmental consequences of
our choices, a price that would be reflected in the marketplace.”153
Developing new, cheaper sources of electricity represents a solution
to the problem that may be consistent with economic and
psychological forces.154  Developing alternatives to fossil fuels,
however, may require government intervention because current
industrial and residential use of fossil fuels is firmly entrenched.155
The United States could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by
reducing fossil fuel usage and increasing carbon absorption.156  Fossil
fuel usage could be reduced by increasing the proportion of non-
carbon emitting energy sources such as nuclear, wind, or solar, and
by conserving energy by increasing efficiency and reducing waste.157
One way this could be accomplished is by using the revenue from
reducing the tax incentives enjoyed by fossil fuel industries to
increase tax incentives for renewable energy and conservation.158

change, five elements determine the results of a cost-benefit analysis of GHG
abatement:  (1) base case emissions projection; (2) policy regime (e.g., whether
emissions trading is permitted); (3) whether benefits of GHG reductions are
considered; (4) the rate and extent of substitution of energy products; and (5) the
rate of improvement of the energy substitutes over time), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/econ_introduction.cfm.  Variations in these
elements account for variation in the predictions made under different models of
cost benefit analysis.  Id.
153. ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE:  ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
348 (1992).
154. Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 318-19.  Gary Bryner from the Natural Resources
Center of the University of Colorado School of Law notes that, “[t]here is a major
disconnect between our reliance on markets for the efficient allocation of resources,
and the failure of markets to include the true costs of producing energy from fossil
fuels. . . . The problem of inadequate pricing of fossil fuels is ultimately a political
challenge.”  Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy:  Assessing Energy Policy Choices,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 412 (2002).
155. See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 97 (citing Kirk Brown of the Business Council
for a Sustainable Economy, who predicts that if Congress gave the renewable energy
industry the approximately $20 billion in tax credits that it gives to fossil fuel
producers, climate-friendly technologies would become instantly competitive with
fossil fuels).
156. See U.N. Env’t Programme, Info. Unit for Conventions, Understanding Climate
Change:  A Beginner’s Guide to the UN Framework Convention 24 (citing the adoption of
such measures throughout the world as essential to the success of efforts to curb
global warming), available at http://www.unep.ch/iuc/submenu/begin/beginner.
htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
157. Id.
158. See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 97-98 (citing Alden Meyer, an energy specialist
with the Union of Concerned Scientists, who estimates that a near absolute transition
to a renewable energy economy could easily be accomplished at a cost of about $25
billion a year over the next ten years, resulting in a major increase in economic
growth).  Reducing the subsidies for fossil fuels would also facilitate the imposition of
a carbon tax.  Subsidies encouraging the use of fossil fuels inhibit the effectiveness of
a carbon tax because they discourage substitution.  Dernbach, supra note 11, at
10976; see Effect of Federal Tax Laws on the Production, Supply and Conservation of Energy:
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Carbon absorption can be increased by planting new forests,
conserving existing timberlands, and by employing less intensive
agricultural methods.159  Although the Internal Revenue Code already
contains incentives for reforestation and conservation, some changes
could be made to increase the availability of such incentives.160
II.  TAX POLICY AND GLOBAL WARMING
A. Energy
1.  Vice President Cheney’s report
Although other concerns have taken precedence recently, energy
policy remains crucial to our nation’s infrastructure.  In May 2001,
Vice President Richard Cheney produced a report that projected the
growth of the “fundamental imbalance between supply and demand,”
causing the U.S. energy crisis.161  The imbalance was illustrated in the
years 1991-2001 by a 2.3% increase in domestic energy production,
versus a seventeen percent increase in consumption, with a further
thirty-two percent increase in consumption projected by 2020.162  The
report direly predicted, “[t]his imbalance, if allowed to continue, will
inevitably undermine our economy, our standard of living, and our
national security.”163  It outlined three “principal energy challenges”:
conserving energy, upgrading U.S. energy distribution
infrastructures, and increasing production while protecting the
environment.164
The numbers in the Vice President’s report do not tell the whole
story.165  First, fossil fuels contain differing amounts of carbon,

Hearing before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 9 (2001) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearing] (statement of
Joseph Mikrut) (“Tax incentives can offset the failure of market prices to signal the
desirable level of investment in energy-saving and alternative energy technologies
because they increase the private return from the investment by reducing its after-tax
cost.”), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
107_house_hearings&docid=f:74221.wais (last visited June 9, 2002).
159. U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 156, at 21, 24.  The results of continued
GHG emissions would be compounded if the balancing effects of carbon sinks were
removed.  Id. at 21.
160. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 158, at 10-31.
161. NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY:  REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP viii (2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov-energy-National-Energy-Policy.pdf.
162. Id. at 1.1.
163. Id. at viii.
164. Id. at ix.
165. See Dana Milbank, Cheney Refuses Records’ Release:  Energy Showdown with GAO
Looms, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at A1, A12 (discussing the congressional
investigation and Cheney’s refusal to cooperate with congressional “erosion of
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producing differing amounts of GHG; coal contains the highest level
of carbon per unit of energy, while petroleum contains twenty-five
percent less and natural gas contains forty-five percent less.166
Second, GHG emissions resulting from transportation have not been
reduced, despite the introduction of stricter auto emission standards
and cleaner fuels.167  Petroleum accounted for thirty-nine percent of
1998 U.S. energy use, primarily consumed in transportation.168  By
comparison, coal accounted for twenty-three percent of U.S.
consumption, primarily for electric utilities, and natural gas
accounted for twenty-three percent, primarily in residential and
industrial applications.169  Between 1990 and 1998, the number of
driver miles increased by twenty-one percent, fueled by economic and
population growth, more roads, and relatively low gas prices.170  In
light of the continued rise in U.S. petroleum consumption, mostly
due to increased transportation consumption, the first logical step in
implementing demand-side management is to increase the price of
petroleum products, thus reducing use, but as discussed below, both
current and pending legislation does not offer this solution.171

[presidential] powers”).  Some members of Congress questioned whether the results
of the report were skewed because of industry advisers and asked the General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) to investigate.  See Dana Milbank, GAO Sues
Administration Over Task Force Records, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2002, at A7 (reporting the
GAO suit against Cheney); see also Mike Allen, GAO to Sue Cheney Within 2 or 3 Weeks:
Hill Agency Seeks Energy Records, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A4 (stating that the GAO
suit, the first of its kind brought by the GAO against a federal entity, sought to
uncover information regarding meeting attendees, locations, dates, and subject
matter); Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, Cheney and the Oilmen, WASH. POST WKLY., Mar. 4-
10, 2002, at 15 (reporting the U.S. District Court order requiring the Department of
Energy to submit over 7,500 pages of materials).  Compare Dana Milbank & Mike
Allen, Energy Contacts Disclosed:  Consumer Groups Left Out, Data Show, WASH. POST,
Mar. 26, 2002, at A1, A8 (noting that although thousands of documents were
withheld, the DOE delivered 11,000 heavily redacted pages to the District Court,
which revealed the administration’s heavy reliance on the advice of the energy
industry), with H. Josef Hebert, Energy Panel Gave Environmentalists Brief Input, THE
NEWS J., Mar. 26, 2002, at A3 (noting that input from environmental activists was
given only minimal and belated consideration in the DOE’s report).
166. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS:  1990-1998 at ES-10 (2000), National Center for Environmental
Publications and Information (releasing annual GHG emissions data for most types
of fuel and numerous economic sectors, in accordance with commitments to the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change), available at http://www.epa.gov/
globalwarming/emissions/national.
167. Id. at ES-7.
168. Id. at ES-10.
169. Id.
170. Id. at ES-7.
171. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the latest energy legislation pending in
Congress and noting that it falls short of significant emission reduction targets).
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2.  Present law
To understand the tax subsidies enjoyed by fossil fuel industries, we
must first examine the taxation of business assets; most taxpayers can
recover the cost of purchasing business assets by means of the
depreciation deduction.172  The idea behind the depreciation
deduction is that the costs of capital assets should be recovered over
their useful life.173  The amount of the depreciation deduction is
typically calculated with reference to the initial cost of the property
and its expected useful life.174  Rather than require each taxpayer to
determine the useful life of each asset, the Code and Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) set forth recovery periods for a large range
of assets.175  The recovery periods vary from three years for some
animals to thirty-nine years for nonresidential real property.176  The
cost of oil and gas production may be recovered by means of the
depletion deduction.177  The mechanism of the depletion deduction
recognizes that it may be difficult to establish a useful life for an oil
well, as it is difficult to know how much oil is in the ground.178
Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code permits percentage
depletion for certain holders of oil and gas interests.179  Percentage
depletion differs from depreciation and cost depletion in that the
total amount of depletion deductions may exceed the actual cost of

172. See I.R.C. § 167 (West 2002) (stating the general depreciation rule, basis for
depreciation, and exceptions); see also id. § 168 (expanding the depreciation
mechanism with an accelerated cost recovery system (“ACRS”)).
173. Id. § 168.
174. See id. (establishing property categories and corresponding methods for
calculating the property’s “useful life” for depreciation).
175. See id. § 168(c) (providing supplemental property lists and exceptions); Rev.
Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 (providing a detailed and lengthy supplement to the
property lists in § 168(c)).
176. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(A) (assigning a three year recovery period for a
horse); Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 677 (assigning a three year recovery period for
breeding hogs); I.R.C. § 168(c) (assigning recovery periods for real property,
including fifty years for railroad grading property).
177. I.R.C. §§ 611-613.
178. See C.W. RUSSELL ET AL., INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 804 (2000)
(suggesting that the legislative intent of this depreciation mechanism was (1) to allow
a depletion deduction based on the gross income from the oil well, regardless of
recovery of base investment; and (2) to create an incentive for exploration by
improving the previous estimated value method, which provoked frequent disputes
between the I.R.S. and taxpayers).  But see id. at 105 (allaying concerns over the
uncertainty of oil and gas investments with an assertion that geological and
geophysical exploration technology has advanced recently, but admitting that
drilling remains the only accurate method for establishing the presence of
recoverable oil).
179. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (amended 1973) (stating that the “economic
interest” for the depletion allowance requires a capital investment in the mineral
rights, and excludes any contract-based interest).
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the interest.180  Thus, investment in qualifying oil and gas properties
has the potential to yield greater proportionate tax benefits than
investment in any other type of property.181
The percentage depletion method for oil and gas properties is
limited to independent producers and royalty owners.182  Generally,
fifteen percent of the taxpayer’s gross income from the oil or gas
producing property is deductible,183 limited to 100 percent of the net
income from the property for the year.184  In addition, the percentage
depletion deduction is limited to sixty-five percent of the taxpayer’s
overall net income, with certain modifications.185  Before 1991, the
deduction was limited to fifty percent of net income.186  Since 1993,
the alternative minimum tax provisions do not apply to oil and gas
percentage depletion deductions, thus providing additional
incremental benefits for oil and gas producers.187  For example,

180. See RUSSELL, supra note 178, at 804 (observing that the percentage depletion
allowance is not limited to the original capital investment).
181. See I.R.C. § 613(b) (limiting the depletion allowance to fifty percent of
taxable income for a broad range of mines, wells, and deposits whose percentage
depletion rates range from five to twenty-two percent of gross income, while allowing
oil and gas properties, but not other investments, to deduct up to 100% of taxable
income).  Oil and gas investments are treated preferentially.  For example, assume
Investor A has invested $4,125,000 in oil-producing property and Investor B has
invested $4,125,000 in a high-rise apartment building.  Assume that both investments
have a gross income of $1,000,000 per year.  Under Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”)
§ 613A(c)(1), Investor A can deduct 15% of her net income, or $150,000 per year,
for depletion.  Under I.R.C. § 168(c), Investor B can deduct the fixed yearly
percentage of her $4,125,000 investment allowed in her recovery period of 27.5 years
for residential real property, thus $150,000 in the case of Investor B as well.  After
27.5 years, Investor B has fully depreciated her investment, and is allowed no further
deductions.  Investor A can continue to take a depletion deduction of up to fifteen
percent of gross income from her oil producing property, even after her initial
investment has been completely recovered.  Moreover, capital improvements that
Investor B makes to her property must be depreciated over a straight-line recovery
period.  On the other hand, Investor A can take advantage of I.R.C. § 263A(c) and
deduct intangible drilling and development costs, such as wages and supplies, as
though they were expenses rather than capital improvements.  While this simple
example illustrates the mechanism of percentage depletion, as a practical matter the
preferential tax treatment for oil and gas properties is generally fully reflected in the
market price.  Thus, the subsidy will result in failure of the market to accurately
reflect the pre-tax values.
182. See I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1)-(4) (defining the depletion allowance for
independent producers, and royalty owners, as approximately 1000 barrels of oil per
day—or its natural gas equivalent); see also id. § 613A(d) (excluding all retailers and
refiners producing an excess of 50,000 barrels per year from the independent
producer depletion deduction).
183. Id. § 613A(c)(1).
184. Id. § 613(a).
185. Id. § 613A(d)(1).
186. See The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 11522(a), 104 Stat. 1388 (amending I.R.C. § 613(a) to allow a deduction of up to
100% of net income for oil and gas properties).
187. See The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1915(a)(1), 106
Stat. 2776 (1993) (amending I.R.C. § 57(a)(1) to exclude oil and gas properties
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eligible taxpayers may take percentage depletion for up to 1000
barrels average daily production of domestic crude oil or an
equivalent amount of domestic natural gas.188  When the price of oil
gets low, taxpayers who own an economic interest in marginal wells
have even greater incentives.189  The fifteen percent statutory
depletion rate is increased by one percent for each whole dollar that
the average price of crude oil for the immediately preceding calendar
year is less than $20 per barrel, up to a maximum depletion rate of
twenty-five percent.190  For example, in 1999 the average price of a
barrel of crude oil was $15.56.191  Thus, the percentage depletion rate
for marginal wells in 2000 was nineteen percent.192
While equipment costs of oil and gas production must be
recovered either by cost depletion or percentage depletion,
intangible drilling and development costs (“IDCs”) can be expensed
and recovered immediately.193  IDCs include all expenditures made by
an operator for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., incident
to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for the production of oil and gas.194  The election to expense IDCs
gives another advantage to investment in oil and gas properties over
other types of capital assets.195
Oil and gas producers are also eligible for the enhanced oil
recovery credit (“EOR”),196 which is a component of the general
business credit.197  A qualified EOR project must involve the use of
one or more tertiary recovery methods defined in I.R.C.

using the depletion deduction under I.R.C. § 613A).  See generally I.R.C. §§ 55-59
(detailing the alternative minimum tax formula, which imposes a minimum tax and
disallows some deductions, thus imposing a floor, or tax that must be paid only if
income is over a certain level).
188. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(3)-(4).
189. See id. § 613A(c)(6)(D) (defining marginal production and marginal wells);
id. § 613A(c)(6)(H) (suspending the taxable income limit imposed by I.R.C.
§ 613(a) on percentage depletion for marginal production, for 1998 to 2001); see also
The Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-47, § 607(a)(1),
116 Stat. 21 (extending the suspension of the taxable income limit for marginal
production through 2003).
190. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(6)(C).
191. Notice 2000-23, 2000-1 C.B. 952.
192. I.R.C. § 263A(c) (allowing intangible costs to be treated as business expenses
rather than capital investments, at the operator’s election, when the costs are
associated with the drilling and development of oil, gas, and geothermal wells).
193. Id. § 263(c).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (as amended in 2002).
195. See I.R.C. § 179 (allowing limited expenses to be deducted in the year they
were incurred, and imposing restrictions on type of expenditure covered).
196. See id. § 43 (allowing an enhanced oil recovery credit for any taxable year
equal to fifteen percent of the taxpayer’s qualified enhanced oil recovery costs for
such taxable year).
197. Id. § 38(a).
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§ 193(b)(3).198  While oil and gas producers get the bulk of the tax
benefits, certain producers of fuel from unconventional sources may
use a tax credit of $3 per barrel or barrel equivalent.199  The Code also
imposes excise taxes on oil, which benefit the Hazardous Substance
Superfund and the Oil Spill Liability Fund.200
Taxpayers may obtain limited tax credits for producing electricity
from certain renewable resources, such as wind, closed loop biomass,
and poultry litter.201  There is also a tax credit for investments in solar
and geothermal energy property.202  The total estimated tax
expenditures for renewable resources is $500 million from 2001 to
2005, less than nine percent of the amount to be spent on oil and
gas.203  Of these types of renewable power sources, all except wind,
solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal energy produce GHG
emissions.204
Energy conservation efforts receive even less benefit from the
Code.  A taxpayer may exclude from income the value of any subsidy
provided by a public utility for the purchase or installation of an
energy conservation measure primarily designed to reduce the
consumption of electricity or natural gas or to improve the

198. Id. § 193(b)(3) (defining tertiary recovery method).
199. See id. § 29 (determining the tax credit for fuel production from an
unconventional source).  From 2001 to 2005, tax expenditures for the benefit of oil
and gas producers are estimated to total $5.8 billion, while the tax credit for
unconventional fuels totals $5.3 billion. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107th
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005 16
(Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter J. COMM. PRINT].
200. See I.R.C. § 4611 (determining the Hazardous Substance Superfund financing
rate is 9.7 cents a barrel, and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund financing rate is five
cents a barrel).
201. See id. § 45 (defining wind, closed-loop biomass, and poultry waste as
“qualified energy resources”).  The credit is a component of the general business
credit, which in total may not exceed twenty-five percent of net regular tax liability
above $25,000, or the tentative minimum tax.  Id. § 38.  This provision, scheduled to
expire in 2002, was extended two years until 2004.  Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 (extending tax
credit allowance to boost employment as a result of the events of September 11,
2001).
202. See I.R.C. § 48 (establishing a ten percent investment credit for the cost of
“energy property” defined as (1) equipment that uses solar energy to generate
electricity to heat or cool a structure, or to provide solar process heat; or
(2) equipment used to produce, distribute, or use energy derived from a geothermal
deposit).  This credit is also a component of the general business credit and subject
to its limitations.  See id. § 38 (defining the limitations of the credit allowed based on
the amount of tax).
203. See J. COMM. PRINT, supra note 199, at 17 (adding tax credit for production in
solar and geo-thermal energy facilities at $100 million to tax credit for electricity
production from wind, biomass, and poultry waste at $400 million to total $500
million).
204. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, OECD, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS; THE ENERGY
DIMENSION 14 (1991) (listing the various greenhouse gases and their concentration
in the atmosphere).
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management of energy demand with respect to a dwelling unit.205  In
1996, Congress removed this exclusion for property other than
dwelling units.206  The cost of this program is anticipated to total $100
million from 2001 to 2005.207  The Code allows a portion of the cost of
certain clean-fuel vehicles to be expensed rather than capitalized.208
Finally, the Code permits a ten percent tax credit for the cost of a
qualified electric vehicle, up to a maximum credit of $4,000.209
Depending on how the electricity is produced, this credit may result
in a reduction of GHG emissions.210
One might inquire how the subsidies for fossil fuel industries have
impacted usage.  Congress mandates following the cost of tax
expenditures, but does not provide for study of the consequences of
such expenditures.211
3.  Recent legislative proposals
Recent energy tax proposals generally increase the imbalance of
benefits in favor of the oil and gas industry.212  The U.S. House of
Representatives and the Senate have passed two different versions of
an energy tax bill.213  The differences will need to be resolved by a
House-Senate conference.214  On May 1, 2002, the Senate named

205. See I.R.C. § 136(c)(1) (defining “energy conservation measure”).
206. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1617(a),
110 Stat. 1755 (substituting “energy demand with respect to a dwelling unit” in place
of “energy demand—(A) with respect to a dwelling unit, and (B) on or after January
1, 1995, with respect to property other than dwelling units”).  The exclusion for non-
residential property had only been in effect one year.  Id.
207. J. COMM. PRINT, supra note 199, at 17.
208. See I.R.C. § 137A (allowing a deduction equal to the cost of any qualified
clean-fuel vehicle property and any qualified clean-fuel vehicle refueling property).
This provision, scheduled to expire in 2002, was extended two years until 2004.  Job
Creating and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 606, 116 Stat. 21,
59.
209. See I.R.C. § 30 (establishing a credit for qualified electric vehicles).
210. See id. § 30(c)(1) (defining “qualified electric vehicle” as “any motor vehicle
which is powered primarily by an electric motor drawing current from rechargeable
batteries, fuel cells, or other portable sources of electrical current”).
211. J. COMM. PRINT, supra note 199, at 2.  In fact, the Joint Committee specifically
states that “in the process of listing tax expenditures, no judgment is made, nor any
implication intended, about the desirability [or effectiveness] on any special tax
provision as a matter of public policy.”  Id. at 3.
212. See Editorial, Adding Up the Energy Bills, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2002, at A20
(noting that by preserving the oil industry’s benefits, the Bush Administration is
continuing the long standing policy of shying away from requiring industry sacrifice).
213. See Securing America’s Future Energy Act of 2001, H.R. 4, 107th Cong.
(2001); The Energy Policy Act of 2002, 1 CONG. REC. S3342-3418 (daily ed. Apr. 25,
2002).
214. See Adding Up the Energy Bills, supra note 212, at A20 (stating that since debates
in the House and Senate have been completed the bills will move forward to a joint
conference committee).
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conferees,215 but as of press time no firm date has been set for final
reconciliation.216   The House bill, the Securing America’s Future
Energy Act of 2001, or the SAFE Act of 2001,217 which passed the
House on August 1, 2001, establishes tax incentives, including tax
credits, with respect to:  (1) oil and gas production;218 (2) offshore oil
and gas vessels and structures;219 (3) emission reductions and
efficiency improvements in coal-based electricity generation
facilities;220 (4) early commercial applications of advanced clean coal
technologies;221 (5) prepayments for natural gas;222 (6) electric
power;223 (7) spent nuclear fuel storage;224 (8) energy efficiency;225
(9) alternative fuels;226 and (10) renewable energy.227  The goal of the
bill is to reduce the U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources from
fifty-six percent to forty-five percent by January 1, 2012, and to reduce
U.S. dependence on Iraqi energy sources from 700,000 barrels per
day to 250,000 barrels per day by January 1, 2012.228  Another stated

215. See Appointment of Conferees on H.R. 4, Securing America’s Future Energy
Act of 2001, 148 CONG. REC. H3462 (daily ed. June 12, 2002) (listing the conferees as
Senators Bingaman, Hollings, Baucus, Kerry, Rockefeller, Breaux, Reid, Jeffords,
Lieberman, Murkowski, Domenici, Grassley, Nickles, Lott, Craig, Campbell, and
Thomas).
216. See 148 CONG. REC. D830-01 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (noting the conferees
met but have not completed comparing the two versions of the bill); 148 CONG. REC.
D692-01 (daily ed. June 27, 2002) (announcing the first meeting of the conferees);
see also Press Release, Senator Frank Murkowski, supra note 7.
217. See H.R. 4, § 6503 (permitting oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) in Alaska); see also Michael Grunwald, Departmental
Differences Show Over ANWR Drilling:  Interior’s Norton Rebuffs Wildlife Service in Senate
Testimony, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2001, at A3 (asserting that Interior Secretary Gail
Norton “cherry-picked” data from the Fish and Wildlife Service to present a false
picture of the impact of drilling in ANWR on caribou populations).  However, it is
unlikely that a conference version of the bill would include drilling in ANWR.
218. See H.R. 4, § 3301 (establishing a credit for producing oil and gas from
marginal wells).
219. See id. §§ 6201-6234 (establishing royalties in kind for offshore oil and gas
development).
220. See id. § 3118 (establishing credit for production in qualifying advanced clean
coal technology).
221. See id. § 3117 (establishing credit for investments in qualifying advanced
clean coal technology).
222. See id. § 3213 (establishing rules and exceptions to prepayments for natural
gas).
223. See id. § 3207 (establishing tax-exempt bond financing for certain electric
facilities).
224. See id. §§ 2341-2344 (authorizing appropriations for development of nuclear
energy technology).
225. See id. § 3107 (establishing credit for energy efficient appliances).
226. See id. §§ 901-903 (establishing provisions on waste reduction and use of
alternatives).
227. See id. §§ 701-702 (establishing a renewable energy production incentive).
228. See id. § 2 (declaring Congress should take all actions necessary in the areas of
conservation, efficiency, alternative source, technology development, and domestic
production to reduce the U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources).
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goal of the bill is to improve environmental quality by reducing
emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases.229
Despite the worthy goal of reducing GHG emissions, it seems
unlikely that this bill will accomplish that goal.  In terms of total
expenditures over the next five years, the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates that conservation provisions in the bill will cost
about $6.9 billion, or thirty-seven percent of the total cost of the
bill.230  “Reliability” and production provisions, all of which will
encourage the use of GHG emitting fuels, are estimated to cost $11.8
billion, or sixty-three percent of the total cost of the bill.231  The
original Senate bill, “The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” in
contrast, spends $5.425 billion on provisions similar to those labeled
“conservation provisions” in the SAFE Act and only $750 million on
oil and gas incentives.232  The Senate bill, after several amendments,
passed on April 25, 2002.233  As amended, the Energy Tax Incentives
Act spends $5.9 billion on conservation provisions and $7.8 billion on
reliability and production provisions.234 Given the shift towards
production and "reliability" created by the amendments to the
original Senate bill, the conference agreement can hardly be
expected to move farther in the direction of conservation.
“Reliability” provisions include increased benefits from
depreciation and depletion of fossil fuel assets.235  The bill reduces the
depreciation period for petroleum refining assets from ten years to

229. See id. § 2003(3) (listing the eight purposes for the proposed Act including
the reduction of air, water, and other environmental impacts, such as greenhouse
gases, of energy production, distribution, transportation, and use processes).
230. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF A CHAIRMAN’S
AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO THE “ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2001”
SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON JULY 18, 2001, JCX-62-
01 (2001) [hereinafter HOUSE REVENUE EFFECTS].
231. Id.
232. Compare HOUSE REVENUE EFFECTS, supra note 230 (establishing that SAFE
includes “clean coal,” “clean-fuel vehicles,” and an extension of the I.R.C. § 45 credit
for producing electricity from certain sources in its “conservation provisions.”), with
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE “ENERGY TAX INCENTIVE
ACT OF 2002,” AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE COMM. OF FINANCE ON FEBRUARY 13, 2002,
JCX-8-02 (2002) [hereinafter SENATE REVENUE EFFECTS](documenting the loss in
revenues to Oil and Gas Provisions to be nearly twice those of Conservation and
Energy Efficiency Provisions).  Also, the estimates for the Senate bill do not account
for subsequent amendments added prior to the bill’s passage.
233. 148 CONG. REC. S3342-3418 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2002).
234. J. Comm. on Taxation, Comparison of the Estimated Budget Effects of
Division C. of H.R. 4, the “Energy Tax Policy Act of 2001,” as Passed by the House of
Representatives and Division H. of H.R. 4, the “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,”
and Certain Mandates as Amended by the SEnate, May 23, 2002, JCX-44-02 (2002),
available at http://www.bailoutwatch.orggovreports/JCTComparisonOfHouse Senate
EnergyBills.pdf.
235. See H.R. 4, §§ 3201-3213 (relating to credit granted under the reliability
provision).
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seven years, thereby accelerating the tax benefits of such an
investment.236  The SAFE Act also increases the barrel-per-day limit for
percentage depletion by independent refiners from 50,000 barrels
per day to 75,000 barrels per day.237  Production provisions include a
new $3 per barrel or $0.50 per 1000 cubic feet of natural gas tax
credit for oil and gas production from marginal wells,238 suspension of
the limitation on percentage depletion based on taxable income,239 an
election to expense certain expenditures related to oil and gas
exploration,240 extension of the carry-back period for losses from oil
and gas properties,241 repeal of the alternative minimum tax IDC
preference,242 and a provision permitting the offset of alternative
minimum tax by the enhanced oil recovery credit.243  The Energy Tax
Incentives Act contains similar provisions, except it requires two year
amortization of certain expenditures related to oil and gas
exploration and does not change any of the alternative minimum tax
preferences or extend the carryback period for losses from oil and
gas properties.244
Conservation provisions in the SAFE Act include a fifteen percent
credit for residential solar hot water (up to $2,000),245 increased tax
credit for qualified electric vehicles,246 a tax credit for energy efficient
appliances,247 a tax credit for increasing the energy efficiency of
homes (either existing or new construction),248 the allowance of a

236. See Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, 678 (providing current recovery period
of costs, through depreciation, at ten years).
237. H.R. 4, § 3206(a).
238. Id. § 3301.
239. See id. § 3302 (discussing temporary suspension of limitation based on sixty-
five percent of taxable income and extension of suspension of taxable income limit
with respect to marginal production).
240. See id. § 3303(a) (relating to deductions for delay rental payments).
241. Id. § 3305.  Generally, net operating losses can only be carried back two years
and carried forward twenty years.  I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (West 2002).  Carrying back
net operating losses permits operating losses in year 5 to be used against net income
in year 3 or 4, thus producing a refund of the tax liabilities in years 3 and 4; if the net
operating losses in year 5 exceed the net income in years 3 and 4, then those losses
can be carried forward to year 6, to offset any income in that year.  Carry-backs are
more valuable than carry-forwards, because they provide a current benefit (i.e., a
refund) versus a future benefit (potential reduction in tax liability in future years).
242. See H.R. 4, § 3308 (allowing temporary repeal of alternative minimum tax
preference for intangible drilling costs).
243. Id. § 3309.
244. SENATE REVENUE EFFECTS, supra note 232, at 2-3.
245. See H.R. 4, § 3102 (expanding credit for electricity produced from renewable
resources).
246. Id. § 3106.
247. Id. § 3107.
248. See id. §§ 3108-3109 (establishing credit for energy efficiency improvements
to existing homes and business credit for construction of new energy efficient
homes).
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deduction for certain energy efficient commercial building
properties,249 and a provision permitting offset of non-business energy
credits against the alternative minimum tax.250  The Energy Tax
Incentives Act contains similar provisions, except that the tax credit
for residential solar property includes fuel cell and wind energy
properties and the new homes tax credit is more targeted.251
As Senator Barbara Boxer said, “[n]o solution to the energy
problem is complete without addressing the need to improve the
demand side of the equation.”252  Rather than increasing the already
large subsidies given to fossil fuel producers under current law, new
proposals should aim to eliminate the preferential treatment for oil
and gas to give a market incentive to switch to renewable fuels.253  A
bill that included the conservation provisions of the SAFE Act of 2001
and the Energy Tax Incentives Act and repealed the present law
granting subsidies for fossil fuels would go a long way towards
stemming GHG emissions and global warming.254  In addition, some
have advocated imposing a carbon tax on GHG emitters.255
Unfortunately, neither the House nor the Senate considered
including a carbon tax in their energy tax bills.256  Others have
proposed domestic carbon trading schemes.257  Oregon has already
implemented a carbon trading program.258  California just enacted a

249. Id. § 3110.
250. See id. § 3114 (declaring new nonrefundable personal credits against regular
and minimum taxes).
251. See SENATE REVENUE EFFECTS, supra note 232, at 1 (granting credit for
residential fuel cell, solar, and wind energy properties).  The new homes tax credit is
limited to $1,250 for homes that are thirty percent more energy efficient and up to
$2,000 for homes that are fifty percent more energy efficient.
252. 147 CONG. REC. S644 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
253. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 29(a) (West 2002) (providing enhanced oil recovery credit
by allowing a generous credit with a minimal phase-out clause, thus making the
credit very attractive to oil producers).
254. See H.R. 4, § 2003(3) (stating that reducing GHGs is one of its purposes and
that the SAFE Act of 2001 will provide incentives to reduce GHG emissions).
255. See Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax:  The Introduction of the Carbon-
Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221, 223 (1992) (arguing that
instituting an energy tax would be a wise policy decision).  Many countries, including
Japan, Sweden, and the U.K., have already begun unilateral emissions reductions and
ministers from Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, joined by Italy, Belgium
and Luxembourg, have recommended to the EC that it propose formal carbon tax
legislation.  EC Ministers Ask EC Commission to Make Formal Energy Tax Proposal, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at G-3 (Dec. 16, 1991).
256. See Adding Up the Energy Bills, supra note 212, at A20 (criticizing Congress for
not including a carbon tax in the energy bill, claiming it is the most efficient way to
promote conservation).
257. See Dernbach, supra note 11, at 10978 (introducing an emissions trading
scheme that enables a country to get credit toward its required emissions reduction
by reducing CO[2] emissions in another country).
258. See id. at 10970 (indicating that Oregon has taken a unique approach to new
electricity generating facilities).
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law requiring reduced GHG emissions from cars and trucks.259    Last
year Massachusetts adopted state regulations requiring carbon
dioxide reductions by power plants.260  New Hampshire also recently
enacted carbon trading legislation.261     The DOE collects voluntary
information about GHG emissions, which should facilitate
determination of results from abatement programs.262  Two bills
proposed in 1999 would give companies credit under any
subsequently passed Federal GHG emissions statute for their
voluntary GHG abatement.263  The Kyoto Protocol permits the use of
carbon sinks to reduce total GHG emissions.264  Under the Kyoto
Protocol, developed countries like the United States can only count
carbon sequestration by forests, although grasses and soils also store
CO[2].265

259. Gary Polakovic & Miguel Bustillo, Davis Signs Bill to Cut Greenhouses Gases, L.A.
TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A1 (requiring new cars sold in California to emit less GHGs).
260. 921 Mass. Reg. 47 (May 11, 2001).
261. Paula Tracy, Pollution Law a First, THE UNION LEADER, May 10, 2002, at A2.
262. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF
GREENHOUSE GASES 2000 SUMMARY, Rep. No. DOE/EIA-0608 (2002), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/vrrpt/summary/index.html (last modified May
5, 2002).
263. Credit for Early Reductions Act, S. 547, 106th Cong. (1999).
264. See SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 134 (Alexander Carius & R.
Andreas Kraemer eds., Springer 1999) (explaining that when developing countries
are measuring their progress toward targeted emission levels, they are to include
verifiable changes “resulting from direct human-induced land use change and
forestry activities,” based on changes in forests since 1990) (quoting Article 3.3 of the
Kyoto Protocol).  Although developed countries can plant or replant forests to
absorb CO[2], they must also count forest losses.  See Dernbach, supra note 11, at
10939 (discussing the various provisions of the Kyoto Protocol).
265. See R.J. Scholes & I.R. Noble, Storing Carbon on Land, 294 SCI. 1012, 1013
(2001), stating,
[t]he existing land sink could, in theory, be enhanced by up to 1.6 PgC/year
by  2010 through demonstrated carbon-storing approaches to forest,
cropland, and grazing land management[; t]his rate of storage could be
maintained for several decades at relatively low cost compared with the cost
of reducing fossil fuel emissions and in most cases without compromising
other land use objectives.
Id.; Pete Morton, The Economic Benefits of Wilderness:  Theory and Practice, 76 DENV. U. L.
REV. 465, 489-90 (1999) (“The economic benefits of storing carbon in the soils of a
wildland network could play a significant role in protecting the temperate rain
forests of Alaska, for example, where up to seventy five percent of forest carbon is
stored in the soils.”).
Protected by the forest canopy, soil carbon can be stored indefinitely
(subject to fluctuations caused by natural disturbances) if these forests are
reserved in a wildland network.  If the forests are logged, however, these soils
can quickly decompose and lose their carbon through exposure to increased
sunlight, temperature, and wind.
Id.
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B.  Forests
1.  Benefits
Reducing fossil fuel use and conserving forests for carbon
sequestration would have benefits reaching beyond GHG
abatement.266  Burning fossil fuels produces pollutants that adversely
affect human health.267  Some researchers assert that air pollution
from fossil fuel use “already [is] sickening or killing millions
throughout the world.”268  Reducing emissions from just nine coal-
fired power plants in the Midwest could avoid 300 deaths, 2,000
respiratory and cardiac hospital admissions, 10,000 asthma attacks,
and 400,000 lost workdays due to respiratory symptoms.269  In 1995,
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and the World Resources
Institute (“WRI”) estimated that nearly 700,000 air-pollution related
deaths occur each year.270  Based on analysis of published studies,
researchers concluded that GHG mitigation in four urban areas,
Mexico City, New York City, Santiago (Chile), and Sao Paulo (Brazil),
could save 64,000 lives through 2020.271  President Bush has
announced a plan to reduce pollution, called “The Clear Skies
Initiative,” which employs a cap-and-trade strategy to cut sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury emissions.272  The initiative sets

266. See, e.g., infra note 272 and accompanying text (listing the benefits that would
flow from closing just a few coal-fired energy plants, including saving hundreds of
lives and preventing thousands of serious illnesses).
267. See Rebecca M. Thomas, Asthma U.S. cases:  17 million; Deaths:  about 5,300 a
year, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2002, at F4 (reporting that scientists suspect pollutants, such
as carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides and hydrocarbons, play a role in
the dramatic increase in the prevalence of asthma since the early 1980s); see also
William Booth, Study:  Pollution May Cause Asthma, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2002, at A2
(discussing recent study results that provide evidence that smog not only aggravates
childhood asthma, but can actually cause it); Union of Concerned Scientists, The
Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels (arguing that fossil fuels produce particulates that irritate
the respiratory system, that the production, transportation and use of oil can cause
water pollution, and that coal mining can leave acid residues that cause the affected
land to be barren), at http://www.ucsusa.org/energy/brief.hidden.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
268. Luis Cifuentes et al., Hidden Health Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation, 293
SCI. 1257, 1257 (2001).  Indeed, the serious impact of air pollution on health has
long been recognized.  When the severely asthmatic King William III of England
moved his residence from London to Hampton to avoid the pervasive smog of
London, his ministers complained about how inaccessible the monarch was at his
rural location.  The king reportedly replied, “[d]o you want to see me dead?”  5
LORD MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 258 (Knickerbocker ed. 1906).
269. Cifuentes, supra note 268, at 1257.
270. WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT IN SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:  FIVE YEARS AFTER THE EARTH SUMMIT 5 (Geneva 1997).
271. See Cifuentes, supra note 268, at 1258 (concluding that GHG mitigation
would avoid 65,000 chronic bronchitis cases, and 37 million person-days of restricted
activity or work loss).
272. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:  President Bush Announces
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a cap on the total emissions, and then permits free market trading of
emissions allowances.  “In theory, emissions trading offers a more
cost effective means of meeting an environmental goal than a
uniform standard, whenever marginal costs vary between plants.”273
While a cap-and-trade strategy has had some success,274 Professor
David Driesen notes that cap-and-trade strategies can stifle innovation
and result in concentrated local pollution.275
Reducing GHG emissions by conserving forests confers additional
benefits; forests have recreational value, as well as being a potential
source for life-saving pharmaceuticals.276  Urban trees serve as a kind
of outdoor air-conditioner, providing shade and evaporative cooling
by evaporation of water off leaves.277  Unlike his son, former President
George H. W. Bush advocated a “no-regrets” approach to national
environmental policy, which would not only reduce GHG emissions,
but also provide other societal benefits.278  These policy options
stressed “energy efficiency, conservation, renewable energy, planting
trees to enhance CO[2] sequestration from the atmosphere, and
substitution of fuels producing little or no CO[2].”279  In fact, one
commentator said that former President Bush made trees “a kind of
fetish of his Administration.”280  For example, the President allocated
$175 million to plant 1 billion trees in 1990.281  Calling trees “the
oldest, cheapest, most-efficient air purifier on Earth,” Bush also

Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002) (explaining the
major provisions of the initiative), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases /2002/02/print/20020214.html (last visited June 3, 2002).
273. David M. Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?:  The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998).
274. See Paul L. Joskow et al., The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 669 (1998) (providing empirical analysis that a cap-and-trade strategy creates an
efficient emission rights market).
275. See Driesen, supra note 273, at 71 (arguing that inherent inefficiencies in the
cap-and-trade strategy makes it a cheap-fix).
276. See Norah Deakin Davis, Decade of the Tree; Meditation on Trees and Tree Planting,
AM. FORESTS, Jan. 1991, at 21 (arguing that the bark of some trees have known
human health benefits including a cure to several kinds of cancer).
277. See HEAT ISLAND GROUP, EVAPOTRANSPIRATION (noting that a single properly
watered tree can evapotranspire up to forty gallons of water a day, the equivalent of
four hours of heat produced by a small electric space heater), at http://eetd.lbl.gov/
heatislands/Vegetation/Evapotranspiration.html (last modified June 16, 1999) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
278. See President’s Remarks to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
I PUB. PAPERS 157 (Feb. 5, 1990) (outlining the U.S. environmental policy under the
first Bush administration), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/
90020502.html (last visited June 1, 2002).
279. Murkowski, supra note 76, at 358.
280. Lance Morrow, Forest of Dreams, TIME, Feb. 12, 1990, at 74 (discussing the
Earth Core’s treatment under different presidential administrations).
281. Id.
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declared, “[w]e need to reforest this bountiful Earth.”282  Taking the
lead on conserving forests would also set a good example for other
nations facing rapid deforestation.283
2.  Capacity
Forests are already playing a vital role in solving the problem of
global warming.284  The carbon sequestration capacity of U.S. forests
is significant.285  The EPA estimated annual U.S. carbon sequestration
at 270 million metric tons carbon equivalent.286  This means that U.S.
forests and other carbon sinks offset approximately 17.7% of total
U.S. anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 through
1999.287  However, increasing forest harvests and land-use changes
reduced the total net carbon sequestration resulting from land use
and forestry activities by approximately seven percent between 1990

282. Assoc. Press, Bush Urges Tree Planting to Cleanse Air:  Greening of America Is Low-
Cost Part of Environmental Stance, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at A2; see also Editorial,
Reagan, Spare That Tree!, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1980, at C6 (refuting the contention
that a majority of air pollution comes from plants and trees); Manuel Lerdau et al.,
Plain Production and Emission of Volatile Organic Compounds, BIOSCIENCE, June 1997, at
373 (noting that urban areas with large amounts of isoprene-emitting vegetation,
such as the replacement species for chestnut trees on the East coast, can double the
biomass of isoprene-emitting species); Christine Mlot, A Clearer View of Why Plants
Make Haze, 268 SCI. 641 (May 5, 1995) (reporting that new realizations that natural
sources of hydrocarbons can swamp any human contributions sparked several
government agencies to rethink ozone-control strategies to include efforts to curb
nitrogen oxide).
283. See Big Timber’s Big Lies, supra note 14, at 62 (arguing that domestic forest
preservation can increase international momentum for further forest conservation
efforts); see also Tracy Walmer, Bush Plants Seed Against Pollutants, USA TODAY, Jan. 31,
1990, at A3 (reporting that domestic forest preservation can increase the U.S. image
abroad by increasing U.S. credibility on environmental issues).
284. See Steven C. Wofsy, Where Has All the Carbon Gone?, 292 SCI. 2261 (June 22,
2001) (arguing that a relatively stable amount of CO[2] accumulating in the
atmosphere over the last twenty years despite a forty percent increase in emission
rates can be attributed to forests and other components of the biosphere, such as soil
and the ocean); see also Bruce A. McCarl & Uwe A. Schneider, Greenhouse Gas
Mitigation in U.S. Agriculture and Forestry, 294 SCI. 2481 (Dec. 21, 2001) (reporting that
afforestation in the United States will reduce U.S. agricultural production, thus
increasing international production and likely increasing GHG emissions in other
countries creating leakage); Carol C. Barford et al., Factors Controlling Long- and Short-
Term Sequestration of Atmospheric CO[2] in a Mid-Latitude Forest, 294 SCI. 1688 (2001)
(Harvard Forest study encouraging the use of forests for carbon sequestration); Jim
Gillon & Dan Yakir, Influence of Carbon Anhydrase Activity in Terrestrial Vegetation on the
O-18 Content of Atmospheric CO[2], 291 SCI. 2584 (2001) (“The oxygen-18 content of
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) is an important indicator of CO2 uptake on land
. . . .  We show large differences in the activity of carbonic anhydrase (which catalyzes
CO2 hydration and 
18O exchange in leaves) among major plant groups that cause
variations in the extent of 18O equilibrium.”).
285. See EIA:  EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, supra note 60, at 69 (combining
sequestration studies and estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Forestry Service, and Department of Agriculture).
286. Id.
287. Id.
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and 1999.288  Harvard Forest researchers found that long-term rates of
carbon sequestration were directly affected by the forest’s
management.289  Some researchers note the negative effects of
forestry based carbon sequestration.290  It may be hard to determine
the net CO[2] effect of forestry projects because of difficulty in
baseline measurement, difficulty in measuring CO[2] flows, and
leakage concerns.291  Forestry projects could also pull funds from
technology development.292  Forestry projects are relatively low cost,
compared to technology development, and so may lower the price of
tradable clean development mechanism (“CDM”) credits.293
However, researchers that note the negative aspects of forestry
projects also note their collateral benefits:  protecting biodiversity,
preventing soil erosion, and improving watershed management.294
Other researchers argue that forest conservation is inconsistent with
maximizing carbon sequestration and advocate clear-cutting followed
by replanting.295  Clear-cutting, though, disturbs forest soils that also
store significant amounts of carbon.296  Newly planted saplings take
many years before reaching maximum carbon storage capacity.297  A
newly planted clear-cut does not protect biodiversity, prevent soil
erosion, or improve watershed management.298  Mature forests
continue to absorb carbon, while providing these other benefits.299

288. Id.; see also Wofsy, supra note 284, at 2263 (explaining that timber harvesting
increased because U.S. land use decisions are driven largely by market pressures).
Wofsy further notes that the United States has never considered carbon
sequestration in making land use decisions.  Id.
289. See Barford, supra note 284, at 1690 (noting that the age structure, species
composition, and health of a forest affects its carbon absorption capacity, and can be
manipulated by forest management strategies).
290. See Wolfram Kagi & Oliver Langauer, Misconceptions on Forestry CDM, JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION Q. 6 (Dec. 2000) (identifying five misconceptions of forestry
management), available at http://www.northsea.nl/jiq/4-2000.pdf (last visited Aug.
9, 2002).
291. Id.
292. See id. (arguing that because forest projects tend to be more economical, they
tend to attract funds that might otherwise go to technology projects).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Dan Ferber, Forests:  No Greenhouse Antidote?, 293 SCI. 1425 (2001)
(providing evidence that at least one type of forest does not requester carbon).
296. See Wofsy, supra note 284, at 2263 (explaining that organic matter such as
wood debris and soil sequester significant amounts of CO[2]).
297. See MICHAEL TOTTEN, GETTING IT RIGHT:  EMERGING MARKETS FOR STORING
CARBON IN FORESTS 19 (1999) (arguing that even fast-growing tree species take
decades to reach their carbon maximizing potential), available at www.wri.org/pdf/
ftcarbonbro/pdf.
298. See id. (citing estimates that the conversion of five million hectares of old-
growth forests to younger plantations in Washington and Oregon created significant
carbon losses).
299. See Barford, supra note 284, at 1688 (arguing that mid- to large-sized forests
can be manipulated to increase carbon sequestration); TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 19
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Therefore, mature forests should be harvested sustainably, while
areas that have already been deforested should be reforested.300
3.  Forest conservation
The concept of conserving forests inspires passionate support and
passionate resistance—in the United States, forests and timberlands
are battlegrounds.  The logging and paper industries seek to use both
public and private timberlands to provide profits for shareholders
and jobs for employees.  The environmental movement, along with
ordinary Americans, seeks to preserve forests for their value as habitat
and just to know that forests still exist.  The battle to save trees can
take dramatic and sometimes humorous forms.301  Can forests be
preserved to achieve both environmental health and economic
flexibility?  As we enter the twenty-first century, the world’s forests are
shrinking at an alarming rate.302  Eighty percent of the world’s
original forest cover has been lost.303  Tropical forests are being
deforested at a rate of fifteen million hectares per year.304  In Russia,
which contains twenty-two percent of the world’s forests, the

(arguing that old-growth forests offer large and up-front carbon offset
opportunities).
300. See TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 18 (outlining a three-part strategy to maintain
current carbon stocks, increase carbon reservoirs through a combination of forest
management strategies, and displace fossil fuel use with sustainable biomass).
301. See Woman Strikes Deal With Lumber Company to Leave Redwood Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1999, at A39 (reporting that Julia “Butterfly” Hill spent two years living high
in an ancient redwood she named Luna, coming down only after reaching an
agreement with the tree’s owners, the Pacific Lumber Company, to spare the tree
and a 2.9 acre buffer zone around it); Michelle Locke, A Striptease to Save Trees, THE
NEWS J., Nov. 13, 2000, at A3 (stating that Donna Nieto, “poet, performer,
conservation crusader, and the new nude thing on the eco-protest scene” removes
her clothing to campaign against clear cutting and to stop logging trucks); The
Simpsons:  Homer to the Max (FOX televisions broadcast, Feb. 7, 1999) (showing one
instance in which a fictional television family engaged in tree-saving activism).  In
Homer to the Max, Homer is invited to a party of Springfield’s elite by his new best
friend, Trent Steele.  Id.  At the party, Trent makes a speech and asks, “[i]f a tree falls
in the forest, will you make a sound?”  Id.  To rousing assent, the party-goers board
the protest bus and Homer and Marge are next seen chained to enormous redwood
trees.  Id.  In The Simpsons, Lisa the Tree Hugger, Lisa attempts to impress a handsome
“eco-hunk” by camping out in a giant redwood destined for logging.  The Simpsons,
Lisa the Tree Hugger (FOX television broadcast, Nov. 9, 2000) (providing another
example of the humorous forms that the battle to save trees can take).  In both
Simpsons episodes, the trees failed to survive.  See also Hawn Protests Use of Her Name,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2000, at F2 (reporting Goldie Hawn objected after the Bureau of
Land Management named a timber sale near Oregon’s Fawn Creek the “Goldie
Fawn”); Hawn’s In a Huff Over Timber Tribute, THE NEWS J., Sept. 27, 2000, at A4
(speaking through her spokeswoman, Ms. Hawn said that she did not “want to see
beautiful timber land destroyed in her name”).
302. See TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 17 (stating that the world could lose 650
million hectares of tropical forest over the next sixty years).
303. Id.
304. Id.; see also WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 885 (1996) (defining a hectare
as approximately two and a half (2.5) acres).
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government recently acted to lift logging restrictions.305  In contrast,
China has made a concerted effort to stem deforestation and
encourage planting of trees.306  As a result, the net uptake of CO[2]
by forests in China has increased from 360 Tg in 1990 to 410 Tg in
2000.307  In the United States, although forests cover thirty-three
percent of the land area—roughly seventy percent of their extent at
the time of European colonization—only twenty percent of old
growth forest remains.308
a.  History
Arguably the presence of forests was the single most important
factor to the success of human civilization.309  For over five thousand
years, until the middle of the nineteenth century, wood constituted
the principal fuel and building material.310  Without wood, man would
not have fire:  without fire, man would not have bread, pottery to
bake the bread, or metal tools to harvest the wheat.311  With ready
access to wood, civilizations grew strong and prospered.312  They built

305. See Mark Hertsgaard, Russia is an Eco-Disaster—and It Just Got Worse, THE NEWS
J., July 24, 2000, at A7 (reporting that the Russian President’s plan to improve the
investment climate for logging will decrease fresh water supplies and lead to plant
and animal extinctions).
306. See Peichang Zhang et al., China’s Forest Policy for the 21st Century, 288 SCI.
2135, 2135-36 (2000) (explaining that although China’s demand for timber resulted
in a three fold increase in volume of timber harvested annually from the 1950s to the
1990s, in 1998, China established a new forest policy called the Natural Forest
Conservation Program (NFCP) which significantly restricts cutting in natural forest
areas); David G. Streets et al., Recent Reductions in China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 294
SCI. 1835 (2001) (explaining that carbon dioxide levels decreased in China because
of a radical reform of its coal and energy industries); see also Philip Pan,
Environmentalists Rip Chopsticks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 2001, at A30 (describing
China’s budding environmental movement that urges the use of reusable chopsticks,
decrying the waste of trees for the manufacture of wooden chopsticks); Chinese Use 25
Mil Trees for Utensils, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 2001, at A30 (stating that China uses
twenty-five million trees annually to produce 45 billion pairs of disposable
chopsticks).
307. See Streets et al., supra note 306, at 1835 (describing that China’s promotion
of afforestation resulted in an increase in the uptake of CO[2]).  1 Teragram (tg) of
CO[2] equals 1 million tons.
308. See, e.g., Why Mature Forests Must be Protected, BRIEFING DOC. (N.W. Old-Growth
Campaign Bellingham, Wash.), May 31, 2002 (explaining only twenty percent of the
original old growth forests remain in the Pacific Northwest and that this depletion
will have severe consequences on the environment), at http://www.nwoldgrowth.
org/infostation/infostation2.cfm?doctype=briefingdocument (last visited Aug. 9,
2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
309. See JOHN PERLIN, A FOREST JOURNEY:  THE ROLE OF WOOD IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CIVILIZATION 26 (1989) (arguing that wood played a crucial role in the
development of civilization).
310. See id. at 25 (stating that the tree supply declined as wood was used for fuel
and building during the Iron Age).
311. See id. at 26 (considering how wood and heat contributed to the development
of agriculture, construction materials, and food supply).
312. See id. at 28 (stating that “wood is the foundation upon which early societies
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great ships and became wealthy traders.313  They built great houses.
When wood supplies ran low, societies moved on in search of wood,
or conquered neighbors for their wood, or simply perished.314
Ancient civilization also experienced the consequences of
deforestation:  soil erosion, floods, and drought, and perhaps even
experienced global warming.315  The New World’s vast timber
resources acted as an impetus for England’s colonization of
America.316  Unfortunately for England, America’s forests also
strengthened the power of the revolutionaries, paving the way for
independence.317  After the American Revolution, forest resources
helped the United States become a world leader.318  Travelers visiting
the United States after independence described Virginia as “an
immense forest, . . . almost without bounds,”319 and New York as
“nothing but one vast forest.”320  In the late eighteenth century, a
French naturalist who traveled through Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois,
and Michigan noted that “the most striking feature of America is the
rugged and dreary prospect of an almost universal forest.”321  The
limitless American forest “was at once the source of subsistence and a
wilderness whose conquest was the key to the future of plenty that
early Americans sought for themselves and their descendants.”322
b.  Value of timber
Conserving trees will mean fewer trees cut and marketed.  Can the
environmental value of trees be distinguished from the market value

were built”).
313. See id. at 27 (explaining that ships, carts and chariots were made of wood).
314. See id. at 25 (explaining that without wood, the great ancient civilizations of
Greece, Egypt, and Rome would not have emerged).
315. See Wallace S. Broecker, Was the Medieval Warm Period Global?, 291 SCI. 1497,
1498 (2001) (arguing that there have been a series of global warmings, oscillating
over 100,000 years and lasting 1500 years each).  The Medieval Warm Period lasted
from approximately 800 to 1200 A.D.  Id.
316. See PERLIN, supra note 309, at 263 (explaining that plantation owners in the
West Indies looked to New England for a permanent supply of wood when their
supply diminished).
317. See id. at 323 (stating that wood, and the resources the American colonies had
access to, gave them the power to defeat the British).
318. See id. at 333 (quoting Tench Coxe, who observed that “no country, so well
accommodated with navigation and adapted to commerce and manufactures,
possesses as great a treasure of wood and timber as did the United States.”).
319. JOHN F. D. SMYTH, 1 A TOUR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 36 (1784).
320. GEORGE W. PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT IN AMERICA 190 (1938).
Tocqueville’s traveling companion, Gustave Beaumont, similarly concluded that “the
whole country is but a forest.” Id. at 193.
321. C.F. VOLNEY, A VIEW OF SOIL AND CLIMATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6
(1804).
322. THOMAS R. COX ET AL., THIS WELL WOODED LAND:  AMERICANS AND THEIR
FORESTS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 12 (1985).
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of cut timber?  Early cases discussed the value of timberlands,
concluding that the value of wild lands is limited to their income
producing potential.323  The existence of a market for timber enables
“value” to be determined through exchange and quantified by
price.324  In 1997, the market value of U.S. timber related products
totaled $97.8 billion dollars:  about 1.2% of the national GDP for that
year.325  Paper products account for approximately fifty-nine percent
of this amount.326  The United States and Canada are the world’s
leading producers and exporters of “market pulp,” primarily used to
make paper products.327  Americans consumed 235 board feet of
wood products per capita.328  In the 1990s, each 1 billion cubic feet of
timber harvested in the U.S. was used for the following:  88,000
homes; 5 million tons of pulp, paper and paperboard products; 25
million shipping pallets; 120 trillion BTUs of energy; and nearly 4
million tons of miscellaneous uses such as furniture, fence posts and
telephone poles, wood used in home remodeling, and exports.329
Single-family housing is the largest consumer of lumber products.330
The average housing unit consumes 14,000 board feet of lumber.331

323. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Pickering, 92 A. 1008, 1010 (Me. 1915) (because wild lands
in Maine are generally valuable only for income producing purposes, it must have
been contemplated that the cutting and sale of marketable trees would be allowed);
Williard v. Williard, 56 Pa. 119, 128-29 (Pa. 1867) (rejecting a claim of waste against a
life tenant engaged in “cutting and rafting timber,” where “the pine lands . . . are
often valuable only for their timber, and are bought solely for this use”); see also
Bradstreet v. Huntington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 402, 448 (1831) (characterizing wilderness
as essentially worthless until converted to human use, which reflects the prevailing
mindset of the era that underdeveloped regions were useless, and thought of as
“waste” land); Davis v. Mason, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 503, 507 (1828) (lamenting that
property in a title dispute in Kentucky consisted of “waste and vacant lands” in “a
mere uncultivated country, in wild and impenetrable woods, in the sullen and
solitary haunts of beasts of prey . . . .”); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 164
(1810) (characterizing Virginia land as “an immense unexplored wilderness, covered
with savages equally fierce and hostile”); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y.
1805) (referring to “certain wild and uninhabited, unpossessed and waste land”).
324. See Morton, supra note 265, at 76 (explaining that placing a value on
wilderness will make it possible to compare it to other commodities, such as timber).
325. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 697 tbl.
1147 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
326. Id.
327. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE OUTLOOK 10-7 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE OUTLOOK].
328. 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 325, at 700 tbl. 1154.
329. H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON., AND THE ENV’T, THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S ECO-SYSTEMS:  1999 PROTOTYPE FOR COMMENT, at http://www.us-
ecosystems.org/forests/food_fiber/index.html#1 (last modified July 10, 2000)
[hereinafter THE NATION’S ECO-SYSTEM] (on file with the American University Law
Review).
330. See 2000 INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE OUTLOOK, supra note 327, at 7-2 (2000)
(stating that single family housing construction is one of the main engines of the
U.S. gross domestic product).
331. Id. at 7-4.
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In 1996, a total of 36.7 million board feet (mbf) was used for housing:
19.0 mbf for new housing; 17.7 mbf for upkeep and improvements,
amounting to 59% of the total U.S. timber production in that year.332
Other benefits of forests, such as scenic beauty,333 watershed
protection,334 and the preservation of biodiversity,335 though highly
valued by society, are undervalued in a market sense, because they
are not traded.  The same problem exists with other natural
resources:  recently, a team of economists and ecologists estimated
the dollar value of seventeen worldwide ecosystem services that are
not part of the normally measured money economy, such as water
filtration by wetlands, air filtration by plants, nitrogen fixing by soil
microbes, and the like.336  Their estimate is that these seventeen
services that we take for granted are worth approximately twice the
entire gross global product, an estimate, they believe, that is too
low.337  As forestlands cannot be simultaneously used as wilderness
and timber production, the relative undervaluing of preserved forests
as compared to timber production complicates land and resource
allocation decisions.338  Creating a market for forestry carbon
sequestration projects would help balance the values of conservation
and timber production.339

332. 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 325, at 700 tbl. 1154.
333. See Davis, supra note 276, at 25 (discussing that trees provide noise barriers
and screen unpleasant sights); see also ECONOMIC WELL BEING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST:  A CONSENSUS REPORT BY PACIFIC NORTHWEST
ECONOMISTS 16 (Thomas M. Power ed., 1995) (concluding that relatively intact
national forests contribute to high quality of life in the Northwest and have attracted
more jobs to the area than have been lost through reductions in timber cutting).
334. See Davis, supra note 276, at 25 (explaining that trees play a vital role in the
hydrologic cycle because they help protect water quality).  The author explains that
tree roots stay the progress of desertification because they control erosion and aerate
the soil.  Id.  Tree roots also reduce the need for irrigation because they shield crops
from the impact of wind.  Id.; see also News from the World of Trees, 105 AM. FORESTS 11
(1999) (showing how forest buffers protect water quality and reporting that in
Delaware, the U.S. Department of Agriculture agreed to pay up to $8 million of the
total cost for the restoration, revegetation, and maintenance of 6,000 forest buffers
along Delaware’s waterways).
335. See William M. Flevares, Note, Ecosystems, Economics, and Ethics:  Protecting
Biological Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039 (1992) (arguing that
the destruction of old growth forests has reduced biodiversity).
336. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997) (arguing that ecosystem services are not quantified in
economic markets, but are a significant part of the economic value of the planet).
337. See id. (stating that gross national product equals $18 trillion and a minimum
estimate of the value of ecological systems is $33 trillion).
338. See Morton, supra note 265, at 466 (claiming public land management
agencies have undervalued wilderness benefits in their land and resource benefit
plans).
339. See generally TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 2-4 (arguing that carbon emissions
have caused climate changes and companies have created emissions trading systems
in response).
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c.  Ownership of forest land
The United States Department of Agriculture defines forestland as:
a Land cover/use category that is at least 10 percent stocked by single-
stemmed woody species of any size that will be at least 4 meters (13
feet) tall at maturity.  Also included is land bearing evidence of
natural regeneration of tree cover (cut over forest or abandoned
farmland) and not currently developed for nonforest use.  Ten
percent stocked, when viewed from a vertical direction, equates to
an areal canopy of at least twenty-five percent or greater.  The
minimum area for classification of forest land is 1 acre, and the area
must be at least 100 feet wide.340
In 1992, the United States contained 737 million acres in
forestland.341  Of that 737 million acres, 504 acres constituted
timberland, which is defined as forest land not withdrawn from
timber utilization by statute or administrative regulation.342
Three main groups own U.S. forestland:  (1) the government;
(2) the timber industry; and (3) non-industrial private landowners.
Each of these groups may respond to different types of incentives for
carbon sequestration.  Of all timberland in the United States, 354
million acres of timberland are privately held.343  Non-industrial
private forest land (“NIPF”) constitutes forty-eight percent of the
entire nation’s forestland, while timber companies hold ten percent
and public land comprises the rest.344  In the Mid-Atlantic region,

340. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUMMARY REPORT:
1997 NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY 82-83 (revised 2000) [hereinafter 1997 NRI],
available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/NRI/1997/summary_report/
glossary.html.
341. See 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 325, at 698 tbl. 1150 (comparing
acres of forest land in the United States from 1970 (754 million acres), 1987 (731
million acres), and 1992 (737 million acres)).
342. See id. (showing total number of timberland acreage to include federal, state,
and privately owned land).
343. Id.
344.   See J. Dixon Esseks & Robert J. Moulton, Evaluating the Forest Stewardship
Program Through a National Survey of Participating Forest Land Owners, Center for
Governmental Stud., Northern Illinois University 16 (2000) (indicating the
importance of non-industrial private land), at http://www.rtp.srs.fs.fed.us/econ/
pubs/misc/jde991.pdf.  However, some timber companies are divesting themselves
of their timber.  One large forest products company, Georgia-Pacific, has recently
disposed of its timberland in a creative transaction.  See Robert Willins & Harley G. A.
Wright, Tax-Free Real Estate Spinoffs:  Will They Catch On, 94 TAX NOTES 619 (2002)
(describing the tax consequences of the Georgia-Pacific/Plum Creek transaction).
The chairman and CEO of Georgia-Pacific stated that,
not only is fee timber ownership not necessary, we believe such ownership
destroys value . . . .  Fee timber is thought to provide a hedge against high
wood prices.  But in reality many forest products companies liquidate high-
value fee timber, which is accounted for at low historical values, to prop up
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small parcels make up much of this privately held timberland.345  A
study showing forests and low-density housing suggests there is
extensive human development within patches of all sizes in this
region.346
1)  Public Forests
Should all or any forestland be publicly held?  Conventional
wisdom says that private ownership is the best way to maximize the
benefit of resources.347  On the other hand, forests may be viewed as
so important to the national interest that the Federal government
should administer them for the benefit of all citizens.348  However, it is
doubtful that government ownership of forests results in the benefit
of all citizens.  John Bliese calls the national forests victims of a classic
“iron triangle.”349  An “iron triangle” refers to the relationship
between timber companies who want cheap access to forests, the
members of Congress who accept campaign contributions from the
timber companies and vote for their subsidies, and the Forest Service,
which is rewarded by Congress with large appropriations for timber
sales and a budget system that increases the agency’s own income
whenever it sells timber, no matter the cost to the taxpayers.350
While the Federal government has the power to conserve forests, in
practice the government is under-compensated for timber cut from
public lands.351  Consider purchasing a six-foot Christmas tree for $40:
the U.S. Forest Service sells a sixty-year-old, forty-foot-tall ponderosa
pine for half that amount.352  In 1980, the Forest Service sold timber
worth $737 million for $625 million (85% of value); in 1990, timber

manufacturing earnings in times of low end-product prices.  This destroys
value.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT:  LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 4 (2001), at
http://www.gp.com/center/financials/pdf/2000/g-par/lettertoshare.pdf (last visited
Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
345. See THE NATION’S ECO-SYSTEM, supra note 329 (“A case study in the Mid-
Atlantic region found almost two million patches 1.2 acres or less in size.  Most of the
region’s forests (80 percent) was in four large patches, each with an area greater
than 1 million acres.”).
346. Id.
347. See discussion of tragedy of the commons, supra note 38.
348. See Ostrom, supra note 53, at 279 (noting that government property involves
“resource rights held by a government that can regulate or subsidize use,” and that,
in the United States, forests are not open access property).
349. Bliese, supra note 119, at 24.
350. Id.; see also RANDAL O’TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 34-35 (1988)
(analyzing the Forest Service’s budgeting system).
351. See Bliese, supra note 119, at 32 (arguing that one of the most notorious
examples of environmentally destructive subsidies in the United States is the below-
cost sale of timber from our National Forests).
352. Michael Kiefer, Whose Woods are These?; The Woods Are Lovely, Dark and Deep;
The Forest Service has Promises to Keep, PHOENIX NEW TIMES,  June 10, 1992, at 32.
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worth $1.2 billion was sold for $849 million (71% of value); in 1997,
timber worth $498 million was sold for $197 million (40% of value).353
Congress sometimes requires the Forest Service to provide goods and
services at below market value, such as recreational permits and
grazing rights.354  Under several federal laws, the Forest Service is not
required to maximize financial returns when considering possible
uses for the land.355  The Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, for
example, requires the Forest Service to consider the “relative values
of the various uses of the forest, and not necessarily the combination
of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit
output.”356  Many environmental laws force the Forest Service to
disallow certain uses of the land if that use will “jeopardize” the
resource, again hampering the Service’s ability to generate revenue.357
However, when Congress permits the Forest Service to charge fair
market value, such as for timber sales, the Forest Service often fails to
do so.358  For example, despite General Accounting Office (“GAO”)
advice, the Forest Service continued to use oral bids at single bidder
sales rather than sealed bid auctions, resulting in an estimated

353. 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 325, at 697 tbl. 1148.
354. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOREST SERVICE:  BARRIERS TO GENERATING
REVENUE OR REDUCING COSTS GAO/RCED 98-58 5 (1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT
98-58] (noting the long-standing philosophy of free access to public lands), available
at http://www.wildwilderness.org/docs/gao98-58.htm.  Powerful interest groups
sometimes influence legislation that permits enhanced access to below market priced
timber resources.  In 1995, the Logging Rider of the Recessions Act permitted
“salvage” logging without regard to environmental concerns.  See Patti A. Goldman &
Kristen L. Boyles, Foresaking the Rule of Law:  The 1995 Logging Without Laws Rider and
its Legacy, 27 ENVTL. L. 1035, 1043 (1997) (describing efforts of timber lobbyists to
use the rider to sidestep environmental laws).  During debate on the Logging Rider,
Representative Bill Richardson (D-N.M.) stated:
[The Rider allows] the pillaging of the environment just to hand a bonus
check to the timber industry.  [It] is a [timber] lobbyist’s dream and a
taxpayer nightmare. . . .  This rescissions bill replaces the rule of law with
lawlessness.  It says to the American people that Congress cares more about
creating a few temporary jobs now than it does about deficit reduction and
environmental protection for the future.
141 CONG. REC. H6642 (daily ed. June 29, 1995).
355. See GAO REPORT 98-58, supra note 354, at 28 (explaining that in passing laws
affecting the Forest Service, Congress expected it to consider economic issues, but
“specifically ruled out” maximizing profits as the dominant goal of the agency).  The
Forest Service is required to plan for six renewable surface uses:  outdoor recreation,
rangeland, timber, watersheds and water flows.  Id. at 12.
356. Id. at 28.
357. See id. at 28-29 (noting that federal environmental laws have forced the Forest
Service to change the focus of their work to sustaining wildlife and its habitat).
358. See id. at 44 (describing the Forest Service’s missed opportunities to charge
fair market value for uses and resources); see also B.J. Bergman, Timber!! One Hundred
Years Later, the U.S. Forest Service Still Sees Our Forests Only for the Trees, 4 THE PLANET
(1997) (describing below-market timber sales), available at http://www.sierraclub.
org/planet/199706/timber.asp.
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decrease in timber sales of $56 million from 1992 to 1996.359  The
GAO found that “generating revenue and reducing costs are not
mission priorities for the agency, and managers lack both flexibility to
make choices and accountability for results.”360  Congressional
provisions providing for revenue sharing from timber sales prior to
deducting costs may further reduce the Forest Service’s incentive to
charge fair market value.361  The GAO concluded, “inefficiency and
waste at the Forest Service have cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of
dollars and opportunities for economic gains have been lost through
indecision and delay.”362
The portion of U.S. timber produced by the Forest Service is
declining in proportion to timber produced privately, in part because
use of national forest lands is increasingly limited.  A Clinton
Administration ban on new roads and commercial logging in certain
areas would protect an additional 58.5 million acres of “some of the
nation’s most pristine timberland.”363  The area of national forests

359. GAO REPORT 98-58, supra note 354, at 44.
360. Id. at 27.
361. See id. at 41 (observing that the Forest Service spent $1.3 billion dollars in
preparing and administering timber sales in 1992 and did not have to deduct those
expenses from the $3 billion in revenue, putting the money into other things
including conservation programs); see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG.,
FOREST SERVICE PLANNING:  ACCOMMODATING USES, PRODUCING OUTPUTS, AND
SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS, OTA-F-505 151 (1992), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1992/9216_n.html (detailing early laws that provide a
percentage of timber revenue from federal lands to communities for schools and
roads).    Although it is not a new phenomenon, recent legislation provides annual
payments to the states and counties from National Forest Service lands.  See Secure
Rural Schools and Community Self Determination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-393,
114 Stat. 1607 (2000) (stabilizing annual payments made to states and counties
containing National Forest System land and public domain lands managed by the
Bureau of Land Management, when counties use the payments for the benefit of
public schools and roads).  These laws are difficult to challenge because they require
one to argue against funding public school.  As the Sixth Circuit noted in Sierra Club
v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra
Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (reversing on other grounds), rural citizens who are
dependent on timber revenue convince politicians to pressure the Forest Service to
maintain sales.  Id. at 251.  The Forest Service is then forced to choose between
maintaining jobs and income for the community or “risk over-harvesting and below
cost sales.” Id.  Not only does this symbiotic relationship affect Forest Service
revenues, but it can harm the environment.  As another court found during the
litigation surrounding the impacts of cutting old growth timber on the northern
spotted owl:  “Mill owners and loggers, and their employees, especially in small
towns, have developed since World War II an expectation that federal timber will be
available indefinitely, and a way of life that cannot be duplicated elsewhere.”  Seattle
Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff’d, 952 F.2d
297 (9th Cir. 1991).  The court also found that, in order to continue to support these
small communities and provide a steady flow of federal timber, the Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management has engaged in “a remarkable series of violations
of the environmental laws.”  Id.
362. GAO REPORT 98-58, supra note 354, at 49.
363. Eric Pianin, Clinton Set to Protect Vast Areas of Forest; Bans on Roads on Logging
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managed as wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, and national
monuments has increased considerably, expanding from less than
nine percent in 1964 to twenty-six percent in 1994.364  The number of
visitor days in the national forests has grown from about 25 million in
1950 to over 340 million in 1996.365  As a result, private lands produce
more timber than the national forests.366
The Forest Service’s failure to maximize revenue by limiting
revenue-generating uses of national forests may not be a cause for
concern for those who want to see the carbon sequestration value of
the forest maximized.  However, allowing below market timber
harvesting does cause concern because timber that could otherwise
be used to store carbon is being sold at bargain prices that do not
even take into account the commodity value of the timber, let alone
its value as carbon storage.367  National forests are common-pool

Upset Westerners, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at A1.  While President George W. Bush’s
Administration originally contemplated challenging the ban, as of this writing, the
roadless regulations were in a sixty-day moratorium.  See Eric Pianin, White House Seeks
to Scuttle Clinton Ban on Logging, Roads; Bush Asks Justice Department to Reopen National
Forests, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2001, at A12; see also USDA Forest Service, Roadless Area
Conservation, at http://www.roadless.fs.fed.us (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with
the American University Law Review) (displaying recent information regarding the
status of roadless areas).  Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck resigned over concerns
about the Bush Administration’s direction on national forests.  See Katherine Pfleger,
Bush’s Plan for Forest Service Prompt Chief to Depart, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2001, at 13.  As
chief, Dombeck worked to conserve old-growth forests.  Dombeck took over the
service in January 1997 and reshaped it from a government agency considered to be
a friend to the timber industry to a more cautious guardian of the national forest
system.  Id.  While more than 200 scientists have urged Bush to spare forests, the
Forest Service recommended against providing permanent wilderness protection to
more than 9 million acres in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest.  See Scientists Want
Logging in National Forests to Stop, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 2002, at A8
(describing letter from scientists that calls for an end to commercial logging); see also
Eric Pianin, Wilderness Protection Not Advised for Tongass; Forest Service Decision Upsets
Environmentalists, WASH. POST, May 17, 2002, at A27 (reporting on a decision to allow
logging in about a quarter of the forest).
364. GAO REPORT 98-58, supra note 354, at 30-31.
365. See id. at 36 (“[A] visitor day equals a 12-hour visit.  For example, three
people visiting a national forest for 4 hours each would equal 1 visitor day.  In 1965, a
visit averaged 0.83 visitor days.”).
366. See 2000 INDUSTRIAL & TRADE OUTLOOK, supra note 327, at 7-2 (noting that
the supply of standing timber from federal lands was mostly replaced by a supply
from private lands); see also Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344, at 16 (noting that fifty-
nine percent of the total domestic output of timber in 1997 came from NIPF).
367. See Bliese, supra note 119, at 24:
Most of our National Forests are not good sources for commercial timber in
the first place; most are in arid areas with relatively poor quality trees on
steep slopes.  But that does not stop the Forest Service from selling them.
The Forest Service also allows the timber companies to use clear cutting, the
most destructive form of logging, which the companies want simply because
it is the cheapest and easiest.  The results for the forests have been
devastating.  Our National Forests have been cut at unsustainable rates for
decades. Many forests which would never have been cut at all if timber
companies had to cover the costs have been heavily logged for years.
MANN.PRINTER.DOC 10/2/2002  2:31 PM
1188 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1135
resources (“CPRs”) because they are owned by the government
ostensibly for the benefit of all citizens.368  To efficiently manage
CPRs, it is recommended that access to the resource is limited and
that users are encouraged to invest in, instead of abusing, the
resource.369
The Forest Service has been effectively restricting access, but
allowing below market sales encourages over-exploitation rather than
investment.  Reforming the administration of our national forests
should start by eliminating below-cost timber sales and other
subsidies.370  However, as this Article is focusing on tax incentives for
green house gas (“GHG”) reductions, I will not address the kinds of
incentives for conservation that might be employed by the Forest
Service.371  For purposes of creating tax incentives for carbon storage,
it is preferable that timberland be held privately as the Forest Service
would not be influenced by tax incentives.372
2)  Private forests
Tax incentives should be designed to influence behavior in those
who would not otherwise engage in that behavior—otherwise they
simply present a windfall to the taxpayer.373  Would tax incentives
change the behavior of private forest owners?  Non-industrial private
forestland offers many benefits, including timber and protection of
the environment and, as of 1992, made up nearly half of the nation’s
forestland.374  Studies indicate that, depending on the region
involved, owners holding between eight percent and thirty-two

368. See Ostrom, supra note 53, at 278 (“CPRs include natural and human-
concentrated resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and
institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces
resource availability for others.”).
369. Id. at 279.
370. See GAO REPORT 98-58, supra note 354, at 51 (recommending the Forest
Service obtain fair market value for resources and that the Chiefs of the Service
revise the agency’s strategic plan accordingly).
371. See Act to Save America’s Forests, S. 1368, 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 2512,
106th Cong. (1999) (protecting national forests from clear cutting); see also National
Forest Protection and Restoration Act of 1999, H.R. 1396, 106th Cong. (1999)
(prohibiting financially and environmentally imprudent logging).
372. See Jim Stiak, Eugene:  A Gathering Place, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1992, at
10, 12-13 (quoting Tim Hermach of the Native Forest Council, who claims heavily
subsidized government timber sales and private incentives are related).  By
subsidizing timber sales, the government adversely impacts the price of private
timber sales.  One effect of this is to harm private owners of small timber acreage.  Id.
373. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes:  The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 992 (1986) (explaining that it is not efficient to offer
tax incentives for behavior already performed by the beneficiary).
374. See Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344, at 16 (describing the production
potential of NIPF).
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percent of total private forest acreage never intend to allow logging.375
Another study conducted by the U.S. Forest Service revealed that
preservationist owners, who do not intend to allow timber harvesting,
hold title to ten percent of the private “forest land” in Michigan.376
Applying these percentages on a national basis, preservationist
owners protect over thirty-three million acres of forest wilderness.377
Because NIPF owners generally are not interested in managing their
lands for maximum timber harvest, their forests are “underutilized
sources of biomass for storing atmospheric CO2” that can offset GHG
emissions.378  The National Research Council believes that NIPFs offer
“the greatest opportunity for increasing terrestrial carbon storage in
the United States because of their availability (compared with land
currently in cultivation) and under-use as illustrated by their low
stocking density and volume estimates.”379  Given that some NIPF
owners are already conserving timber through inattention or
preservationist tendencies, any new tax incentives should be directed
towards the owners that are actively harvesting timber, if possible.
Of course, some of the NIPF owners may be responding to
incentives already contained in current law.  The U.S. Department of
Agriculture created the Forestry Incentives Program (“FIP”) and the
Stewardship Incentives Program (“SIP”) to offer technical and
financial assistance to NIPF owners.380  Some NIPF owners that
currently participate in a conservation program reported that they
would not have agreed to be a part of the program without the
financial incentives.381  Those who profit from timberlands face a
myriad of local, state, and federal tax rules.382  As this Article focuses
on the impact of Federal tax policy on timberlands, I will analyze the
Federal tax rules relating to timber, paying specific attention to those
provisions that affect the three ways of enhancing forest carbon:
(1) preserving and protecting existing forests; (2) practicing

375. John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519 n.230 (1994).
376. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RESOURCE BULLETIN NC-93, THE PRIVATE FOREST
LANDOWNERS OF MICHIGAN 14 (1993).
377. Sprankling, supra note 375, at 566.
378. Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344, at 17.
379. Id.
380. See Natural Res. Conservation Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Conservation Programs
(providing information on NRCS conservation programs), at http://www.nrcs.usda.
gov/programs (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
381. See Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344, at 93 (finding that seventy percent of
respondents from a Forestry Stewardship Program survey said they would not have
implemented as much of the plan without the incentives).
382. See ENVTL. LAW INST., RESEARCH REPORT:  FORESTS FOR THE BAY (2000)
(analyzing state laws governing timberlands), available at  http://www.eli.org/
pdf/ForestsfortheBay00.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
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improved low-impact logging or sustainable forest management; and
(3) reclaiming degraded lands with fast-growing tree species.383
4.  Taxation of timber
a.  Preferential capital gains treatment
Although timber can be considered a natural resource, the tax
treatment of timber differs significantly from the tax treatment of
other natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals.384  As noted
above, oil production receives the most preferential treatment of all
the natural resources.385  This is because independent oil producers
(and royalty owners) may use percentage depletion, a form of cost
recovery that permits deductions in excess of the investment.386
The capital gains rules provide the greatest incentive to cut timber.
While ordinary income tax rates for individuals vary from 15% to
39.6% (depending on the taxpayer’s taxable income),387 the usual
capital gain rate is 20%.388  In general, to have capital gains treatment,
a taxpayer must sell or exchange a capital asset held for more than
one year.389  Stock in trade, inventory, and property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business do not constitute
capital assets.390  For some taxpayers, timber might be considered
inventory or property held for sale in the ordinary course of business.

383. See TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 3 (presenting three means of enhancing forest
carbon).
384. See RUSSELL, supra note 178, at 101 (explaining that the production costs can
be deducted or capitalized in the timber industry, which is not allowed in the oil or
gas industry).
385. See generally supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (providing an example
of how oil production is given preferential treatment in the tax code).
386. See I.R.C. § 611 (West 2002) (listing the types of natural resources that can
receive allowances for deduction or depletion, and the special rules governing these
allowances); see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED
PRESENT-LAW PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
DOMESTIC OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND CERTAIN UTILITY CONSERVATION PAYMENTS,
JCX-5-01, at 3 (2001) (“Because percentage depletion, unlike cost depletion, is
computed without regard to the taxpayer’s basis in the depletable property,
cumulative depletion deductions may be greater than the amount expended by the
taxpayer to acquire or develop the property.”).
387. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (listing tax rates that apply to individuals and married
couples at different income levels).
388. See id. § 1(h) (providing complex rules for determining the tax rate on
capital gains).  Special rates apply to gains recognized on the sale of collectibles and
“unrecaptured section 1250 gains.”  Id.  For other capital assets held for more than
one year, the 20% rate applies to taxpayers with marginal income tax rates greater
than 15%, unless the gain is a “qualified 5-year gain.”  Id.  Taxpayers in brackets
lower than 15% pay only 10% capital gains tax.  Id.  Corporations do not benefit
from the capital gains differential, and are taxed at rates from 15 to 35%.  Id.
389. See id. § 1222 (defining terms relating to capital gains and losses).
390. Id. § 1221(a)(1).
MANN.PRINTER.DOC 10/2/2002  2:31 PM
2002] GLOBAL WARMING AND TAX POLICY 1191
Nevertheless, the gains on the sale of such timber may qualify for
capital gains treatment under sections 631 and 1231 of the Internal
Revenue Code.391
Prior to the enactment of section 631, a timber owner who cut
timber for sale as logs or for use in its trade or business (e.g., a
sawmill business using logs to make lumber or a furniture maker
using logs to make furniture) recognized ordinary income on the
cutting of the timber, while a timber owner who sold timber outright
on the stump recognized capital gains.392  According to one
commentator, this disparity created an incentive to sell timber
outright, rather than to manage timber for continuous supply.393
Arguably, this disparate treatment violated principles of horizontal
equity,394 because similarly situated timber owners faced significantly
different tax consequences as a result of subtle differences in the
disposal transaction.  The Sixth Circuit described the resulting
hardship to timber owners, stating that:
There was little inducement for the operator to cut his timber if
[due to high ordinary income tax rates] he could retain only a small
portion of the proceeds of sale.
The timber operator was left with three choices.  First, he could cut
and sell his timber, pay the tax and realize little profit.  Second, he
could sell his property outright, or the standing timber alone, and
obtain capital gains treatment on his profits.  Third, he could simply
not sell at all and maintain his holdings.  These alternatives created
problems for the operator.  The third one created a problem of
national importance.395

391. See id. § 1231(a) (providing that if the section 1231 gains exceed the section
1231 losses for any taxable year, such gains and losses will be treated as long-term
capital gains or losses).  Section 1231(a)(3) defines § 1231 gains and losses, inter alia,
as recognized gains or losses on the sale or exchange of property used in the trade or
business.  Section 1231(b)(2) defines property used in the trade or business to
include timber to which § 631 applies.  See id. § 631 (providing rules for how a gain
or loss in the cutting of timber is to be calculated).  A gain or loss to the taxpayer is
recognized in an amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of
the timber, and the adjusted basis for depletion of such timber in the hands of the
taxpayer.  Id.
392. RUSSELL, supra note 178, at 2207.  See generally F. Gerald Burnett, Timber
Transactions, 610 T.M. PORTFOLIO A-2 (1994) [hereinafter 610 T.M. PORTFOLIO]
(analyzing the special tax treatment of timber operations, concentrating on I.R.C.
§§ 631 and 1231) .
393. RUSSELL, supra note 178, at 2207.
394. See R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45
(1967) (defining horizontal equity as the principle that people with the same income
should pay the same taxes).  Horizontal equity is one criterion for analyzing tax
policy decisions.
395. United States v. Brown Wood Preserving Co., 275 F.2d 525, 527 (6th Cir.
1960).
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“The problem of national importance” referred to by the Sixth
Circuit was the need for forest products created by World War II.396
The rules discriminated against smaller sawmill operators who were
unable to purchase standing timber in bulk, and discouraged the use
of cutting contracts, which would result in ordinary tax treatment.397
Congress considered cutting contracts useful in applying scientific
forest management programs designed to insure continuous supplies
of timber in future years.398  Accordingly, in 1944, Congress enacted
section 631, which permits a taxpayer to elect to treat a timber
cutting as a sale or exchange, thus enabling the taxpayer to receive
preferential capital gain treatment on the sale.399  As this preferential
treatment only occurs on cutting and sale of timber,400 it does not
encourage preservation of existing forests.  However, to the extent
this rule encourages scientific management, it does encourage
sustainable forest development.
b.  Taxation of timber expenses
Some timber owners may take a depletion deduction.401  A
depletion deduction for timber, unlike the percentage depletion
deduction for oil and gas property, is limited to the taxpayer’s basis in
the standing timber.402  If the eligible taxpayer maintains proper
records, he may take an annual depletion deduction with respect to

396. Id.
397. See generally S. Rep. No. 78-627, at 25-26 (1943) (discussing the general
problem of how the tax laws discriminate against those who dispose of timber by
cutting it as compared with those who sell timber outright, and suggesting an
amendment to the law to remedy the situation).
398. See 610 T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra note 392, at A-4 (discussing the Forest
Industries Committee on Timber Valuation and Taxation’s proposed legislation to
eliminate the perceived tax inequities that affected forest property owners and
operators).  The proposals included provisions to provide that timber cut by an
owner before sale would qualify for capital gains taxation, and that gain from timber
sold from cutting contracts with retained economic interests would be taxed as
capital gains.  Id.
399. I.R.C. § 631(a) (West 2002).
400. Id.
401. See id. § 611(a) (stating that only taxpayers who own an “economic interest”
in standing timber are eligible for the depletion deduction).  The Supreme Court
defined “economic interest” as having two elements:  (1) acquisition by investment in
the natural resource in place; and (2) derivation of income from the extraction or
removal of the natural resource.  Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).  The
rule in Palmer is also set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.611-1(b)(1).  Treas. Reg.
§ 1.611-1(b)(1) (2001).  Generally, an owner of the fee or leasehold estate
containing the standing timber will hold an economic interest.  610 T.M. PORTFOLIO,
supra note 392, at A-36.  The second prong of the test requires the taxpayer to be at
risk:  that is, the taxpayer must rely on the severance of the timber for recovery of her
investment.  Id.
402. I.R.C. § 612; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(c)(2) (stating that once the total
credits for depletion equals the cost or other basis of the timber property plus
subsequent allowable capital additions, no further deductions are allowed).
MANN.PRINTER.DOC 10/2/2002  2:31 PM
2002] GLOBAL WARMING AND TAX POLICY 1193
timber cut during the year.403  Thus, if the timber owner cuts no
timber, he gets no depletion deduction.  Therefore, the timber
depletion rules do not encourage preservation of existing forests.
Certain timber expenses are currently deductible—however, all of
those also relate to the cutting and sale of timber.404
While preserving forests offers upfront carbon offset opportunities,
aforestation slowly stores carbon, resulting in significant carbon
storage in later years.405  The Code provides preferential treatment for
reforestation costs.406  Instead of waiting until the timber is sold, as
required with the depletion deduction, certain reforestation costs
may be amortized over an eight-year period.407  A taxpayer may not
amortize more than $10,000 of reforestation costs annually, no
matter how large the taxpayer’s woodlands.408  The Code also permits
a reforestation credit.409  However, even these benefits are designed to
facilitate the cutting of trees:  the deduction and credit only applies
to “qualified timber property,”410 which is defined as a “a woodlot or
other site located in the United States which will contain trees in
significant commercial quantities and which is held by the taxpayer
for the planting, cultivating, caring for, and cutting of trees for sale

403. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3 (discussing the rules applicable to depletion
allowances for timber, and how the allowance should be computed).  The Treasury
Department has also ruled that, “[i]n general, the capital remaining in any year
recoverable through depletion allowances is the basis provided by section 612 and
the regulations thereunder.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(a).
404. See Rev. Rul. 71-334, 1971-2 C.B. 248 (enumerating the kind of timber sale
expenses that may be deducted:  (1) advertising the timber for disposal; (2) cruising
to determine the quantity and quality of the timber to be disposed of; (3) marking or
otherwise designating the timber for cutting; (4) marking seed trees to be retained;
(5) scaling, measuring, or otherwise determining the quantity of timber cut; (6) fees
paid to consulting foresters, selling agents and others for services directly related to
the timber disposal; (7) supervising or checking performance under the contract;
and (8) other expenses directly attributable to the disposal).
405. TOTTEN, supra note 297, at 3.
406. See Rev. Rul. 75-467, 1975-2 C.B. 93 (defining reforestation costs as the direct
costs incurred in planting and artificial or natural seeding and include
(1) preparation of the site, including any girdling, herbicide application, baiting of
rodents, or brush removal work to afford good growing conditions; (2) the costs of
seed or seedlings; and (3) labor and tool expense); see also I.R.C. § 194(c)(3)
(defining reforestation expenditures).
407. See I.R.C. § 194(a) (stating that “a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction of an
amount for the eight years, with respect to each month within the taxable year, equal
to the amortizable basis at the end of such month divided by the number of months
remaining in the period.”).
408. See id. § 194(b)(1) (limiting the amount to $5,000 in the case of a separate
return of a married individual).  But see Small Business Tax Fairness Act of 2001, H.R.
546, 107th Cong. (increasing, if enacted, the amounts in I.R.C. § 194 from $10,000 to
$25,000, but suspending the increase until 2004).
409. See I.R.C. § 48(b) (stating that the reforestation credit is ten percent of the
amortizable basis of “qualified timber property”).
410. Id. §§ 48(b)(2) and 194(c)(1).
MANN.PRINTER.DOC 10/2/2002  2:31 PM
1194 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1135
or use in the commercial production of timber products.”411
The passive activity loss rules, designed to thwart tax shelters, will
likely limit NIPF owners’ use of the reforestation tax benefits.412  The
passive activity loss rules generally restrict the use of passive activity
losses (or credits) to offsetting passive activity income, unless the
taxpayer “materially participates” in the activity.413  Professor Donna
Byrne argues that the passive activity loss rules discourage investment
in timber growing by NIPF owners.414  Because the timber growth
cycle occurs slowly and lasts decades, few owners can meet any of the
annual “material participation” standards set forth in the Treasury
regulations.415  Professor Byrne asserts that timber investment does
not constitute the classic tax shelter abuse that Congress tried to
prevent by enacting the passive activity loss rules.416  If NIPF owners
provide “the greatest opportunity for increasing terrestrial carbon
storage,”417 discouraging investment in timber growing by NIPF
owners also frustrates the goal of curtailing global warming.
c.  Incentives for conservation
1)  Present law
The Code does provide some incentives for conserving forestland.
A timber owner can receive a tax deduction for contributing real
property interests in timberland to a charitable organization, the
United States, or a State or local government.418  Charitable donations

411. Id. § 194(c)(1).
412. See Donna M. Byrne, Timber Growers and the Passive Activity Loss Rules:  Some
Unintended Effects, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 729, 733-34 (1991) (discussing how the passive
activity loss rules act as an impediment to the development of timber growing).
413. I.R.C. § 469(c).
414. See Byrne, supra note 412, at 744 (discussing how, while Congress’ tax
changes have some effect on timber growing, the passive activity loss rules create an
unintended disincentive for timber growers).  Under I.R.C. § 469(a)(2), the passive
activity rules only apply to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C corporations, and
personal service corporations.  Id.  Accordingly, these rules generally do not affect
industrial timber operations, which are usually undertaken by non-closely held
corporations.  Id.
415. See Treas. Reg. § 1.4695T(a) (2001) (containing seven alternate tests for
material participation); see also Byrne, supra note 412, at 749-51 (discussing the
application of the tests to NIPF owners).
416. See Byrne, supra note 412, at 742 (mentioning that timber investments are not
true tax shelters because of their long growing period, the need for substantial
capital investment, and because tax consideration is not the primary motive for
them).
417. Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344, at 17.
418. The Forest Legacy Program, 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (2001) (providing grants to
enrolled states to purchase conservation easements or fee acquisitions on
environmentally important forest lands that are threatened with conversion to non-
forest uses).  The program is funded annually by the Conservation and Reinvestment
Act (CAARA).  H.R. 701, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Land Trust Alliance, The Forest
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are generally deductible for income,419 estate,420 and gift421 tax
purposes.  However, donations of less than the donor’s entire interest
in the property are generally not deductible.422  But, the Code does
provide an exception to the partial interest rule for gifts of qualified
conservation interests.423  Therefore, a timber owner could obtain a
deduction for a contribution of his entire interest in the property, a
remainder interest, or a conservation easement.424  Although
timberland is specifically identified under only one of the definitions
of conservation interest, it could potentially fall under any of the four
definitions:  (1) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation
by, or for the education of the general public; (2) the protection of a
relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar
ecosystem; (3) the preservation of open space (including farm and
forest land) where such preservation will yield a significant public
benefit and is either (a) for the scenic enjoyment of the general
public, or (b) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy; or (4) the preservation of a
historically important land area or a certified historic structure.425
Last year, Congress removed geographic restrictions on eligibility of
land donations, freeing up almost one-third of the continental
United States, which had been previously ineligible.426  Furthermore,
owners wishing to donate easements on forestland may be eligible to

Legacy Program, at http://www.lta.org/publicpolicy/flshort.htm (last visited Aug. 9,
2002) (on file with the American University Law Review) (listing states that currently
qualify for Forest Legacy funds, states that are in the process of developing Forest
Legacy plans, and those that have expressed interest in the program).  The program
has conserved over 120,000 acres of environmentally important, working forestland.
Id.
419. I.R.C. § 170 (West 2002).
420. Id. § 2055.
421. Id. § 2522.
422. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED FEDERAL
TAX PROVISIONS THAT IMPACT LAND USE, CONSERVATION, AND PRESERVATION, JCX-68-
99, at 13 (1999) (discussing generally that gifts of certain types of property interests
are subject to special restrictions).
423. See I.R.C. § 170(h) (defining a “qualified conservation contribution” as a
contribution of a qualified property interest, to a qualified organization, exclusively
for conservation purposes).
424. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2) (defining “qualified property interest”).
425. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (defining “conservation purpose”).
426. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 551(a). 115 Stat. 38 (repealing the distance requirement in I.R.C.
§ 2031(c)(8)(A)).  Prior to amendment, I.R.C. § 2031(c)(8)(A) imposed a
geographic restriction on the definition of “qualified conservation easement,”
requiring that the land be located within twenty-five miles of a metropolitan area or a
national park or wilderness area, or within ten miles of an Urban National Forest.
The repeal of I.R.C. § 2031(c)(8)(A) will help reduce suburban sprawl by reducing
the sale and development of farmland, forests, and other open spaces.
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receive payments under the Forest Legacy program.427
In 2001, Congress repealed the estate tax, effective in 2009.428 It is
unclear how the repeal429 of the estate tax will impact farm ownership,
forest lands, or land conservation.  Neither the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the General Accounting Office, nor the Treasury
Department has ever seriously investigated the issue.  One purpose of
estate tax repeal is to enable farms and small businesses to pass intact
to the next generation.430  However, eliminating the estate tax will not
protect land from heirs who want to reap greater profits by
development.431  On the other hand, the possibility of relief from a
portion of the estate tax may motivate landowners to donate a
conservation easement.  If there is no estate tax “stick,” then the
“carrot” of a deductible conservation easement is no incentive.432  If

427. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a) (2001).  The Forest Legacy Program protects
environmentally important forest areas that are threatened by conversion to non-
forest uses through the use of conservation easements.  The enabling statute
authorizes the Forest Service to pay the fair market value of any property interest
acquired.  Id. § 2103c(j).  The acquisition costs would be shared among regional
organizations, State and other governmental units, landowners, corporations, or
private organizations, with the Federal government paying no more than seventy-five
percent of the total acquisition costs.  Id.; see also Laura S. Beliveau, Comment, The
Forest Legacy Program:  Using Conservation Easements to Preserve the Northern Forest, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 507 (1993) (evaluating the various options available to federal,
state, and local governments to balance private ownership, economic diversity, and
ecological value in the Northern Forest); Forest Legacy Program website (discussing
the program’s purpose, activities, administration, guidelines, and who is eligible for
its benefits), at http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/flp.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
428. See Janet Hook, Estate Tax Foes Facing Hurdles; Critics Grow Worried that
Momentum to Abolish it Has Faded, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2001, at 02A
(discussing the debate in Congress and other parts of the government about the
repeal of the estate tax).
429. See The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
§ 501(d) (repealing the estate tax for estates of decedents dying after December 31,
2009).  A sunset provision required by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires
that the repeal not apply to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 2010.  Id.
§ 901(b); David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Backs More Ethanol; Nears Passage of Energy Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A24 (reporting how the Senate Majority Leader, Senator
Tom Daschle (D-S.D.), agreed to hold a vote on making the repeal permanent in
exchange for limiting debate on the energy bill).
430. See S. REP. NO. 107-30, at 51 (2001) (“The Committee finds that the estate
and generation skipping transfer taxes are unduly burdensome on affected
taxpayers, and particularly decedents’ estates, decedents’ heirs, and businesses, such
as small businesses, family-owned businesses, and farming businesses.”).
431. Contra Jonathan H. Adler, Why the “Death Tax” is Deadly for Endangered Species,
FOREST LANDOWNER (Nov./Dec. 1999) (“[T]he estate tax imposes a significant
burden on private landowners who wish to maintain land in an undeveloped state
from generation to generation . . . .  The imposition of federal estate taxes often
forces large parcels of environmentally valuable land to be broken up into smaller,
less environmentally valuable parcels.”), available at http://www.deathtax.com/
deathtax/forest.html (last visited June 5, 2002).
432. The “carrot” is sweetened to the extent I.R.C. § 170 allows a deduction
against income tax.
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the estate tax were to be retained, it could be modified to encourage
forestland owners to preserve their property.  Congress could extend
certain provisions of the estate tax to forestland owners.  Under
present law,433 heirs who continue farming agricultural estates are
allowed to pay any incurred estate tax over ten years.434  Providing for
a deferred payment of some or all of the estate taxes due on
forestlands could reduce the pressure to sell.
Another provision of the estate tax allows farmers to value their
land based on its “use-value” as farmland rather than on the
potentially higher market value that developers might be willing to
pay.435  This special use valuation provision could be amended to
allow greater conservation of forest lands by eliminating the
requirement that forest ownership qualify as “businesses” or by
treating forest land as “farming.”436  In addition, Congress could
remove the cap on conservation easements.  When fully phased in
this year, the conservation deduction will be limited to $500,000.437
Unfortunately, in many parts of the country, this deduction will only
protect small farms and forests.  An uncapped exclusion, however,
would protect larger blocks of land, which are critical to healthy
ecosystems.
Another tax incentive for forestlands is an exclusion of cost-sharing
payments under the forestry incentives program from gross income.438
A significant part of the incentives including cost-sharing payments
are found in the Forest Stewardship Program (“FSP”).439  The FSP
provides technical assistance through state forestry agencies to help
landowners develop management plans for their non-industrial

433. See supra note 429.  The estate tax repeal is phased in over the next seven
years—so it still applies today.
434. See I.R.C. § 6166 (West 2002) (providing a set of rules for the general
extension of payment time of an estate tax when the estate consists largely of a
closely held business).
435. See id. § 2032A (stating that the value of qualified real property shall be its
value for use under which it qualifies as qualified real property).
436. See id. § 2032A(b)(2) (defining the term “qualified use” as:  “use as a farm for
farming purposes, or use in trade or business other than the trade or business of
farming”).
437. Id. § 2031(c)(3).
438. Id. § 126(a)(8); see also 16 U.S.C. § 2103(f) (2001) (requiring that the
Secretary agree to share the cost of implementing those forestry practices and
measures described in agreements where the Secretary determines cost sharing is
appropriate); I.R.C. § 194(c)(3)(B) (declaring that “reforestation expenditures shall
not include any expenditures for which the taxpayer has been reimbursed under any
governmental reforestation cost-sharing program unless the amounts reimbursed
have been included in the gross income of the taxpayer.”).
439. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
624, § 1215, 104 Stat. 3525 (1990) (establishing the Forest Stewardship Program).
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private forest lands.440  These plans typically list the owner’s objective
in managing their land and then recommend activities to achieve
each objective.441  One of the goals of the FSP is to manage and
enhance the productivity of timber, fish and wildlife habitats, water
quality, wetlands, recreational sources, and the aesthetic value of
forest lands.442  J. Dixon Esseks and Robert J. Moulton conducted a
comprehensive survey of NIPF owners who participated in the FSP.443
The authors surveyed 61,737 NIPF owners throughout the United
States, with a majority residing in the Northeast.444  The majority of
owners surveyed owned 10 to 200 acres of forestland and most had
held their land for at least ten years.445  When surveyed about their
objectives in owning forestland, NIPF owners tended to rank timber
production relatively low in importance, often seeing logging as
detrimental to higher-ranked objectives such as aesthetic,
recreational and other quality of life goals.446  In addition, many NIPF
owners indicated that they had become more likely to manage their
forestland to promote wildlife habitat.447  Further, fifty-eight percent
of NIPF owners reported implementing a managerial purpose of
improving or preserving forestland as wildlife habitat,448 while thirty-
one percent reported implementing a managerial purpose of
harvesting or marketing trees.449  The survey also revealed that NIPF
owners of relatively small parcels of land tended to value timber
production less than did owners or larger tracts.450  This finding is
reasonable since small parcels might not contain enough mature
trees to justify the cost of harvesting or because logging would leave

440. Id. at 3526.
441. Id.
442. See THE U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE USDA FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC PLAN,
INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY:  A FRAMEWORK FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
4 (2000 Revision) (defining as part of the mission of the USDA Forest Service to
“ensure sustainable ecosystems by restoring and maintaining species diversity and
ecological productivity that helps to provide recreation, water, timber, minerals, fish,
wildlife, wilderness, and aesthetic values for current and future generations of
people.”), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/plan/stratplan.pdf (last visited Aug. 10,
2002).
443. Esseks & Moulton, supra note 344.
444. See id. at 24 (defining Northeast to include the states of Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
445. Id. at 38-39.
446. Id. at 16-17.
447. Id. at 21.
448. See id. at 47 (asking NIPF owners to discuss whether their Stewardship Plan
recommends any ways to improve or preserve forestland as habitat for wildlife).
449. See id.  (asking NIPF owners whether their plan recommends activities having
to do with harvesting or marketing trees).
450. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
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them with too few trees to enjoy for recreational or aesthetic
purposes.
The cost sharing payments of the FSP also provided significant
incentives for NIPF owners.  Participation in the FSP by owners in
Pacific states indicated that cost share participants spent 2.6 times
more in non-reimbursed expenses than did non-participants in those
states.451  In addition, the estimates of non-reimbursed spending by
cost-sharing participants in the Northern states and Pacific region
exceeded the average federal costs per acre by factors of 1.1 to 8.1
respectively.452  The survey also revealed that sixty-five percent of NIPF
owners indicated that they would not have done as much under their
FSP if they had not received cost-sharing payments.453  Further, thirty-
two to thirty-seven percent of owners reported planting trees and that
such activity was “new” to them.454  The survey also found that forty-
four to fifty-four percent of NIPF owners indicated that they were
“more likely” to pursue improving wildlife habitat.455  Lastly, the
survey revealed that fifteen to thirty-four percent of NIPF owners
reported being less likely to harvest timber than before receiving
their FSP plans.456
If NIPF owners are more likely to use their land for wildlife habitat,
more likely to plant trees, and less likely to harvest timber, it appears
that tax-exempt cost-sharing payments and the FSP are already
enhancing carbon storage in our nation’s forests.  It simply remains
for Congress to add carbon storage as one of the goals under the
FSP.457

451. See id. at 61 (indicating that participation in the FSP did make statistically and
practically significant differences depending on the region).
452. See id. at 63 (using the regional average number of planned acres derived
from all surveyed owners to arrive at the owner’s spending per acre).
453. Id. at 65.
454. See id. at 74 (noting that, according to statistical analysis, participants in the
FSP were more likely to report that planting trees was new to them if they were:
women, were retired, had owned land under the FSP for a short period of time, had
received follow up technical assistance and had not received advice from a specialist
before entering the FSP).
455. Id. at 78.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 93.  Congress should also provide consistent funding for the FSP.  The
Federal budgets from both fiscal year 1999 and 2000 contained no appropriations for
the Stewardship Incentives Program, the principal source of cost-sharing money for
the FSP.  See Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Stewardship Incentive Program, at
http://www.fs.fed.us/cooperativeforestry/sip.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on file
with the American University Law Review) (describing Stewardship Incentives
Program, including purpose of program, how money is used, eligibility and program
administration).
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2)  Legislative proposals for conservation
Congress has contemplated additional incentives for open space
preservation.  The Community Renewal and New Market Act of 2000
would have excluded fifty percent of the capital gains recognized on
sales of real property to a public or private conservation entity.458  The
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the provision would
protect $125 million per worth of land each year at an average cost of
$64 million per year.459  The provision also would have helped save
land owned by those who cannot afford to give it away and would
have given the conservation agencies a competitive edge to acquire
and conserve the highest priority sites.460  The current reality is a
striking contrast:  when a conservation group ended up being the
highest bidder on a Forest Service timber sale, the sale was voided
because the conservation group did not intend to harvest the
timber.461
Congress has also considered various bills to preserve forests.  One
bill would increase the dollar limitation on reforestation
expenditures to $25,000.462  Another would reduce the amount of
time required to amortize reforestation expenditures.463  The Forest
Resources for the Environment and the Economy Act would add
carbon storage as a goal for managing national forests.464  A more
modest bill would assess opportunities to increase carbon storage on
national forests derived from the public domain and facilitate
voluntary reporting of forest projects that reduce atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations.465  The Save America’s Forest Act would

458. The Community Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000, S. 3152, 106th Cong.
§ 601 (2000).
459. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, THE ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF S.3152, JCX-
106-00, at 4 (2000) (providing comprehensive revenue estimates for the proposed
legislation).
460. See Press Release, Nature Conservatory, The Nature Conservatory Calls for
Passage of Key Conservation Bill (June 28, 2001), available at http://nature.org/
wherewework/northamerica/colorado/press/press339.html (urging the inclusion of
a conservation tax incentive in the federal budget as proposed by candidate Bush
during the campaign).
461. See Kim Murphy, Ecologists Battle Timber Industry at Auction Block, L.A. TIMES,
May 26, 1997, at A1 (reporting that the Forest Service rejected the auction bid
because regulations did not allow them to award a logging contract to a party that
had no intention of fulfilling it).
462. The Small Business Tax Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 546, 107th Cong. § 401.
463. See The Reforestation Tax Act of 2001, H.R. 1581, 107th Cong. (2001)
(reducing the amortization period under I.R.C. § 194 from 84 months to 60
months).
464. See S. 1457, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to
assess potential for increasing carbon storage on public land and improve reporting
of forest projects that reduce atmospheric carbon concentrations).
465. See S. 820, 107th Cong. (2001) (directing the Secretary to establish a Carbon
and Forestry Council and also providing guidelines on reporting, monitoring, and
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strengthen the protection of native biodiversity and ban clear-cutting
on Federal land, and designate certain Federal land as ancient
forests, road-less areas, watershed protection areas, special areas, and
Federal boundary areas where logging and other intrusive activities
are prohibited.466  The National Forest Protection and Restoration Act
of 2001, which garnered 107 co-sponsors in the House, would stop all
logging in national forests.467
5.  Demand issues
a. Housing
If the United States reduces its production of timber products
without decreasing demand, the increase in carbon storage will be
matched by an increase in timber harvesting in other parts of the
world, causing leakage as Americans simply import more lumber to
satisfy demand.468  Outside its own borders, the United States has less
control over whether timber is harvested by sustainable methods that
minimize carbon-emitting disturbances of forest soil.
The main incentive for timber usage in the Code is the home
mortgage interest deduction.469  By reducing the effective cost of
housing relative to other investments, the home mortgage interest

verification of carbon storage from tree planting and forest management actions).
466. S. 1368, 106th Cong. (1999).
467. H.R. 1494, 107th Cong. (2001).
468. See Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy:  Moving Past
Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543 (1999) (arguing that environmental policies
should take into account the normative value of the products created by the
polluting (or extractive) process).  Harsch further argues that as the purchase of
large homes is largely discretionary, the cost of the incremental lumber and energy
use should be increased to reflect the diminished marginal utility of the expenditure.
Id.  Harsch also states:
[B]oth the conventional and proposed approaches to environmental
management fail to make normative value judgments about the products or
industrial activities whose harmful effects they seek to minimize.  In other
words, no matter how important or seemingly trivial a product may be to the
economy or to the people’s lives, the tendency is to place exactly the same
environmental restrictions on its creation and distribution.  For example,
plastic is regulated in the same way whether it is used to make life-saving
syringes or grocery store bags.  Similarly, aluminum used to make airplanes is
regulated in the same manner as aluminum used to make cans of Coca-Cola.
This failure to make normative judgments means that environmental law
and policy treat the mere existence of a consumer want as sufficient
justification for the ecological disvalue its satisfaction entails.  In the present
social system, a consumers expressed desire is given validity in the
marketplace regardless of the reason for it existence. Environmental policy is
indifferent to whether a purchase represents a necessary expenditure or
profligacy.
Id. at 577.
469. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2002).
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deduction encourages home ownership.470  As the amount of the
deduction increases with increasing costs (which generally correlates
to the size of the homes), the home mortgage interest deduction
encourages the purchase of larger homes.471  According to the
Industrial & Trade Outlook, “the strength of the domestic housing
market, including new construction and remodeling, is the key to
growth in the U.S. wood products industry.”472  More than eighty-one
percent of softwood lumber is used for residential and light
commercial construction.473  Further, single family residential
construction is the main consumer of softwood lumber, and
according to industry data, the average unit uses 14,000 board feet of
framing lumber.474  The demand for lumber increased 4.1% in 1999
and is expected to continue to increase because of the relatively high
level of single-family housing starts, the largest consumer of lumber
products, and the vigorous residential repair, remodeling, and home
improvement sectors.475  Because the average size of homes built in
the United States are predicted to increase slightly, more lumber
products are expected to be consumed domestically in the years 2000
to 2004.476  In addition, increasing activity in the repair and
remodeling end-use segments was expected to further bolster lumber
consumption.477  It has been estimated that of the eighty-one percent
of soft lumber used in residential and light commercial construction,
approximately twenty-eight percent is used for remodeling.478
The home mortgage interest deduction not only leads to
increasing lumber consumption, but also to loss of forest land.479
From 1982 to 1997, developed land increased from 75 million acres
to 105 million acres.480  Converted forest lands accounted for over one
third of that increase (11.7 million acres), surpassing that of cropland

470. Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie:  The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1358 (2000).
471. See id. at 1395 (arguing that turning the deduction into a tax credit would
end the government’s subsidization of the purchase of larger homes).
472. 2000 INDUSTRIAL & TRADE OUTLOOK, supra note 327, at 7-2.
473. See id. at 7-1 (detailing global industry trends on the use of U.S. wood
products).
474. See id. at 7-4 (illustrating industry performance in 1999 noting that sawmills
and planning mills are the largest sector in the solid wood products industry).
475. Id.
476. See id. at 7-5 (describing industry and trade projections for sawmills and
planning mills for 1999 to 2004).
477. Id. at 7-5.
478. See id. at 7-4 (reporting that consumption in the remodeling sector decreased
1.9% from 1997 to 1998).
479. See Mann, supra note 470, at 1384 (positing that “[t]he home mortgage
interest deduction’s most obvious nexus to sprawl is that it facilitates the preexisting
American preference for large, single family homes.”).
480. 1997 NRI, supra note 340, at 36 tbl. 5.
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(8.8 million acres).481  Sprawl, defined in this Article as low-density
development that extends beyond traditional city boundaries,482 not
only destroys carbon-absorbing forests but also generates significant
increases in carbon emissions.483  Low-density development
discourages walking and use of public transportation, thus requiring
residents to travel by private automobile, which increases pollution
and carbon dioxide emissions.484  Low-density development far from
city centers increases homeowners’ commutes, resulting in even more
carbon dioxide emissions from cars.485  Furthermore, increasing the
size of homes means additional energy usage, causing more GHG
emissions.486
Without completely curtailing development, developers could
receive incentives to preserve trees on building sites, instead of
clearcutting the site before building.487  In a previous article, I
detailed a proposal to tailor tax incentives for homeownership to
provide greater rewards to those who purchase location efficient
homes.488  Congress has already considered proposals to create tax

481. Id.  Despite this, the total amount of forest land increased by about 800,000
acres, primarily because of cropland and pastureland reverting to forest.  Id.
482. THE SIERRA CLUB, THE 1998 SIERRA CLUB SPRAWL REPORT, at http://
www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report98/report.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on file
with the American University Law Review).  The term “sprawl” does not have one
technical definition, however, the definition of “sprawl” typically encompasses the
same idea as put forth by the Sierra Club.
483. See infra note 484.
484. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:  EXTENT OF
FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON “URBAN SPRAWL” IS UNCLEAR GAO/RCED-99-87 1 (Apr. 1999)
(reporting on the contribution of federal programs and polices to address urban
sprawl); see also F. Kaid Benfield, Running on Empty:  The Case for a Sustainable National
Transportation System, 25 ENVTL. L. 651, 657 (1995) (stating that “[t]he threat of
global warming is perhaps less certain but potentially more serious than that of the
health problems associated with transportation pollution.  Among greenhouse gas
emitters, our transportation system is particularly egregious, accounting for about
forty-five of all U.S. volatile organic compound emissions.”).
485. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 470, at 1370-71 nn.137, 138 (discussing how low-
density development increases carbon dioxide emissions because of increased
automobile usage).
486. See EIA:  EMMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, supra note 60, at 22:
At 313.4 million metric tons carbon equivalent, residential carbon dioxide
emissions represented 20 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions in 2000.  The residential sector’s pro-rated share of electric power
sector emissions accounts for about two-thirds of that amount (211.5 metric
tons carbon equivalent) . . . .  Total carbon dioxide emissions from the
residential sector increased by 4.9 percent in 2000.
See generally Mann, supra note 470 (contending that this increase is further evidence
of epidemic sprawl throughout the country).
487. See generally Greenspace Environmental Website, at http://home.earthlink.
net/~whisperingmeadow/cc.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (stating that clear-cutting is the complete removal
of all vegetation from an open area for the purpose of logging or construction).
488. Mann, supra note 470, at 1393-96.
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incentives for improving the energy efficiency of homes.489  Congress
has also considered proposals to create tax incentives for using
energy efficient, less GHG-emitting automobiles.490

489. See H.R. 4, 107th Cong. § 2101 (2002) (providing grants for contractors who
build energy efficient homes); S. REP. NO. 107-140, at 16 (2002).   The Senate Report
described the energy efficient homes provision as follows:
The Committee recognizes that residential energy use for heating and
cooling represents a large share of national energy consumption, and
accordingly believes that measures to reduce heating and cooling energy
requirements have the potential to substantially reduce national energy
consumption. The Committee further recognizes that the most cost-effective
time to properly insulate a home is when it is under construction and that
the most effective mechanism to encourage the utilization of energy-efficient
components in the construction of new homes is through an incentive to the
builder. Accordingly, the Committee believes that a tax credit for the use of
energy-efficiency components in a home’s envelope (exterior windows
(including skylights) and doors and insulation) or heating and cooling
appliances will encourage contractors to produce highly energy-efficient
homes, which in turn will reduce national energy consumption. Reduced
energy consumption will in turn reduce reliance on foreign suppliers of oil
and will reduce pollution in general.
Id.; see also H.R. 4 § 2109 (containing an incentive for increasing the energy efficiency
of an existing home); H.R. 2076, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing a fifteen percent
credit up to $2,000 for each of two types of residential solar energy property:
qualified photovoltaic systems and qualified water heating systems); H.R. 3455, 107th
Cong. (2001) (giving incentives to introduce new technologies to reduce energy
consumption in residential buildings).  House Report 3455’s maximum business
deduction for residential rental building expenditures on property that reduces a
building’s annual energy costs by thirty percent is $1,500; for property that achieves a
fifty percent reduction, the deduction is capped at $4,000.  For the highly energy-
efficient property credit, which would be available to principal residence owners as a
nonrefundable personal credit, the maximum for thirty percent property would be
$500; for fifty percent property, the maximum credit would be $1,250.  See id.; see also
The Energy Conservation Tax Credit Act, S. 196, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing a
refundable tax credit for the cost of energy conservation measures, such as ceiling
insulation, weather stripping, water heater insulation blankets, low- flow
showerheads, thermal doors and windows, clock thermostats, and external shading
devices).  Senate 196 would also provide grants to school districts to retrofit public
school buildings to increase energy efficiency and conservation.  The bill would
require utility companies to provide information on electricity bills regarding the
amount of electricity used during peak and nonpeak hours and how much the
consumer is paying during each period.  Id.
490. See H.R. 4 §§ 201-205 (providing tax benefits directly to the consumer to
lower the cost of new technology and alternative-fueled vehicles); S. REP. NO. 140,
107th Cong. at 7 (2002).  The Senate Report states that these benefits
can help lower consumer resistance to these technologies by making the
vehicles more price competitive with purely petroleum-based fuel vehicles
and creating increased demand for manufacturers to produce the
technologies.  The eventual goal is mass production and mass market
acceptance of new technology vehicles.  No one technology has established
that it alone provides the solution. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide tax
benefits tailored to specific vehicle technologies, as long as the vehicle’s
engine technology directly replaces gasoline and diesel fuel with an
alternative energy source.
Id.  Senate Report 140 largely incorporates concepts from earlier bills.  See also Clean
Efficient Automobiles Resulting From Advanced Car Technologies Act of 2001
(Clear Act), H.R. 1864, 107th Cong. (encouraging the use of fuel cell, hybrid, battery
electric, and other advanced motor vehicle technologies by offering an alternative
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b.  Paper
After home construction, paper uses the most lumber.491  Much talk
is made of the “paperless” society we are becoming,492 but the average
American office worker generates between 120 to 150 pounds of
recyclable white paper waste per year.493  Generally, manufacturing
from recycled materials creates less waste and fewer emissions.
Providing tax incentives for recycling could reduce our consumption
of virgin lumber for paper, thereby preserving forests for carbon
storage.  There are few existing federal laws about recycling paper,
although several proposals have been made.  For example, in 1997,
the House of Representatives proposed to make recycling office waste
mandatory in its offices.494  In 2000, the Greening of the Government
Act proposed that federal agencies be required to meet minimum
standards for recycled content of paper:  forty percent post-consumer
materials or thirty percent post-consumer materials/100% Processed
Chlorine free.495

motor vehicle credit modified specifically for qualified electric vehicles).  The credit
would also apply to the retail sale of alternative fuels as motor vehicle fuels and could
even be used toward the installation of alternative fueling stations.  Id.  These tax
incentives would sunset within six years, except for those applying to fuel cell
vehicles, which would last ten years.  Id.; see also 147 CONG. REC. E838 (daily ed. May
17, 2001) (statement of Rep. Camp) (“With minimum development cycles of two to
four years for new vehicles, incentives are needed now to move existing designs to
the market and thus accelerate the process of consumer acceptance.”); Wider
Incentives for Non-Gasoline Small Electric Vehicles Act of 2002, H.R. 3631, 107th
Cong. (modifying the electric motor vehicle credit contained in I.R.C. § 30,
originally enacted in 1992, by increasing the potential amount of the credit to up to
$40,000 and by including certain three-wheeled vehicles).
491. 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 325, at 697 tbl. 1147; see also Mona L.
Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 348, 352
(2000) (arguing that the Internal Revenue Code actively encourages waste).  Hymel
further states:
Congress should not subsidize advertising . . . through tax deductions.
Rather, tax policies should reinforce, rather than contradict, other national
policies, such as conservation. My claim is simple:  advertising leads us to
believe that ever-increasing consumption will make us happy; science
overwhelmingly suggests otherwise, and in fact, suggests that our high and
increasing consumption cannot be sustained.  Existing federal tax laws
encourage advertising through preferential tax treatment that, in essence,
subsidizes advertisers.  Given growing concerns over our consumptive
lifestyles, I argue that the federal government should not subsidize
advertising and that the tax treatment of advertising costs should be
reevaluated.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
492. See, e.g., Harry Bruse, We’re Drowning in this Paperless World, THE RECORD
(Kitchener-Waterloo), Jan. 17, 2002,  at A9.
493. H.R. 251, 105th Cong. (1997).
494. H.R. REP. NO. 119, 105th Cong. (1997).
495. S. 3271, 106th Cong. § 13 (2000).
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III.  ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
A.  In General
I have discussed a number of proposals that could help preserve
forests and thereby reduce GHG emissions.496 Environmental taxes
could provide another method to reduce GHG emissions.  Classic
evaluation of tax provisions involves consideration of equity,
economic efficiency, and ease of administration.497  Equity has two
components:  horizontal equity, which requires that similarly situated
taxpayers be taxed similarly;498 and vertical equity, which requires
taxpayers to be taxed according to their ability to pay.499  Economic
efficiency requires that a tax provision be economically neutral.500
Ease of administration means that a provision should be easy for the
I.R.S. to enforce and easy for the taxpayer to understand.501
If the provision under consideration is a tax expenditure, the
concepts of equity and efficiency may need to be modified.  Tax
expenditures are provisions that provide tax reductions to particular
groups of beneficiaries, creating a targeted economic benefit like a
direct expenditure.502  In a recent paper, Professor Paul McDaniel
posits that the relevant equity inquiries for tax expenditure provisions
are (1) is it “fair” to grant a financial subsidy or incentive only to a
particular group of individuals or businesses to the exclusion of
others; and (2) if so, are the financial benefits distributed “fairly”
among those who are potential beneficiaries of the program.503  The
relevant efficiency inquiries include (1) is the subsidy correcting a
market failure or generating “externalities” of value to the general
public; (2) is the full amount of the tax expenditure being received
by the intended beneficiaries; (3) is the subsidy being provided at the
lowest administrative cost to the government and the program

496. See generally supra Part III.A.3.
497. See generally SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 18, at 70-98.
498. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (11th
ed. 1997) (describing how the different notions of equity need to be considered
when evaluating a tax provision).
499. Id.
500. See generally SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 18.  Of course, few tax provisions
achieve economic neutrality.  Indeed, many are enacted specifically to alter the
economic consequences of a given action.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 38 (2000) (the
“general business credit”) (listing a number of tax credits designed to encourage
certain types of investments, such as investment in the steel industry).
501. See generally SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 18 (explaining that the ease of
administration leads to more overall efficiency).
502. See J. COMM. PRINT, supra note 199 (explaining tax expenditures).
503. Paul R. McDaniel, Tax and Spend 9 (Apr. 16, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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beneficiaries; and (4) does the subsidy create undesirable economic
distortions within the affected industry.504
The difficult problem of global warming suggests another criteria
should be used for evaluating tax provisions, in addition to equity,
efficiency, and ease of administration:  whether the provision is
friendly to the environment.  To meet this goal, a tax provision
should encourage (or at least not discourage) resource conservation
and pollution prevention.505  As discussed above, the tax provisions
relating to energy and timber production generally fail the
environmental criteria.506  These provisions also fail from an
economic efficiency standpoint under either the classic or the new
McDaniel criteria:  they do not account for the economic costs of
environmental damage and health effects of pollution.507  If a
provision creates an incentive to emit GHGs, it is not only
environmentally damaging but arguably economically inefficient, as it
benefits industries that do not bear the cost of the environmental
damage they create.  Because the global atmosphere is a CPR,
polluters can avoid the full cost of their activities.  Rather, the costs of
pollution are diffused over all of the users of the global atmosphere.
Thus, market forces fail to require the polluter to bear the cost.  A
policy of taxing the negative externalities of “environmental bads”
could correct for this market failure.508  The OECD considers taxes on
pollution to have “negative excess burden:  they improve rather than
distort the functioning of the market economy.”509  Conversely, the

504. Id.
505. ALAN THEIN DURNING & YORAM BAUMAN, TAX SHIFT 15 (1998).
506. See supra notes 505-10 and accompanying text.
507. See Durning, supra note 505, at 39 (stating that “the ideal tax rate, according
to economists, charges polluters for the costs they impose on others.”); see also
Repetto, supra note 114, at 8:
Under some conditions, an environmental charge cannot only minimize the
costs of meeting any given target for control of total emissions but also lead to
an overall level of control that minimizes the sum of environmental damages
and control costs.  The key is setting the rate to equal the marginal damages
from an additional unit of the offending activity, at just that overall level of
control at which the marginal damage from an additional l unit equals the
marginal cost of abating it.
508. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED TAXES IN OECD COUNTRIES:  ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 21
(2001) [hereinafter OECD TAX 2001]:
[A] negative externality is a cost that one economic agent imposes on
another but does not take into account when making production or
consumption decisions.  When the costs of pollution or resource use are not
reflected in prices, market inefficiencies result with excessive production or
consumption of products and activities that impose social costs.  Externalities
exist because of the public goods nature of the environment.
509. OECD, ENVIRONMENT AND TAXATION:  THE CASES OF THE NETHERLANDS,
SWEDEN AND THE UNITED STATES 109 (1994).
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subsidy for fossil fuel production provided by the Internal Revenue
Code not only fails to tax environmental bads, it actively encourages
them.510
B.  Market-Based Incentives
While early attempts at pollution regulation generally involved
“command and control regulation,” there is a growing consensus for
using market-based instruments to effect environmental reform.511
Market based instruments include pollution taxes, pollution
subsidies, and tradable permits.512  Pollution taxes are generally
considered the “gold standard” of market-based instruments.513
Pollution taxes allow polluters the flexibility to use the most cost-
effective means of reducing their emissions, in contrast with
command and control regulations, which typically specify standards
for the means of reducing pollution.514  Pollution subsidies work in

510. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence:  Congress, Economics, and
Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 688 (2001) (assessing Congress’ confusion about the
role of taxation in curbing externalities).  Professor Cavanaugh describes the
principles of Pigouvian taxation, that is, the use of tax to correct for externalities,
originally espoused by A.C. Pigou in 1912.  Id. at 688.  Citing the example of tax-
subsidized transportation benefits, Professor Cavanaugh notes that Congress is
subsidizing rather than penalizing an activity (driving) with significant negative social
costs.  Id. at 688, 717-23.  The same analysis applies to the tax treatment of the fossil
fuel industry.
511. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 112 (stating that “critics . . . argue that
command and control regulation (i) imposes unreasonable information-gathering
and exorbitant costs on government; (ii) often imposes disproportionate burdens on
new pollution sources; and (iii) provides no incentives to polluters to develop new
strategies to reduce their pollution beyond the levels required by law.”) (footnotes
omitted).
512. See infra notes 513-24.
513. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulations, 108 YALE L.J. 677,
682 (1999) (noting that “the standard analysis crowns taxes as the presumptive first
choice for optimal environmental regulation”). Professor Wiener ultimately
concludes, however, that in a global context where law cannot be imposed by
“unitary fiat” but rather must be assented to voluntarily, tradable allowances become
the best choice because they maximize participation efficiency.  Id. at 798.  But see
David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4 (2000) (analyzing Professor Wiener’s approach, and concluding
that a transnational approach does not necessarily lead to the choice of a particular
instrument).  Driesen doubts that international allowance trading creates greater
“participation efficiency” than pollution taxes or traditional regulation.  Id. at 24.
Rather, he advocates a “transnational pluralist approach,” which would permit
domestic allowance trading without requiring international coordination. Id. at 35.
Under a transnational pluralist approach, “the private parties receiving payments
subsidizing environmental improvement are not the same private parties that must
pay the tax.  Under these scenarios, the cheapest mechanism (taxes) should produce
the cheapest aggregate reductions.” Id. at 35.  Although global warming is certainly a
global problem, this Article’s approach focuses on U.S. law and thus avoids the
concern about applicability in a global context.
514. TAXATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  A MULTINATIONAL LEGAL STUDY
4 (Sanford E. Gaines & Richard A. Westin eds., 1991).
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much the same way as pollution taxes:  the polluter can use any cost
effective means of reducing emissions and has an incentive to do so if
the cost is less than the amount of the subsidy.515  However, pollution
subsidies can create perverse incentives.  Because a subsidy reduces
the costs of entering a pollutive industry, it may encourage greater
investment in the industry and thus more pollution.516  Tradable
allowances, or permits, set a quantity limit for emissions and permit
market forces to determine who will use the allowances.517
The effect of a pollution tax is to cap the costs of abatement.518
Alternately, the effect of a tradable allowance is to cap the quantity of
emissions.519  Cost restrictions, such as pollution taxes, work better
than quantity restrictions when “health or environmental damages
are not very sensitive to short term emissions levels or when concerns
exist about potentially high costs.”520  As the damages from GHG
emissions result from cumulative exposure, short term increases in
GHG emissions cannot be traced to large environmental damages.521
Accordingly, for abating GHG emissions, price instruments such as
carbon taxes can be expected to be more efficient and effective than
quantity instruments such as tradable allowances.522  Tradable
allowances may lead to environmental hot spots in low-income
communities,523 and diminish the pressure on emitting companies to
make technological changes to restrict GHG emissions.524

515. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 115 (stating that the amount of the subsidy is
critical in the effectiveness of the policy because the polluter still has little incentive
to desist, even with the subsidy, if they are going to lose money).
516. See Wiener, supra note 513, at 727 (describing the way in which an
environmental protection action can in effect encourage more capital inflow into the
polluting industry).
517. TAXATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  A MULTINATIONAL LEGAL STUDY,
supra note 514, at 5.  The sulfur dioxide emission trading program created by the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments exemplifies a tradable allowance program.  See 42
U.S.C. 7651-7651o (2001).
518. See TAXATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  A MULTINATIONAL LEGAL
STUDY, supra note 514 (discussing pollution tax).
519. See Wiener, supra note 513, at 728 (discussing how tradable allowances put a
limit on the amount of pollution that the industry as a whole can produce).
520. Richard D. Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions and Limiting Costs 3-4,
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/climatechangemorganstern.pdf (last
visited Aug. 29, 2002).
521. See id. (discussing cumulative exposure).
522. See id. (discussing effectiveness of price instruments).
523. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 129 (explaining that tradable allowances could
lead to certain industries or areas, which may not be able to economically reduce
pollution, trading for more allowances rather than make pollution reducing
improvements).
524. See id. (stating that it may be cheaper for industries to trade for allowances if
they can do so, rather than make improvements).
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1. Scientific effectiveness
The scientific effectiveness of a tax proposal is another important
consideration.  The scientific effectiveness of a proposal needs to be
evaluated both before it is adopted (ex ante) and after it has been
implemented (ex post).525  An ex ante evaluation would be based on
price elasticities of the affected products (such as energy and energy
intensive products, such as steel) and the costs of abatement.526  The
demand for total energy use is somewhat inelastic in the short term,
but becomes more elastic in the long term.527  Cross-price elasticities
measure the effect that the change in price in one product has on the
price of a competing product.528  In crafting a GHG mitigation
instrument, governments should consider the environmental impacts
of cross-price elasticity, and design the instrument to shift use from
high emitting sources to low emitting sources.529  The OECD
concludes that environmentally related taxes, by raising the price of
certain fuels, can result in significantly lower demand and
pollution.530  However, competing provisions, such as oil and gas
subsidies, can complicate the ex ante evaluation of a GHG mitigation
proposal.531
Ex post evaluation, which is typically more reliable, cannot be done
until the proposal is implemented.532  Examining the results of carbon
taxes implemented in other countries can approximate an ex post
evaluation of a proposal.  Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Norway have all imposed carbon taxes for at least
ten years.533  Belgium, Austria, and Germany impose taxes on energy
use.534  These countries also cut some combination of personal
income tax, social security contributions, corporate tax, or the tax on
capital with the increased revenues raised by the carbon tax.535  The
average revenue raised by environmentally related taxes imposed by
OECD countries is two percent of GDP and six percent of total tax

525. OECD TAX 2001, supra note 508, at 46.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 100.
528. Id.
529. See id. at 102-03 (describing how governments should consider the elasticity
of whatever society would use as an alternative to the pollution industry and craft
their policies to increase use of these alternatives).
530. See id. at 103 (describing how the elasticity of a product may be low in the
short term, but in the long term the elasticity is greater and the environmental policy
is more effective at curbing demand).
531. See OECD TAX 2001, supra note 508, at 46 (showing how other policy tools
can complicate the evaluation of an environmental policy).
532. See id. (stating that results need to be observed to make this type of analysis).
533. Id. at 51.
534. Id. at 52.
535. Id. at 40.
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revenues.536  Sweden, Norway, and Finland have conducted ex post
studies of the effectiveness of their carbon taxes.537  The Swedish study
showed that CO[2] emissions from the heating, industrial and
housing sectors were about nineteen percent lower in 1994 than in
1987.538  The Norwegian study showed a twenty-one percent decrease
in CO[2] emissions from stationary combustion plants.539  The
Finnish study concluded that carbon emissions would have been
seven percent higher in 1998 if carbon taxes had not been
implemented.540
As discussed above, many Americans fear that GHG mitigation
would place U.S. industry at a competitive disadvantage.541  Studies
cited above show that the U.S. economy as a whole could improve as
a result of GHG mitigation, but energy intensive industries are likely
to argue for exemptions from a tax on CO[2] emissions to preserve
their competitive position.542
The OECD concluded that “the negative environmental impacts of
exemptions and rebates in many cases will be highly problematic as
the sectors given special treatment tend to be the largest polluters.”543
One study found that exemptions for high emitting industries would
raise the total cost of GHG reduction by twenty percent.544
Exemptions also reduce incentives to invest in research and
development of less carbon intensive alternatives.545
2.  Political considerations
The foregoing analysis suggests that the United States should adopt
a carbon tax to reduce GHG emissions.546  While economic theory
might favor such a tax, practical political considerations make its

536. Id. at 100.
537. Id. at 102.
538. Id. at 105.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. See generally supra Part II.B.2 (discussing opinion of some that mandatory
greenhouse gas reductions will harm the U.S. economy or put it at a competitive
disadvantage).
542. Id.
543. OECD TAX 2001, supra note 508, at 79.
544. Id. at 80.
545. Id.
546. See LARRY PARKER, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ISSUE BRIEF, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE:  MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES 11 (Mar. 12,
2002), available at http://www.cnic.org/nle/crsreports/climate/clim-5.pdf:
Estimates of the carbon tax necessary to stabilize U.S. CO2 emissions at their
1990 level by the year 2000 range from under $30 per ton to over $100 per
ton.  . . . [t]he impact of the carbon tax on the economy would depend to
some degree on how the government disposed of generated revenues.
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enactment doubtful.547  Congress has proposed a carbon tax several
times, but none has come close to enactment.548  One proposal would
impose different rates on different types of fuels according to their
carbon content.549  Another proposal would impose a tax of $50 per
ton of carbon dioxide emitted by power generating units with a
generating capacity of five or more megawatts.550  This tax would be
used to establish a Clean Air Trust Fund, which would pay for, inter
alia, the development of a carbon sequestration strategy to offset
growth in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions and for carrying out
methods of biologically sequestering carbon dioxide.551  A newer
version of this proposal drops the carbon dioxide tax, but imposes an
excise tax of thirty cents per megawatt of power produced by fossil
fuel burning plants.552
Conservative politicians, who currently make up a majority of the
House of Representatives and control the Administration, generally
look with disfavor on increasing taxes on business.  Frequently
opposition to taxation is couched in terms of protecting private
property rights.553  However, one conservative commentator notes
that “[a]ll forms of pollution violate the property rights of all of their
victims.”554  Another argues that “[a] society that takes property rights
and consent seriously, such as ours, will then at least enact
environmental laws that seek to minimize and eventually eliminate

547. Depending on its structure, a carbon tax could also fall disproportionately on
low income taxpayers, as they pay a higher percentage of their income for energy
usage.  Also, as low income taxpayers tend to rent rather than own property, they
would be unable to increase the energy efficiency of their dwelling units.  However,
recycling carbon tax revenues to offset other regressive taxes, such as the payroll tax,
could ameliorate this regressive effect.  A regressive tax fails the vertical equity
criterion.  The OECD calls this tax shift a “double dividend.”  See OECD TAX 2001,
supra note 508, at 37.
548. See infra notes 549, 550, 552 and accompanying text (discussing recent
legislative proposals).
549. See H.R. 1086, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 804, 103d Cong. (1993)
(reintroducing H.R. 4805, 101st Cong. (1990) in virtually identical form); see also
Repetto, supra note 114, at 54 (describing a tax on the carbon content of fuel as “the
equivalent of a charge on emissions,” and further asserting that the administrative
and enforcement costs of imposing and collecting a tax on individual sources of
CO[2] emissions would be prohibitive).
550. S. 2636, 105th Cong. § 9 (1999).
551. Id. § 8.
552. See S. 1131, 107th Cong. § 7 (2001) (reintroducing in virtually identical form
S. 1949, 106th Cong. (1999)); cf. H.R. 1335, 107th Cong. (2001) (creating tradable
CO[2] allowances).
553. See, e.g., James A. Dorn, Ending Tax Socialism (arguing that under a
progressive tax system, property is not safe from the hands of the state), at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/9-13-96.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
554. Bliese, supra note 119, at 17.
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pollution.”555  Conservatives should embrace market based pollution
controls, as such policies could be designed to meet the goal much
more effectively and efficiently than could bureaucratic regulatory
policies.556
One commentator advocates the adoption of a tradable permit
system to control GHG emissions, arguing that “the political system in
the United States . . . has revealed its strong preferences for quantity
instruments in their grandfathered form.”557  Several researchers have
examined hybrid instruments that combine quantity restrictions with
a “safety valve” price cap.558  Some of these proposals involve a
guarantee that if freely traded emissions permits exceed a specified
price, the government will issue more permits at a lower, pre-
determined price.559  If the target price is set low enough so that
emissions usually exceed the quantity limit, the extra cost of the
government guaranteed permits has the economic effect of an
emissions tax.560
Recent proposals that create voluntary incentives to reduce GHG
emissions may be more politically palatable, but none has gotten out
of committee yet.561  One proposal would add a reduced greenhouse
gas emissions facilities credit to the investment tax credit, in an
amount equal to the applicable percentage of qualified investment in
a reduced greenhouse gas emissions facility for a taxable year.562  The

555. Mark Sagoff, Some Problems with Environmental Economics, 10 ENVTL. ETHICS 55,
61 (1988).
556. See Bliese, supra note 119, at 4 (“[I]t is not the conservative’s job to help the
business world get whatever it wants.  It is the conservative’s job to try to devise a
proper system in which businesses are forced to compete (and to assume
responsibility for their actions), whether they like it or not.”).  Bliese also notes the
basic inconsistency of certain “conservative values,” citing as an example the western
rancher who considers himself a “paradigm American conservative,” and yet
vociferously opposes any attempt to increase subsidized grazing fees on Federal land
to market value.  Id.
557. Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change:  How Can National
Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL FOUND. 293, 321 (1997)
(citations omitted).
558. See Jenry D. Jacoby & A. Denny Ellerman, The “Safety Valve” and Climate Policy,
MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, REP. NO. 83 (Feb.
2002), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/reports.html#pubs; see
also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS FOR
REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS 17 (June 2001) [hereinafter CAP-AND-TRADE
EVALUATION] (presenting hybrid cap-and-trade/safety valve approach) .
559. Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 558, at 1.  But see CAP-AND-TRADE EVALUATION,
supra note 558, at 17 (describing a proposal where additional permits are sold at the
specified price, not a lower pre-determined price).
560. Jacob & Ellerman, supra note 558, at 2.
561. See infra notes 562, 565, 568, 574 and accompanying text (discussing recent
legislative proposals).
562. See S. 1293, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001) (reintroducing in virtually identical form
S. 1777, 106th Cong. (1999)).
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bill would also create a research and development tax credit for
qualified research expenses for reducing or sequestering GHG.563
This proposal would constitute a pollution subsidy.564  Another
proposal would create tradable CO[2] allowances, authorizing the
carryover and trading of unused allowances, requiring surrender of a
number of CO[2] allowances equal to the total tonnage emitted
during the calendar year and permitting the performance standard
to be exceeded if the plant has sufficient emissions credits.565
Even Senators with significant ties to fossil fuel industries support
research into GHG mitigation.566  As Robert Stavins noted:  “[t]he
ultimate test of any greenhouse policy instrument—whether domestic
or international—will be whether it is scientifically effective,
economically rational, and politically feasible.”567  Perhaps the most
acceptable compromise of political feasibility, scientific efficiency,
and economic rationality is sponsored by Senator Sam Brownback (R-
KN), who proposes to create a carbon sequestration credit.568  Under
the proposal, an eligible taxpayer could take a carbon sequestration
investment credit which would amount to $2.50, multiplied by the
number of tons of carbon sequestrated annually, limited to fifty
percent of the investment attributable to the eligible taxpayer with
respect to the sequestration project throughout such taxable year.569
The bill requires the formation of an “implementing panel,” which
would approve the sequestration project and award an aggregate

563. Id. § 2.
564. See supra notes 505-10 and accompanying text.
565. H.R. 1335, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001) (imposing an excess emissions penalty
and requiring units to offset such emissions).
566. See S. 1294, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001) (establishing, as introduced by Senator
Frank Murkowski (R-AK), a long-term Climate Technology Research, Development,
Demonstration, and Deployment Program “to foster technologies and practices
that—(1) reduce or avoid anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; (2) remove
and sequester greenhouse gases from emissions streams . . . (3) remove and
sequester greenhouse gases from the atmosphere . . . ”); id. § 6 (“(4) provide for a
pilot program for financial assistance for qualifying international energy deployment
projects”); id. § 8 (“(5) assess the status and readiness (including potential
commercialization) of each energy technology and any regulatory or market barriers
to deployment; and (6) establish an information clearinghouse to facilitate the
transfer and dissemination of the results of federally funded research and
development activities being carried out on energy technology.”).
567. Stavins, supra note 557, at 327.
568. S. 765, 107th Cong. (2001) (reintroducing Senate 2982, 106th Cong.
(2000)).
569. Id. § 2 (giving priority in allocation of credits to carbon sequestration projects
that accomplish the following objectives:  (i) native forest preservation;
(ii) reforestation of former forest land that has not been forested for at least ten
years; (iii) biodiversity enhancement; (iv) prevention of greenhouse gas emissions
through preservation of carbon storing plants and trees; (v) soil erosion
management; and (vi) soil fertility restoration).
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amount up to $200 million in tax credits each year.570  It also requires
the credit to be recaptured “if the eligible taxpayer violates a term or
condition of the approval of the project by the implementing panel
at any time” or “the eligible taxpayer adopts a practice which the
implementing panel has specified in its approval of the project as a
practice which would tend to defeat the purposes of the carbon
sequestration program.”571
A targeted credit like the carbon sequestration credit proposed by
Senator Brownback does not advance the tax policy goal of ease of
administration.572  The credit requires a new layer of bureaucracy to
determine qualification for the credit and to monitor whether a
recapture event has occurred.573  However, other bills that Senator
Brownback proposes would be effective in stimulating private
investment in carbon sequestration.  One of his proposals provides
cost-sharing payments to investors in qualified sequestration
projects.574  As discussed above, cost-sharing payments to NIPFs have
been successful in stimulating participation and investment in
forestry planning.575  Adding carbon sequestration to the list of
forestry goals and providing cost-sharing payments would help tap
the under-utilized carbon storage capacity in privately held
forestland.

570. Id.
571. See id.  The recapture percentage is set at 100%,
if the recapture event occurs during the first 10 years of the project, 66 2/3%
if the recapture event occurs during the second 10 years of the project,
33 1/3% if the recapture event occurs during the third 10 years of the
project, and 0% if the recapture event occurs at any time after the 30th year
of the project.
Id.
572. See supra note 568 and accompanying text.
573. S. 769, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001).  The bill created:
within the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the
Department of Commerce an implementing panel consisting of:  (1) the
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, (2) the
Secretary of Agriculture, (3) the Secretary of State, (4) the Secretary of
Energy, (5) the Chief of the Forest Service, and (6) representatives of
nongovernmental organizations who have an expertise and experience in
carbon sequestration practices, appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
The Chief of the Forest Service shall act as chairperson of the implementing
panel.
Id.
574. S. 785, 107th Cong. (2001).
575. See supra note 451 (discussing cost-sharing payments).
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3.  Piety, prudence, and other non-economic considerations
Eliminating subsidies for fossil fuel use576 and adding tax incentives
for carbon sequestration would encourage conservation, enhance
public welfare, possibly avert the potential catastrophe of global
warming, and may even be considered a moral imperative.  John
Bliese gives two other “conservative” reasons for adopting policies
that preserve the environment:  piety and prudence.577  He asserts
that “attempting to conquer nature is, thus, ‘theologically wrong’ and
the modern attack on nature is not merely poor policy but is nothing
less than ‘sin.’”578  He argues that piety would preclude the common
forestry practice of clear-cutting.579  An example of a pious man
atoning for his “ecosins,” Karl Peter Hasenkamp determined how
much carbon dioxide he and his family produce by driving their
automobile, heating their home, and buying energy-intensive
products and “then sent a donation to Global ReLeaf to plant
enough trees to scrub the air of a compensatory amount of CO2.”580
Prudence would require reducing GHG emissions to mitigate the
potentially significant effects of global warming.581  Similarly,
climatologist Stephen Schneider stated:
if there are things we can do to slow down this rate of change that
simultaneously will provide multiple benefits, then it would seem
logically compelling to take them seriously . . . .  Using fuel
efficiently not only reduces CO2 injection, but also cuts acid rain,
reduces the health effects of air pollution in cities, reduces the
dependence of our energy security on unreliable resources, and
improves our long-term competitiveness by cutting the energy cost
of manufactured products. 582

576. See Joe Thorndike, Tax History—Civilization at a Discount:  The Morality of Tax
Avoidance, 2002 TAX NOTES MAG. 83-84 (Apr. 29, 2002)  (retelling statement of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr.,
who called percentage depletion “the best example of legalized theft from the
United States Treasury which the revenue laws still permit”).
577. Bliese, supra note 119, at 7 (describing piety as an essential conservative
value, defined as “the humble acknowledgment that we live in a world which we did
not create, and that we inhabit it for only a brief span of time”).
578. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
579. See id.  (describing the various ecological difficulties logging causes)
(footnotes omitted).
580. Norah Deaking Davis, Decade of the Tree; Meditation on Trees and Tree Planting,
97 AM. FORESTS 21, 24-25 (Jan. 1991).
581. Bliese, supra note 119, at 12 n.76 (discussing the various deleterious effects of
the continued emission of enormous amounts of greenhouse gas into the
atmosphere, including but not limited to a rise in sea level, the flooding of coastal
cities, an increase in the number of catastrophic storms, a dramatic decrease in
agricultural productivity, and an expansion of “desertification”).
582. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING:  ARE WE ENTERING THE
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Global warming qualifies as an “ecological horror story.”583  In a
recent article, Professor Holly Doremus argued that economic,
esthetic, and ethical explanations of ecological concerns are all
limited in political persuasiveness.584  Doremus claims economic
arguments concentrate solely on the material value of nature’s
products and services, ignoring other values, and suggest that no
action need be taken until disaster looms.585  Although esthetic
arguments work well when dealing with specific spectacular locales,
such as Yellowstone or Yosemite, they are subject “to charges of
arbitrariness, elitism, and dictating tastes that should be left to
individual choice.”586  Global warming may slowly change particular
scenic places, as tropical islands sink under a rising sea,587 but
obviously many of the consequences of global warming are more
diffuse.588  Like John Bliese,589 Professor Doremus acknowledges the
value of religion in bringing conservatives into the ecological
movement.590  However, she argues that even a combination of
economic, esthetic, and ethical arguments might fail to be
persuasive.591  Ultimately, she concludes by stating that any argument

GREENHOUSE CENTURY? 283-84 (1989).
583. See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:  Toward a New
Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 19 (2000) (categorizing ecological concerns
that could potentially erase mankind from the earth as an ecological horror story).
Doremus suggests that an ecological horror story has limited political effectiveness
because it “call[s] for nature protection only at a high level of generality.”  Id.
Stating that the increased levels of carbon dioxide as a result of human behavior may
cause significant changes in global temperatures, drastically affecting sea levels,
weather patterns, and ecosystem services, Doremus emphasizes the difficulty in
translating this insight into a concrete argument against any of the many local
decisions that are made that contribute to the overall problem.  Id.
584. See id. at 14 (stating that the environmentalists have gotten what they have
asked for from legislators, the problem is that framing a request in one of these
discourses does not ask legislators for what they really want).
585. See id. at 47, 48 (stating that the key limitation of the economic discourse is
that it ignores and devalues the reasons why people want to preserve nature).
586. See id. at 49 (indicating that opponents to nature conservation can easily
defeat this discourse by convincing legislators that modifying nature will actually
increase, not decrease, its beauty).
587. See McKibben, supra note 28, at 111-12 (describing the disastrous effects of
global warming on the Maldive Islands).
588. See Doremus, supra note 583, at 51 (using the parable of Noah to illustrate the
potential extreme result of global warming in an attempt to grab the attention of
both the Judeo-Christian religious community and legislators in general).
589. See Bliese, supra note 119.
590. See Doremus, supra note 583, at 51 (identifying the notable gap that has
opened between nature advocates and the more conservative political community).
But see Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks:  Fitting Environmental
Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law,  25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 388-89
(1998) (noting that religious beliefs in an omnipotent deity that exercises power over
nature may have lowered the level of responsibility felt by humans for preserving
nature, and fostered complacency about the environment).
591. See Doremus, supra note 583, at 63 (stating that the combination of the three
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about ecological preservation must acknowledge that humans are
part of nature in a broader sense.592
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Tax policy can present an economic solution to the problem of
global warming.  The federal tax system has long been successfully
employed to apply economic pressure to accomplish social change.593
However, the reasons for changing tax policy must be not only
economic, but esthetic and ethical as well.  Providing a carbon
sequestration credit will give GHG emitters an economic incentive to
invest in forest conservation.  That investment will provide economic,
esthetic, and moral dividends.  The economic dividends of reducing
GHG emissions will also accrue to the economically disadvantaged,
who will realize a benefit in the form of reduced disease rates.
A tax policy solution to global warming has three parts:  (1) ending
the current law subsidies for fossil fuel use; (2) imposing a carbon tax
on GHG emitters; and (3) providing incentives to mitigate GHG
emissions.
A.  Repealing Current Law Subsidies for Fossil Fuels
Current law subsidies, discussed above,594 include provisions for
percentage depletion, exceptions to the general rule of capitalization
for certain exploration costs, and the EOR.595  As David Driesen
argues, “[s]ociety tends to rely on fossil fuel burning to generate

discourses could encounter conflicts and will render all of them ineffective).
592. Id. at 65.
Today the nature problem is as much about who we are, and who we aspire
to be, as it is about how to save species or ecosystems.  The new discourse,
therefore, should be as much about people as it is about nature.  It should
explain how people can fit into nature and fit nature into their lives.  It
should address not only the ways nature can shape individual identity and
character, but the ways it can shape, and be shaped by, human communities.
In order to provide guidance for local action, the discourse should focus on
ways in which frequent contact with nature can make a difference to people,
and make people different. It should acknowledge that nature can, and
should, be found even in places heavily modified by human action.  It should
recognize the potential for conflicts, helping people understand how and
when human comfort, economic advantage, and even esthetic enjoyment of
nature ought to give way to nature protection.  Finally, it should be sensitive
to the real costs of limiting or reversing human control of nature, and take
seriously the fair distribution of those costs.
Id.
593. See supra note 18 (citing Surrey & McDaniel and others, discussing valid
reasons for using federal tax policy to accomplish important governmental goals).
594. See supra notes 384-86 and accompanying text (discussing how tax code
subsidizes fossil fuels).
595. See I.R.C. § 43 (West 2002) (setting up the framework and specifically
explaining the enhanced oil recovery credit).
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energy, because fossil fuel traditionally costs less than renewable
forms of energy.  Policies tending to perpetuate this cost differential
pose a serious barrier to reducing reliance on fossil fuels. . . .”596
Ending the current law subsidies for fossil fuel use will be difficult,
given the nature of our political system.  While recent proposals for
campaign finance reform597 may limit future influence of key fossil
fuel industries by restricting their ability to contribute to political
campaigns, the entrenched nature of these special interests presents
significant challenges to reform.598  Even if campaign finance reform
curtailed all corporate political donations, politicians are still
susceptible to the political pressure of companies that employ large
numbers of constituents or invest significant amounts of money in
their districts.  Senator Mitch McConnell calls trying to push big-
money influence out of political campaigns “like putting a rock on
Jell-O.  You can squeeze it down, but it just goes in other
directions.”599  Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA), chairman of the National
Republican Congressional Committee, echoes that sentiment by
stating that “[we] are empowering interest groups to a level we have
never seen.”600  Campaign finance reform may help incumbents, who
may have pre-existing relationships with special interest groups,
remain in office.601  If the present laws are changed, industries could
be expected to argue for generous transition rules, which would
blunt the effectiveness of the changes.  Accordingly, it appears that
repealing current law subsidies is not politically practical at this time,
and it even appears likely that new proposals will continue to add
benefits for fossil fuel producers.
Applying a carbon tax and incentives for GHG reduction without
repealing existing subsidies for fossil fuel use just puts window
dressing on the greenhouse effect.  It is hard to see what could be less
economically efficient than paying for both incentives to use and

596. Driesen, supra note 273, at 47.
597. See The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.
(restricting the use of soft money, prohibiting its use by national party committees
and limiting contributions to state party committees to $10,000, which can only be
spent for get-out-the-vote and registration efforts); see also Juliet Eilperin & Helen
Dewar, Campaign Finance Bill Passes, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A3.
598. See Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign
Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33-81 (2002) (analyzing the potential results of
campaign finance reform on federal income taxation).
599. Editorial, Squash the Jell-O, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at A26.
600. See id. (discussing the difficulty in suppressing the contribution of soft money
to political organizations).
601. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 686 (1997) (arguing that limiting contributions insulates the
incumbent by limiting challengers’ ability to overcome the reputation related
advantages of incumbency).
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incentives to stop using fossil fuels.  Instead, the Code should be
amended to return to the 1991 rules limiting percentage depletion to
fifty percent of net income,602 the oil and gas industry should again be
subject to the alternative minimum tax rules,603 and marginal oil well
production should not be encouraged by preferential treatment of
expenses.604  Likewise, oil and gas exploration costs should not be
subsidized605 and, to prevent Americans from turning to cheaper,
foreign sources of fossil fuels, higher import tariffs could be
imposed.606
B.  Imposing a Carbon Tax
The United States has the lowest environmental taxes of all OECD
countries.607  Imposing a carbon tax would provide revenue for
increased reductions in other forms of taxes, while providing
collateral benefits.  The collateral benefits would include decreased
health risks, lowered chance of catastrophic flooding, and
preservation of climate dependent ecosystems.  A carbon tax would
not necessarily reduce American industry’s competitiveness.  The
OECD notes that competitive concerns are lessened when substitutes
are available (such as fuel cell technology) and when the carbon tax
revenues are recycled back into the business sector.608  A carbon tax
would provide the “stick” to go along with the “carrot” of tax
incentives for alternative energy sources and carbon sequestration.
Furthermore, pollution taxes avoid some of the pitfalls of other
market-based instruments.609  The Bush Administration appears to
favor voluntary emission reductions over mandatory caps.610  While a
carbon tax is theoretically a voluntary measure because industry can
choose to reduce emissions to avoid the tax, it seems unlikely that this
Congress would impose another tax on business, even if it planned to
recycle the revenues from that tax to reduce other tax burdens.611
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602. See supra note 179 (discussing percent depletion).
603. See supra note 187 (discussing the alternative minimum tax).
604. See supra notes 189-90 (discussing marginal oil wells/preferential treatment).
605. See supra notes 384-86 (discussing subsidies for oil and gas exploration).
606. But see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) October 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (discussing World Trade Organization’s
ability to limit tariffs).
607. OECD TAX 2001, supra note 508, at 54 fig. 4.
608. Id.
609. See supra notes 514-17 and accompanying text (discussing market based
instruments).
610. See Eric Pianin, Bush Touts Greenhouse Gas Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at
A1 (discussing the details of Bush’s proposals to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases).
611. See H.R. 438, 101st Cong., 1990 (“Resolved, that it is the sense of the House of
Representatives that Federal excise taxes upon emissions from fossil fuels or upon
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Switzerland has implemented an alternative that might be
politically possible:  the Swiss rule provides for a carbon tax to be
imposed only if industry fails to attain emission abatement objectives
by voluntary means.612  The Swiss rule is economically similar to the
cap-and-trade proposals613 combined with a safety valve discussed
above.614
Finally, the United States should listen to other countries and
cooperate in the Kyoto Protocol.615  Taking a unilateral stance against
the Protocol damages America’s reputation and may inspire other
countries to deny cooperation in other important international
initiatives.  The voluntary emissions “intensity” reductions proposed
by the President as an alternative to Kyoto cannot be relied upon to
actually reduce emissions, as the target would increase as GDP
increases.616
C.  Incentives for GHG Mitigation
A tax credit for carbon sequestration would preserve forests and
wildlife as it helps control climate change.  The President’s global
climate plan appears to support incentives for carbon sequestration,
although details have yet to be revealed.617  Carbon-intensive
industries would be persuaded to invest in aforestation and forest
conservation programs.  Such a credit would have to be carefully
crafted so that the forestry projects effectively sequester carbon.
Senator Brownback’s proposal to create an implementing panel
would provide effective safeguards.618  Making the credit transferable
could enhance its attractiveness.  Transferability facilitates low cost
compliance.619
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the carbon content of fuels should not be imposed.”).
612. OECD TAX 2001, supra note 508, at 78.
613. See supra notes 272-75 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of cap-and-
trade policy).
614. See supra notes 522-24, 562 and accompanying text (discussing “safety valve”
concept).
615. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9 (listing signatories to Kyoto Protocol).  While
the United States has signed the protocol, it has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate.
616. Ken Guggenheim, President Proposes Kyoto Option, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb.
15, 2002, at 16A (claiming that environmental groups say that Bush’s proposal to cut
GHG “intensity” by eighteen percent over the next ten years would actually mean
that more GHG will be emitted than at present).
617. See Press Release, The White House, President Bush Announces Clear Skies &
Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002) (discussing the desire to offer
incentives to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html.
618. See supra note 570 (discussing Senator Brownback’s proposal to create
implementing panel).
619. See Driesen, supra note 273, at 3 (noting, in the context of tradable emission
permits, that such trading schemes may constitute a “cheap fix” rather than a “free
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While I recommend providing a credit for domestic carbon
sequestration, a credit could be extended to international
sequestration projects.  For example, the Brazilian Amazon contains
about forty percent of the world’s remaining tropical rainforest and
has the world’s highest forest destruction rate.620  Researchers note
that carbon-offset funds paid to developing countries could help
promote forest conservation by changing the economic forces driving
forest destruction.621  A domestic credit is preferable because the
benefits of conserving forests would then stay at home, thereby
enabling local residents to forge a bond with nature.  That bond must
exist to justify taking action to protect nature and, ultimately, our
own quality of life.
The tax system is an appropriate and effective way to encourage
businesses to adopt an environmental ethic and take action to reverse
global warming.622  Strong economic, aesthetic, and moral arguments
support changing our tax system to protect the environment from
global warming.  For maximum effectiveness, all prongs of the three-
part strategy outlined above should be employed.  Anything less
would be window dressing on the greenhouse, and possibly curtains
for biodiversity, survival of species, and human health.
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lunch”).  Driesen argues further that tradable emissions permits discourage
innovation.  See id. at 4.
620. William F. Laurance et al., The Future of the Brazilian Amazon, 291 SCI. 438, 438
(2001) (noting that the average rate of forest destruction in the Brazilian Amazon is
two million hectares per year), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/
cgi/content/full/291/5503/438.
621. Id.  In addition, the preserved forest would reduce flood damage, conserve
soils, maintain a stable regional climate, preserve biodiversity, and support
indigenous communities and ecotourism activities.  See id. (explaining the advantages
of allowing carbon offset funds to be used to promote forest conservation).
622. See generally Christopher Bergin, Summers Says It’s Important to Promote “Valves”
through the Code, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-3 (Nov. 16, 2000) (reporting that
Treasury Secretary Laurence H. Summers advocated the use of the tax code to
promote social values).
